Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Appellant’s wrongful discharge claim on the ground that it was barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion.Appellant filed a complaint against her former employer, alleging violation of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and wrongful discharge in violation of Nebraska law and public policy. A federal district court granted summary judgment for Defendant, concluding that the claim was governed by the Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act (NFEPA) and was not a general state law tort claim for wrongful discharge. Appellant’s title VII claim remained pending in the federal court. Appellant then filed the instant complaint against Defendant in the district court for Lancaster County, alleging wrongful discharge “in violation of Nebraska law and public policy.” The district court dismissed the wrongful discharge claim, concluding that it was barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion because the federal district court had already decided the claim on the merits and dismissed it as time barred. The Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hill v. AMMC, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions of aggravated driving under the influence and displaying unlawful or fictions license plates. The Court held that the district court did not err in (1) there was probable cause to support Defendant’s arrest for operating a motor vehicle to avoid arrest; (2) law enforcement had probable cause to arrest Defendant for driving under the influence (DUI); and (3) the court did not err in finding Defendant guilty of second-offense DUI and unlawful/fictitious display of license plates. View "State v. Petsch" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Defendant’s postconviction motion on the grounds that the motion was filed outside the one-year limitations period under Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-3001(4).In 2011, Defendant pled no contest to one count of attempted assault on an officer and admitted he was a habitual criminal. In 2013, Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief, alleging that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a direct appeal after Defendant asked that he do so. The district court dismissed the motion, finding that that motion was time barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the files and records affirmatively showed that Defendant’s postconvcition motion was time barred. View "State v. Conn" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction for possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person, holding that the district court did not err when it overruled Defendant’s motion to reveal the identity of a confidential informant and when it admitted a gun into evidence over Defendant’s objection.Specifically, the Court held (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that it did not appear that the confidential informant may be able to give testimony necessary to a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence on the charges pending against Defendant; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that there was adequate foundation to allow the gun into evidence. View "State v. Blair" on Justia Law

Because third degree sexual assault is not a lesser-included offense of first degree sexual assault, the juvenile court erred in adjudicating Jordan B. based on its finding that he committed third degree sexual assault when the only law violation alleged in the petition was first degree sexual assault.The county attorney filed a petition asking the juvenile court to adjudicate Jordan as a juvenile who committed an act that would constitute a felony pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(2). The felony alleged was first degree sexual assault, as described in Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-319. The juvenile court found that the State failed to prove Jordan committed acts constituting first degree sexual assault as charged. Nevertheless, the court raised sua sponte the “lesser included offense” of third degree sexual assault and adjudicated Jordan as a child within the meaning of section 43-247(1). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the juvenile court adjudicated Jordan on grounds for which he had no notice, in violation of the Due Process Clauses of the Nebraska and United States Constitutions. View "In re Interest of Jordan B." on Justia Law

Because third degree sexual assault is not a lesser-included offense of first degree sexual assault, the juvenile court erred in adjudicating Jordan B. based on its finding that he committed third degree sexual assault when the only law violation alleged in the petition was first degree sexual assault.The county attorney filed a petition asking the juvenile court to adjudicate Jordan as a juvenile who committed an act that would constitute a felony pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(2). The felony alleged was first degree sexual assault, as described in Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-319. The juvenile court found that the State failed to prove Jordan committed acts constituting first degree sexual assault as charged. Nevertheless, the court raised sua sponte the “lesser included offense” of third degree sexual assault and adjudicated Jordan as a child within the meaning of section 43-247(1). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the juvenile court adjudicated Jordan on grounds for which he had no notice, in violation of the Due Process Clauses of the Nebraska and United States Constitutions. View "In re Interest of Jordan B." on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal from a sentence imposing both imprisonment and postrelease supervision was the fees and payments required under the postrelease supervision order.Defendant entered a no contest plea to a felony. The district court imposed a sentence of one year in prison followed by eighteen months of postrelease supervision. The court ordered Defendant to pay a number of fees in connection with the postrelease supervision, including an administrative enrollment fee, a monthly programming fee, and a monthly fee for chemical testing. The court also ordered Defendant to pay costs associated with any counseling, evaluations, or treatment undertaken at the direction of Defendant’s postrelease supervision officer. Defendant appealed, arguing that the court abused its discretion by imposing costs and fees of postrelease supervision upon her. The Supreme Court affirmed the sentence, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its imposition of conditions of postrelease supervision regarding fees and payments. View "State v. Dill" on Justia Law

In this appeal from a default judgment, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision denying Appellant’s motion for reconsideration or, in the alternative, to set aside the default judgment on the basis of several defenses.Appellee filed a breach of contract action against Appellant. When Appellant did not file a responsive pleading, the district court granted Appellee’s motion for default judgment. Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration or, in the alternative, to set aside the default judgment. In support of the motion to set aside, Appellant alleged several defenses, including lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. The district court overruled Appellant’s motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant made a showing sufficient to warrant setting aside the default judgment because Appellant made prompt application to set aside the default and demonstrated at least one meritorious defense in support of its motion. View "Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance Co., Inc. v. Oceanside Laundry, LLC" on Justia Law

At issue was whether Defendant implicitly consented to a mistrial and, if not, whether there was manifest necessity for a mistrial.In this criminal case, the trial court declared a mistrial after determining that defense counsel’s questioning of a witness was improper and that the prejudice could not be remedied by a curative jury instruction. Defense counsel did not explicitly object to a mistrial but apologized for the improper questioning and presented for the court’s consideration three cases where curative instructions were held to be sufficient to remedy improper references to inadmissible evidence. Defendant then filed a plea in bar alleging that there was no manifest necessity to declare a mistrial. The court denied the plea in bar on the ground that manifest necessity justified the mistrial. The Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds, holding that Defendant consented to the mistrial, and therefore, the district court did not err in denying the plea in bar. View "State v. Leon-Simaj" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentences for first degree murder, unlawful discharge of a firearm, and other crimes, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.Specifically, the Court held (1) the trial court’s instruction regarding transferred intent, when read with all the instructions, did not misstate the law; (2) there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s conviction for unlawful discharge of a firearm; and (3) Defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel were either without merit or could not be determined based on the record. View "State v. Wells" on Justia Law