Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Marvin Shell died in 2012. Jane Voboril, Shell’s niece, and Sharon Vanosdall, Shell’s sister-in-law, were the two beneficiaries of Shell’s will. The distributions to Voboril and Vanosdall were subject to different amounts of inheritance taxes. Voboril’s lawyer, however, argued that the will showed Shell’s intent to treat inheritance taxes as an expense of the estate. The county court agreed and entered an order treating the inheritance taxes as an expense of the estate. Vanosdall appealed, arguing that the will did not clearly express this intent. the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the will showed Shell’s intent to treat inheritance taxes as an expense of his estate. View "In re Estate of Shell" on Justia Law

The settlor (Settlor) directed her attorney to prepare an irrevocable trust, the corpus of which was three insurance policies, that named the attorney as the trustee (Trustee). The policies were payable on the Settlor’s death to the Trustee for the benefit of the Settlor’s daughters. The Trustee executed all three insurance policy applications. Each application provided the insurer with a false address for the trust. The policies subsequently lapsed for nonpayment of the premiums due. Although the insurers issued notices of nonpayment of the premiums, the Settlor, Trustee, and beneficiaries did not receive notice of the lapse until two years later. The Settlor and her daughters (collectively, Appellants) sued the Trustee, alleging that he breached his fiduciary duties as trustee and, as a result, the policies lapsed, resulting in the loss of the initial premiums. The trial court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the Trustee did not have a duty to pay the premiums or to notify anyone of the nonpayment of the premiums. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Trustee had a statutory duty, which arose when the insurers issued the notices of nonpayment of the premiums, to inform Appellants of the material facts necessary for them to protect their interests. View "Rafert v. Meyer" on Justia Law

Edward Stuchlik died testate and was survived by his wife, Margaret Stuchlik, and five children, including John Stuchlik and Kenneth Stuchlik. John sought removal of Margaret as the personal representative of the Edward Stuchlik estate and removal of Margaret and Kenneth as cotrustees of the Edward Stuchlik Family Trust. John asked the court to appoint him as personal representative and trustee in their place. The county court entered judgment in favor of Margaret and Kenneth. The Supreme Court affirmed in most respects and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) because Margaret was waiting to be discharged as personal representative pending the outcome of this action, any action for her removal as personal representative was without merit; (2) John’s arguments that Margaret and Kenneth should be removed as costrustees based on a theory of a contract for wills or an oral trust between Margaret and Edward were irrelevant to the petition to remove a costrustee; but (3) the court erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider allegations pertaining to the extent Margaret’s and Kenneth’s activities as general partners of a partnership related to their fitness as costrustees. View "In re Estate of Stuchlik" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal were certain parcels of land included in the corpus of a trust established by Virginia Waechter. In 2010, Virginia sold the parcels as trustee of the trust to her daughter Peggy Orr and her daughter’s husband, Jeff Orr. Plaintiffs, Virginia’s son and other contingent beneficiaries of the trust filed a complaint asking that a constructive trust be placed on the real estate and alleging that Virginia was not competent to sell the land to Peggy and Jeff and that the sale showed indications of fraud. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that Plaintiffs lacked standing to seek a constructive trust and that Neb. Rev. Stat. 30-3855(a) bars a cause of action for intentional interference with an inheritance or gift. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs lacked standing to impose a constructive trust because, under case law and section 30-3855(a), they had only a mere expectancy; and (2) state law does not recognize a tort for intentional interference with an inheritance or gift. View "Manon v. Orr" on Justia Law

In 1998, a trust was established for the care of Evelyn A. Nabity. In 2011, Evelyn amended the trust agreement that changed the identity of the trustees. In 2012, Evelyn’s son, Robert, petitioned for the appointment of a guardian, conservator, and guardian ad litem for Evelyn and for registration and administration of the trust. Robert argued that Evelyn had not been competent to amend the trust agreement and requested a determination of the proper trustees. In the trust administration proceeding, the county court found that Evelyn was not competent to execute the trust amendment and entered an order declaring Robert and his brother cotrustees. In the guardianship proceeding, the county court set aside a health care power of attorney Evelyn executed in 1998 and ordered Robert to serve as Evelyn’s permanent guardian and conservator. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was clear and convincing evidence that Evelyn was incompetent to execute the amendments to the trust agreement; and (2) the appointment of a permanent guardian and conservator for Evelyn did not deny her the benefit of a valid health care power of attorney. View "In re Trust Created by Nabity" on Justia Law

After Kim Abbott, a beneficiary of her grandfather’s trust, learned that the trust had become “non-economical,” she filed a complaint against the trustees, alleging that the trustees had breached their fiduciary duties to maintain trust records, to properly inform and report to the beneficiaries, and to administer the trust in good faith. The county court dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the trustees had breached their duty to inform and report but the breach was harmless. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the Court of Appeals (1) did not err in ultimately concluding that the trustees’ breach of their duty was harmless; but (2) erred in concluding that the annual schedule K-1 tax reports were sufficient to reasonably inform beneficiaries of the trust and its administration. Remanded. View "In re Rolf H. Brennemann Testamentary Trust " on Justia Law

Ralph Greb died in 2010. At issue in this case was the distribution of Ralph’s estate in kind to two beneficiaries, his son, Richard, and his daughter, Nanette. The county court overruled Richard’s and Nanette’s objections and approved the proposed distribution of the estate. Nanette appealed and Richard cross-appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the county court’s order of distribution, holding (1) two multiple-party bank accounts were correctly excluded from the probate estate because Nanette failed to meet her burden of proving a lack of survivorship rights; (2) because a corporation dissolved by the state for failure to pay taxes continued as a de facto corporation, Ralph’s gifts of corporate stock during his lifetime were not part of his probate estate; and (3) because Nanette was not obligated to pay indebtedness owed to the estate by her spouse, the county court did not err in ordering distribution of the asset in kind to both Richard and Nanette. View "In re Estate of Greb" on Justia Law

Constance created an LLC and a revocable trust. Constance transferred her real estate to the LLC and directed that, upon her death, her remaining property be transferred to the Trust. After Constance's death, her son David, as trustee of the Trust and as manager of the LLC, filed a declaratory action to allow the sale of the real estate pursuant to the Trust. Constance's other children, as beneficiaries of the Trust and members of the LLC, filed counterclaims for a declaratory judgment that the LLC should govern disposition of the real property and sought an accounting. The district court determined that the Trust would control the disposition and that David did not breach his fiduciary duties. The court of appeals affirmed. David subsequently moved for attorney fees and postjudgment interest, which the district court granted. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's order and denied the beneficiaries' request for attorney fees, holding (1) the award of attorney fees and costs was outside the scope of the mandate given by the court of appeals, and therefore, the district court was without jurisdiction to consider the motion; and (2) the beneficiaries were not entitled to attorney fees on the ground that David's motion was frivolous. View "Klingelhoefer v. Monif" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, relatives of Decedent, sought Attorney's services in the administration of Decedent's estate. Plaintiffs later brought this professional negligence case against Attorney and his firm (Defendants), claiming that Attorney failed properly to disclose a conflict of interest to Plaintiffs, Attorney erroneously advised Plaintiffs to execute disclaimers that should be regarded as invalid and ineffective, and Attorney caused the estate to incur additional taxes by failing to include the purportedly disclaimed property in the qualified terminable interest property election on the estate tax return. The district court (1) entered judgment in favor of Defendants on the conflict of interest claim, and (2) dismissed as time barred Plaintiffs' claims regarding the disclaimed property and associated tax return elections. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment regarding the conflict of interest; but (2) reversed the judgments on Plaintiffs' remaining claims, holding that the district court erred when it concluded that the statute of limitations barred the claims. Remanded. View "Guinn v. Murray" on Justia Law

After Decedent died in 2010, her son, Robert, was appointed the personal representative of her estate. After Robert filed an inventory of estate property and a proposed schedule of distribution, Christy, the daughter of Decedent's other son, filed a motion for supervised administration, arguing that pursuant to Decedent's will, she was left an interest in Decedent's land but that Robert did not include this interest in the schedule of distribution. At issue before the probate court was what portion of Christy's interest in the estate was purchased by Mark, Robert's son, at a bankruptcy auction in 1998. The probate court concluded that Christy's interest in Decedent's share of the land was not transferred to Mark following the bankruptcy sale and approved Christy's motion for supervised administration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the probate court did not err in finding Christy's motion for supervised administration tolled Christy's thirty-day deadline to object to the distribution of assets; (2) the probate court had jurisdiction to resolve the question of what was sold at Christy's bankruptcy auction as it related to Decedent's estate; and (3) the probate court made the correct determination regarding what Christy was entitled to through Decedent's estate. View "In re Estate of Odenreider" on Justia Law