Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Mutual of Omaha Bank filed a petition seeking declaratory judgment against Patrick and April Kassebaum, who owed the Bank payments due under several promissory notes. In particular, the Bank sought to have the district court declare the rights of the parties with respect to an assignment of unliquidated proceeds or personal injury litigation executed by the Kassebaums. The Kassebaums filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment, alleging that the assignment was ineffective. The district court denied the motion, and the matter proceeded to trial. A jury entered a verdict in favor of the Bank in the amount of $126,376. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Kassebaums' assignment was valid and enforceable under Nebraska law. View "Mut. of Omaha Bank v. Kassebaum " on Justia Law

For several years, Michael Feloney used his neighbor Robert Baye's driveway to turn his vehicle to enter his garage. Eventually Baye decided to build a retaining wall on his driveway, which prevented Feloney from using Baye's driveway. Feloney sued Baye, requesting the district court to impose a prescriptive easement on Baye's driveway for ingress and egress. The district court granted summary judgment for Baye, concluding (1) Feloney's use of the driveway was permissive under the "unenclosed land" rule, which provides an exception to the rule presuming adverseness when the use is over unenclosed land; and (2) thus Feloney could not prove the elements required for a prescriptive easement. The Supreme Court affirmed but for different reasons, holding (1) the presumption of permissiveness arises when the land is unenclosed wilderness and does not apply in urban settings such as in this case; (2) when the owner of a property has opened or maintained a right of way for his own use and the claimant's use appears to be in common with that use, the presumption arises that the use is permissive; and (3) Feloney's use of Baye's driveway was presumptively permissive under this rationale. View "Feloney v. Baye" on Justia Law

Volunteers of America, Dakotas (VOA) proposed to build an apartment-style building for veterans in Omaha. To construct the building as planned, VOA applied for variances from area and use restrictions under the Omaha Municipal Code (Code). VOA applied to the zoning board of appeals of Omaha (Board) for the variances. Appellants, Field Club Home Owners League and Thornburg Place Neighborhood Association, opposed the application. The Board granted the variances, concluding that the Code created an unnecessary hardship because it did not contemplate a project like VOA's. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and vacated the district court's judgment, holding (1) the record failed to show that VOA had standing to seek the variances; but (2) because Appellants raised standing for the first time on appeal to the Court, the district court must conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue. Remanded. View "Field Club v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Omaha" on Justia Law

The underlying cases here involved Randy and Helen Strodes' unsuccessful challenge to the valuation of certain property located in Saunders County. The court of appeals concluded that the Strodes' appeals were not timely filed and dismissed their appeals for lack of jurisdiction. The jurisdictional issued hinged on whether the Strodes' motions for rehearing filed before the Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC) were timely filed and therefore tolled the time during which the Strodes could thereafter petition the court of appeals to judicially review the TERC's actions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the motions were timely filed before the TERC, and therefore, the time to petition to the court of appeals was tolled, and the court had jurisdiction over the appeals. Remanded to the TERC with directions to consider the merits of the Strodes' motions for rehearing. View "Strode v. Saunders County Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

David and Wilai Burden provided childcare services in their home. The Southwind Homeowners Association filed suit against the Burdens, alleging that the childcare services as provided violated several restrictive covenants applicable to the premises and asking that the Burdens be enjoined from providing those services. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Association, concluding that the childcare services were in violation of several restrictive covenants, and granted an injunction. The Burdens appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that summary judgment was appropriate where no genuine issues of material fact remained, and as a matter of law, the Burdens' activities on the property violated the Association's covenants. View "Southwind Homeowners Ass'n v. Burden" on Justia Law

This case concerned a city's preexisting lien on land eventually condemned. At issue was whether the city could file a motion in either county or district court for setoff of the lien amount from the condemnation award. The landowner argued (1) the city must condemn the lien, as well as the subject property, in order to claim the land in condemnation proceedings; and (2) it was error for the county court in this case to grant such a setoff because county courts lack jurisdiction to make judicial determinations in condemnation proceedings. The Supreme Court vacated in part and reversed in part, holding (1) it is appropriate for a district court to consider the question of a setoff upon a timely motion by the condemnor when the condemnor has a lien interest in the land acquired; and (2) the district court in this case erred in remanding the matter of the setoff to the county court, as the issue was properly presented to the district court through a timely motion by the city, and the district court had jurisdiction to determine the city's lien and whether and to what amount it should be deducted from the condemnation award. View "City of Waverly v. Hedrick" on Justia Law

The dispute in this case revolved around a limited partnership (Kellom Heights) formed to provide financing for the redevelopment of property. Appellees were Kellom Heights, a corporation, and limited partners in Kellom Heights. Appellants were the redevelopment corporation, the general partner, and a corporation that was a limited parter of the redevelopment corporation. Appellees became dissatisfied with the operation of Kellom Heights and filed this complaint asserting various causes of action. The district court found for Appellees on certain causes of action and entered a judgment in their favor in the amount of $918,228 plus costs and interest. The court also awarded attorney fees and denied Appellees' request for prejudgment interest. The Supreme in part reversed and remanded, holding (1) the district court erred when it rejected Appellants' statute of limitations defenses as to certain claims; and (2) the court erred in ruling that additional supervisory fees were not permitted. The Court affirmed the remainder of the district court's judgment. View "Fitzgerald v. Cmty. Redevelopment Corp." on Justia Law

A public power and irrigation district (District) filed an action against a development and other sublessees (collectively, Development) to quiet title to land owned by District and leased by Development. Development filed motions to dismiss the complaint, arguing that District's complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be grante. The district court sustained the motions and overruled Development's motion for attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in granting Development's motions to dismiss because (1) the allegations in District's complaint, taken as true, were plausible and thus were sufficient to suggest that District had presented a justiciable controversy, and (2) the motions to dismiss filed in this case provided no notice that Development was asserting the affirmative defenses of judicial estoppel, collateral estoppel and res judicata. Remanded. View "Central Neb. Pub. Power v. Jeffrey Lake Dev." on Justia Law

The County of Dixon did work on Landowners' property, including grading and removing fences and trees, as part of a road maintenance project. Landowners eventually brought an inverse condemnation proceeding. The district court awarded Landowners damages of $4,049 and attorney fees in the amount of $5,600. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the portion of the court of appeals' decision that affirmed the award of attorney fees, holding that the court of appeals misconstrued the controlling statutes; and (2) otherwise affirmed. Remanded with directions to award reasonable attorney fees under both Neb. Rev. Stat. 76-720 and 76-726(2). View "Armstrong v. County of Dixon" on Justia Law

This appeal involved an allegedly void trust that was executed and recorded in 1979 and to which several parcels of real property were purportedly deeded. The trust terms provided that it would terminate in 2004. In 2008, the trustees of the questioned trust deeded the property to the trust's purported beneficiaries. One of the settlor's children sued to set aside the trust and deeds and to quiet title in the property to the settlor's heirs at law. The district court determined that the plaintiff's claims were barred by the statute of limitations. At issue on appeal was when the applicable statute of limitations began to run. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute of limitations for the plaintiff's claims had expired. View "Newman v. Liebig" on Justia Law