Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the county court determining as a matter of law that testator Michael R. Brinkman's will was ambiguous with regard to the status of his daughter, Nicole Brinkman, and that Nicole was included under the will as a child, an issue, and an heir of Michael, holding that there was no error by the county court.After Michael died, Nicole sought a declaration of her rights under her father's will, claiming that she was entitled to one-half of the residual share of her father's testamentary estate. Michael's son, Seth Michael Brinkman, and the personal representative for the estate claimed that Michael had disinherited Nicole. The county court determined that the will was patently ambiguous with regard to whether Michael specifically intended to disinherit Nicole and that Nicole was entitled to inherit under the provisions of the will. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the county court correctly found that Nicole was not disinherited and that she should receive as a child, an issue, and an heir of Michael pursuant to the terms of the will. View "In re Estate of Brinkman" on Justia Law

In this proceeding brought by the daughters of Gale Marsh to determine the amount of inheritance tax due, the Supreme Court affirmed the county court's determination of the ownership interest of Marsh's revocable trust in a limited liability company valued at more than $12 million, holding that the court did not err in determining that assignments signed by Marsh rather than the trustees were valid.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) published notice of the evidentiary hearing was not a prerequisite of the County court's subject matter jurisdiction, and even if notice was not published, the County did not suffer prejudice; (2) the county court did not abuse its discretion in overruling the County's motion for a continuance; and (3) the court's determination that ownership interests were validly transferred from the trust conformed to the law, was supported by competent evidence, and was neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. View "In re Estate of Marsh" on Justia Law

In this county court probate case, the Supreme Court affirmed as modified the judgment of the probate court determining that a son must reimburse his mother's estate $190,550, holding that, except as to the son's statute of limitations defense, there was no merit to the son's appeal or the estate's cross-appeal.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the county court correctly exercised jurisdiction over this proceeding; (2) there was no merit to the estate's cross-appeal; (3) except as to the defense of the statute of limitations, the son's appeal lacked merit; and (4) upon this Court's de novo review, the statute of limitations barred the estate's recovery for transactions that occurred before February 1, 2012. View "In re Estate of Adelung" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the county court requiring Webster County to pay fees and expenses to a court-appointed successor personal representative, holding that the court lacked the authority to order the County to pay the successor personal representative fees.In its order, the court found that the court-appointed successor personal representative had served for two and one-half years, that his fees were fair and reasonable, that the estate was insolvent, and that the amount owed by the heirs was likely uncollectible. The court then ordered that Webster County pay the amount of $6,455 to the personal representative. The Supreme Court vacated the order, holding that the court lacked the statutory authority to order the County pay the successor personal representative's fees. View "In re Estate of Hutton" on Justia Law

In this quiet title action, The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Joy Arnold and quieting title in favor of the Estate of Beverly Freiden, holding that Michael Walz, a tenant of Beverly's real property, did not exercise an option to purchase the property associated with the lease, and the real property remained in the Estate.Walz leased real property from Beverly under a lease that included an option to purchase the property at any time before the end date of the lease. Beverly died during Walz' tenancy. After the term of Walz' initial option ended, Walz and Jon Freiden executed several lease modifications that purportedly extended Walz' option to buy the real property. When Walz claimed he owned the property, Arnold, the personal representative of the Estate, petitioned the district court to quiet title to the property in the Estate. The district court granted summary judgment for Arnold. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no genuine issue of material fact with respect to the fact that the real property remained in the Estate, and therefore, the district court did not err when it quieted title in the Estate. View "Arnold v. Walz" on Justia Law

In this will contest, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision granting summary judgment determining that the decedent's will was valid, holding that where the bill of exceptions did not contain the proponent's evidence there was no evidence to support the summary judgment for the proponent.After Appellee filed an application for informal probate in county court Appellant filed an objection. The matter was transferred to district court, which entered summary judgment determining that the decedent left a valid will. Appellant appealed. The bill of exceptions, however, contained only Appellant's evidence, and Appellee's evidence did not appear in the bill. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the matter, holding that because Appellee did not produce her evidence in a manner so as to be included in a bill of exceptions she effectively failed to make a prima facie case. View "Bohling v. Bohling" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the county court on an application for direction that found money Sheila Radford gave Mary Radford prior to Sheila's death was an ademption of Mary's interest in Sheila's trust, holding that the county court erred in finding the payment from Sheila to Mary constituted an ademption of Mary's share under Sheila's trust.On appeal, Mary challenged the court's application of the ademption statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. 30-2350, to the trust, and alternatively, claimed the court erred in finding that it was Sheila's intent to have the money be an ademption of Mary's interest. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the payment could not be a section 30-2350 ademption because Mary was not a devisee under Sheila's will; and (2) Sheila's payment to Mary could not constitute an ademption by satisfaction because Mary was a beneficiary under the trust and not a devisee under the will. View "In re Estate of Radford" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the county court construing Joan Jane Barger's will, holding that the court did not err.In this contest between family members over the decedent's will, the Supreme Court held that the county court did not err by (1) considering extrinsic evidence after failing to determine whether the will was ambiguous; (2) finding that Joan's intent was to distribute her property designated as property held by a trust even though the trust had been terminated; (3) determining the trust was terminated prior to Joan's death; and (4) finding that certain children were not prohibited from taking under article V of the will due to an earlier will contest. View "In re Estate of Barger" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the county court denying the petition to remove a trustee filed by certain trust beneficiaries, holding that the beneficiaries failed to prove that the trustee's removal was not inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust.The trust beneficiaires in this case filed a petition to modify the trust to remove Elkhorn Valley Bank & Trust as trustee and approve Jennifer Lea Wilson as successor trustee. The county court issued a written order denying the petition to remove the Bank as trustee, determining that removal would be inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that removal was inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust, and therefore, the county court did not err in denying the beneficiaries' motion. View "In re Trust Created by Fenske" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the county court accepting the resignation of the trustee for a trust fund created for the perpetual care and maintenance of the Sunset Memorial Park Mausoleum, ordering the trustee to pay trustee fees, attorney fees, costs, and expenses incurred during the prosecution of the petition, and failing to provide for future trust management.The Trustee in this case sought to terminate the perpetual care trust due to circumstances not anticipated at the time the trust was created. Myrtle Hughbanks, Sunset Memorial Park Cemetery Association, Inc., and others opposed terminating the trust. The county court found that the Cemetery Association lacked standing and accepted the resignation of the Trustee. The Cemetery Association and Hughbanks appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the county court's denial of the parties' motions for attorney fees but reversed the order of discharge and associated award of fees, holding (1) in addition to Hughbanks, the Cemetery Association possessed standing; and (2) due to the perpetual nature of a mausoleum trust, the county court erred in granting the Trustee's request for resignation and discharge without the Trustee's having identified and requested the appointment of a successor trustee. View "Bank of the West v. Sunset Memorial Park Cemetery Ass'n" on Justia Law