Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was whether a lease clause requiring a remainderman that leased real estate from a life tenant for one year ending on October 31, 2015 to pay unspecified real estate taxes made her liable for 2015 taxes that became due and payable on December 31. The life tenant died in August. The county court determined that the lease agreements controlled the lessor’s and lessee’s respective obligations to pay taxes, found the leases to be ambiguous, and ordered the life tenant’s Estate to reimburse the remaindermen. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that, because the Estate did not own the property on December 31, 2015, and the leases did not obligate the decedent to pay taxes that had not yet become due, the county court erred in ordering the estate to reimburse the remaindermen for the real estate taxes they paid. View "In re Estate of Karmazin" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a lease clause requiring a remainderman that leased real estate from a life tenant for one year ending on October 31, 2015 to pay unspecified real estate taxes made her liable for 2015 taxes that became due and payable on December 31. The life tenant died in August. The county court determined that the lease agreements controlled the lessor’s and lessee’s respective obligations to pay taxes, found the leases to be ambiguous, and ordered the life tenant’s Estate to reimburse the remaindermen. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that, because the Estate did not own the property on December 31, 2015, and the leases did not obligate the decedent to pay taxes that had not yet become due, the county court erred in ordering the estate to reimburse the remaindermen for the real estate taxes they paid. View "In re Estate of Karmazin" on Justia Law

In this dispute over the calculation of he two-year statute of limitations under the State Tort Claims Act (STCA), the Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts that the action was time barred.Plaintiff filed a complaint against the State, the Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska, and Nebraska Medicine (collectively, the State), alleging invasion of privacy. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s action as barred under the STCA statute of limitations set out in Neb. Rev. Stat. 81-8,227(1). The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err in concluding that Plaintiff’s complaint was time barred under section 81-8,227(1). View "Komar v. State" on Justia Law

In this dispute over the calculation of he two-year statute of limitations under the State Tort Claims Act (STCA), the Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts that the action was time barred.Plaintiff filed a complaint against the State, the Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska, and Nebraska Medicine (collectively, the State), alleging invasion of privacy. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s action as barred under the STCA statute of limitations set out in Neb. Rev. Stat. 81-8,227(1). The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err in concluding that Plaintiff’s complaint was time barred under section 81-8,227(1). View "Komar v. State" on Justia Law

At issue in these forty appeals, consolidated into four for purposes of appeal, was whether the individual landowners were entitled to an award of attorney fees under Neb. Rev. Stat. 76-726.Just prior to TransCanada Keystone Pipeline, LP’s eminent domain proceedings seeking to acquire right-of-way and other property interests in constructing an oil pipeline, certain property owners - including some of the same landowners involved in these eminent domain proceedings - filed a constitutional challenge to the pipeline route. TransCanada then dismissed its condemnation petitions, except that the Holt County petitions were dismissed in order for TransCanada to pursue approval of a pipeline route by the Public Service Commission. The landowners filed motions for attorney fees and costs. In each case, the county court granted the requests for attorney fees. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that none of the landowners established that they were entitled to attorney fees under the circumstances. View "TransCanada Keystone Pipeline, LP v. Nicholas Family Ltd. Partnership" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the postconviction court denying Appellant’s motion for postconviction relief asserting twelve acts of ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the motion for postconviction relief without holding an evidentiary hearing or appointing counsel. On appeal, the Supreme Court held (1) Appellant was not entitled to relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims; (2) Defendant’s claims of sentencing error did not warrant an evidentiary hearing; and (3) because Appellant’s postconviction motion presented no justiciable issues for postconviction relief, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion for appointment of counsel. View "State v. Haynes" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant’s sentence imposed on his conviction for use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony and affirmed his convictions for first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony.After a jury found Defendant guilty, the district court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment on the murder count. On the second count, the court initially imposed a consecutive prison sentence of fifty to fifty years but, after a sidebar conference requested by defense counsel, reduced the term to twenty to twenty years. The Supreme Court held (1) as to Defendant’s assignments of error, any error was harmless; and (2) there was plain error in the sentence imposed on the second count because the trial court’s initial sentence was validly imposed and took effect as soon as it was pronounced, and therefore, the court’s subsequent reduction of the term of imprisonment was a nullity. View "State v. Kidder" on Justia Law

In these two consolidated appeals stemming from marital dissolution proceedings, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ determination that a district court must state specific findings in order to set aside or modify a referee’s report authorized by chapter 25 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes as clearly against the weight of the evidence. The Court held that nothing in the plain language of Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-1131 requires explicit findings, and therefore, a district court may implicitly find that a referee’s findings are against the clear weight of the evidence. In the second appeal, the assigned errors flowing from contempt proceedings lacked merit, and therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Becher v. Becher" on Justia Law

Two interim juvenile court orders, one dictating an out-of-home placement and the other continuing it, complied with the statutory requirements of Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-251.01(7)(a) and (b).After in-home services proved ineffective, the juvenile court ordered Juvenile’s placement at Omaha Home for Boys. The court then continued this interim order and continued the dispositional hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the juvenile court made the correct statutory findings that all community-based resources had been exhausted and that maintaining Juvenile in his home presented a significant risk of harm to him or the community. View "In re Interest of Dana H." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal brought by a juvenile challenging an order of the juvenile court ordering that he be removed from his family home and placed in Boys Town, holding that the juvenile court’s order was not a final order.On appeal, the juvenile argued that there was insufficient evidence for the juvenile court to find that, under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-251.01(7), all community-based resources had been exhausted and that maintaining him in his home presented a significant risk of harm to him or the community. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the order appealed from did not substantially affect the juvenile’s right to home placement and was thus not a final order under Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-1902(2). View "In re Interest of Zachary B." on Justia Law