Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Margaret and Hannah lived together in a romantic relationship in Nebraska. They moved to Texas, in 2003 where they legally changed their last names to “Whilde.” In 2010, Hannah gave birth to a baby, conceived by artificial insemination. Margaret did not adopt the child. In 2011, Hannah returned to Otoe with the baby. Ultimately, a Nebraska court determined that Nebraska law applied but considered the effect of a Texas court’s temporary order granting Margaret rights, and concluded that an in loco parentis relationship “at one time did exist” between Margaret and the child but had ceased after Margaret returned to Texas. The court awarded sole custody to Hannah. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed. Margaret later sought to vacate an order changing the child’s name to Hannah's family name. She argued that she was entitled to notice by certified mail as a “noncustodial parent” under Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-21,271(2) and had not received such notice. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed rejection of Margaret’s motion. The order extinguishing Margaret’s rights was effective at all relevant times: when Hannah filed the name change petition, when she published notice, when the petition was considered and granted by the district court, and when Margaret filed her motion to vacate the name change order. View "In re Change of Name of Whilde" on Justia Law

While dating April, Johnson made threats concerning April’s relationship with her former husband Edward. The night before April’s death, Johnson was upset that Edward had repaired April’s van. April’s neighbors reported hearing loud arguing in the early morning hours of December 11, 2011. On December 12, April did not report to work. Officers found April’s body. A pathologist opined that her death was a homicide caused by a stab wound to her abdomen and suffocation, On December 15, Johnson was arrested in Michigan driving April’s van, which contained Johnson’s blood-stained T-shirt and shoes. The DNA matched April’s profile. Johnson was convicted of first-degree murder, use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person. On appeal, Johnson unsuccessfully claimed that the court erred by admitting cumulative, gruesome autopsy photographs; brought a Batson challenge; and challenged testimony and exhibits about Johnson’s DNA profile. Johnson’s motion for post-conviction relief alleged ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to move for discharge on the basis of speedy trial, failing to object to the prosecutor’s voir dire comments, failing to properly examine various witnesses, failing to argue after moving for a directed verdict, failing to object to the state’s closing argument, failing to sever one count, and failing to allow Johnson to testify. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. Johnson failed to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate violation of his constitutional rights. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Margaret and Hannah lived together in a romantic relationship in Lincoln, Nebraska. They moved to Austin, Texas, in 2003. In 2010, Hannah gave birth to a baby, conceived by artificial insemination. Margaret did not adopt the child. The relationship declined. In 2011, Hannah returned to Otoe with the baby. A Texas court entered a temporary order, finding that Margaret had legal standing to assert rights with respect to the child and setting forth certain rights and duties that the women would share. In 2014, Hannah sought to register the Texas order (Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-1226) and requested that the Nebraska court set aside the Texas order and modify custody. Margaret was living in Nebraska. No effort had been taken to obtain entry of a final order in Texas. Margaret returned to Texas. Her contact with the child was minimal thereafter, Hannah moved to suspend Margaret’s contact with the child because of Margaret’s mental health issues. The Nebraska court preliminarily ordered that there be no contact. The Texas court relinquished its jurisdiction. The Nebraska court determined that Nebraska law applied but considered the effect of the Texas court’s determination and concluded that an in loco parentis relationship “at one time did exist” between Margaret and the child but had ceased after Margaret returned to Texas. The court awarded sole custody to Hannah. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed, stating that in loco parentis status is transitory and may be lost. View "Whilde v. Whilde" on Justia Law

An insured obtained life insurance policies and named her trust as the owner. Her insurance agent stole the renewal premiums. The policies lapsed. The insured and the trust’s beneficiaries sued the trustee; the trustee brought a third-party claim against the agent. The court bifurcated the trial. Pursuant to a jury verdict on the first stage, the court entered an order against the trustee. Before trial on the third-party claim, the court certified its order as final. The Nebraska Supreme Court dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the certification under Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-1902 was an abuse of discretion. The court expressed concern with the propriety of the court’s determination that there was no just reason for delay. The intent behind the statute was to prevent interlocutory appeals, not to make them easier. The court should ordinarily make specific findings setting forth the reasons for its order. Here, the court’s order merely used the language of the statute and did not explain why certification was appropriate. The court noted the interrelationship of the claims and that a delay of three-four months before the third-party complaint would be ready for trial would not likely cause an unusual hardship. View "Rafert v. Meyer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellants’ complaint without leave to amend. The complaint stemmed from Nebraska Department of Natural Resources’s (DNR) issuance of closing notices to holders of surface water permits, which barred Appellants from using the surface waters of the Republican River and its tributaries to irrigate their crops. Appellants alleged claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and that they had been subject to an inverse condemnation. Appellants also alleged that their due process rights had been violated and sought restitution. The district court dismissed the amended complaint pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 6-1112(b)(6) without leave to amend. The Supreme Court held (1) Appellants failed to state a claim for inverse condemnation; but (2) the district court erred in failing to find that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Appellants’ claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983, due process, and restitution. The court remanded with directions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction those claims barred by sovereign immunity. View "Cappel v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the juvenile court adjudicating Appellant for violating a Lincoln city ordinance prohibiting disturbing the peace. The juvenile court found that the State had proved the allegations in the petition beyond a reasonable doubt, specifically, that Appellant knowingly or intentionally disturbed the peace of a high school security officer by engaging in fighting. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a school security officer and campus supervisor may be an appropriate victim of disturbing the peace; and (2) the evidence adduced sufficiently supported the juvenile court’s adjudication. View "In re Interest of Elainna R." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court denying Petitioner’s motion for postponement of fees. At the same time he filed his motion, Petitioner presented the district court clerk with a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court treated the motion to postpone fees as a request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) and denied the request, concluding that Petitioner’s underlying petition for a writ of habeas corpus was frivolous. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the cause with instructions, holding that the district court erred in treating Petitioner’s motion as one for IFP status where Petitioner did not seek IFP status and was not required to obtain IFP status in order to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. View "Buggs v. Frakes" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions for unlawful discharge of a firearm and use of a weapon to commit a felony and the sentences imposed of twenty to thirty years for unlawful discharge of a firearm and an additional term of imprisonment for twenty to thirty years for use of a weapon to commit a felony, to run consecutively to each other. The court held (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it sustained the State’s motion to consolidate Defendant’s trial with that of his codefendant; (2) the district court did not err when it overruled Defendant’s Batson challenge to the jury selection process; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the jury access to surveillance video during deliberations; (4) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions; and (5) the district court did not impose excessive sentences. View "State v. Wofford" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Landlord in this negligence action brought by Tenant seeking to recover damages for injuries she sustained when falling on the entry step of the single-family home she rented. The Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not err in the portion of the ruling in the summary judgment order that Landlord was not obligated to warn Tenant of a dangerous condition on the property; but (2) genuine issues of material fact precluded an award of summary judgment with respect to Tenant’s allegation that Landlord failed to exercise reasonable care to repair and maintain the property as required by the parties’ lease. View "Benard v. McDowall, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals addressing Appellant’s successive appeals from district court orders denying successive applications to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). Appellant filed the applications in connection with his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. On the merits of the second appeal, the court of appeals concluded that Appellant was asserting a frivolous legal position in his habeas petition and thus affirmed the district court’s order denying IFP on appeal. The court then held the first appeal under submission to give Appellant an opportunity to pay the statutory docket fee. The Supreme Court remanded with directions to vacate the district court’s order in the second appeal and, in the first appeal, to affirm the district court’s denial of Appellant’s original IFP application, holding (1) Appellant’s appeals were governed by Glass v. Kenney, 687 N.W.2d 907 (Neb. 2004), not State v. Carter, 870 N.W.2d 641 (Neb. 2015); (2) with respect to the second appeal the district court erred in denying Appellant’s application to proceed IFP on appeal; and (3) with respect to the first appeal, the lower courts correctly concluded that Appellant’s habeas petition asserted a frivolous legal position. View "Mumin v. Frakes" on Justia Law