Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

United States Cold Storage (Cold Storage) and Sanitary and Improvement District No. 59 of Sarpy County (SID 59) filed complaints challenging separate annexation ordinances enacted by the City of La Vista. The ordinances at issue were ordinance 1142 and ordinance 1107, together which purported to annex SID 59 in its entirety, including an industrial area. The district court found in favor of La Vista on all claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in upholding the validity of both ordinance 1007 and ordinance 1142 adopted by La Vista for the annexation of SID 59. View "U.S. Cold Storage, Inc. v. City of La Vista" on Justia Law

Selma Development, LLC (Selma) obtained a loan from TierOne Bank (TierOne) that was guaranteed with six individual guaranty agreements. Selma later defaulted on the note. The property was sold at a trustee's sale, but the sale price was insufficient to cover the debt. TierOne brought an action seeking payment from the guarantors (Defendants). After a hearing, the trial court concluded that the fair market value of the property greatly exceeded the amount received from the trustee's sale. The court then granted TierOne's motion for summary judgment and entered judgment against Selma for $306,230 and against Defendants for $586,229. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's judgment remanded, holding (1) once the trial court determined that the fair market value of the property was greater than the amount received at the trustee's sale, it had to determine whether the Nebraska Trust Deeds Act applied to the guarantors, and accordingly, its order determining fair market value was not a final order; and (2) Defendants offered evidence which created a genuine issue of material fact regarding their defenses, precluding summary judgment. View "Selma Dev., LLC v. Great W. Bank" on Justia Law

This appeal, filed by brothers Gary and Dennis Baasch (Appellants), concerned disputed land located in Howard County. After a bench trial, the district court for Howard County denied Gary Baasch's counterclaim for quiet title. The court found that husband and wife Paul and Betty Lou Obermiller (Appellees) owned all the land they claimed to own, that the fence constructed by Appellants was on Appellees' land, and that Gary Baasch did not own any of the disputed land. The court also found that Appellants had trespassed, ordered them to remove the fence, and enjoined them from blocking access to the land owned by Appellees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded (1) Appellees were the rightful owners of the disputed land; (2) because Appellees owned the land, Appellants' intentional installation of a fence on the land constituted a continuous trespass; and (3) Appellees were entitled to an injunction. View "Obermiller v. Baasch" on Justia Law

The parties here were the surviving children of Decedent. Under Decedent's will, they were beneficiaries of a joint life estate interest in farmland. The will provided that no life tenant or remainderman could partition the property during the existence of any life tenancy. Through a codicil, Decedent later added a provision disinheriting any child who contested his will. After the probate court entered the final order in the probate proceeding, Appellees brought a partition action to divide the property. The district court dismissed the action, concluding that Appellees were not bound by the will's restriction against a partition because they had not contested the will during the probate proceeding. Appellants then filed a declaratory judgment, claiming that Appellees had forfeited their inheritance by contesting the will through the partition action. The district court dismissed Appellants' action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly determined that Appellants' partition action was not a will contest because it was filed after the estate was closed. View "Martin v. Ullsperger" on Justia Law

This was an action for partition of the real property in the estate of Ronald McKillip. At the time of his death, McKillip owned four tracts of land. McKillip's will left the property to his three daughters, "share and share alike." The probate court confirmed ownership of the real estate to the daughters in equal shares. One daughter brought an action to partition the real estate. A referee appointed by the county court determined that a partition in kind of the real estate was not possible and recommended a public sale. The court approved the report and concluded that the real estate could not be partitioned in kind "without great prejudice to the owners." The court ordered the referee to sell the real estate, and the personal representative appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the real estate should be partitioned in kind. Remanded with directions. View "In re Estate of McKillip" on Justia Law

The issue in this appeal was whether a homeowners' association may enforce a covenant prohibiting "business activities of any kind whatsoever" against homeowners who have operated a daycare in their home for a period of twelve years. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's order to the extent it found that the daycare business violated the "no business activities" covenant and to the extent it granted summary judgment on the defenses of estoppel, laches, and unclean hands; but (2) reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the homeowners' association with respect to the affirmative defense of waiver raised by the homeowners because there were genuine issues of material fact surrounding this issue. View "Farmington Woods Homeowners Ass'n v. Wolf" on Justia Law

A broker doing business as McCully Ranch Company brought suit against its client Baccaro Ranch, LLC, as seller, claiming that Baccaro breached the real estate listing agreement and that McCully was entitled to a commission from Baccaro under contract theory or, in the alternative, under the theory of unjust enrichment. In a previous appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the listing agreement was enforceable and remanded the cause for further proceedings. After trial, the district court determined that McCully was not entitled to a real estate commission. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that McCully erred in its judgment, as MuCully produced a ready, willing, and able purchaser during the term of the listing agreement on terms acceptable to Baccaro and therefore was entitled to a commission. View "McCully, Inc. v. Baccaro Ranch Co." on Justia Law

Westin Hills West Three Townhome Owners Association (the Association) appealed an order of the district court, which entered summary judgment in favor of the owner of the property, Federal National Mortgage Association, doing business as Fannie Mae (FNMA). In this foreclosure of lien case, the Association claimed that the recording of its declaration of covenants before the deed of trust gave the assessment lien recorded after the deed of trust first priority. The district court rejected this claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court did not err in granting FNMA's motion for summary judgment, as the deed of trust was superior to any assessment lien mentioned in the declaration of the Association. View "Westin Hills Townhome Owners Ass'n v. Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n" on Justia Law

Mutual of Omaha Bank filed a petition seeking declaratory judgment against Patrick and April Kassebaum, who owed the Bank payments due under several promissory notes. In particular, the Bank sought to have the district court declare the rights of the parties with respect to an assignment of unliquidated proceeds or personal injury litigation executed by the Kassebaums. The Kassebaums filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment, alleging that the assignment was ineffective. The district court denied the motion, and the matter proceeded to trial. A jury entered a verdict in favor of the Bank in the amount of $126,376. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Kassebaums' assignment was valid and enforceable under Nebraska law. View "Mut. of Omaha Bank v. Kassebaum " on Justia Law

For several years, Michael Feloney used his neighbor Robert Baye's driveway to turn his vehicle to enter his garage. Eventually Baye decided to build a retaining wall on his driveway, which prevented Feloney from using Baye's driveway. Feloney sued Baye, requesting the district court to impose a prescriptive easement on Baye's driveway for ingress and egress. The district court granted summary judgment for Baye, concluding (1) Feloney's use of the driveway was permissive under the "unenclosed land" rule, which provides an exception to the rule presuming adverseness when the use is over unenclosed land; and (2) thus Feloney could not prove the elements required for a prescriptive easement. The Supreme Court affirmed but for different reasons, holding (1) the presumption of permissiveness arises when the land is unenclosed wilderness and does not apply in urban settings such as in this case; (2) when the owner of a property has opened or maintained a right of way for his own use and the claimant's use appears to be in common with that use, the presumption arises that the use is permissive; and (3) Feloney's use of Baye's driveway was presumptively permissive under this rationale. View "Feloney v. Baye" on Justia Law