Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s application to probate his father’s will. Plaintiff allegedly learned about his father’s will more than three years after he and his brother commenced an informal probate proceeding to administer their father’s intestate estate. The father’s other two children objected to probating the will. The district court granted summary judgment to the objectors and dismissed the amended petition as time barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err (1) in determining that the three-year statute of limitations barred Plaintiff’s application to probate his father’s will; (2) in determining that Plaintiff failed to prove elements of equitable estoppel; and (3) in rejecting Plaintiff’s argument of equitable tolling. View "In re Estate of Fuchs" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the district court sustaining Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and overruling Plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend the judgment in this action brought by Plaintiff against the Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska and Kevin Ruser. In her complaint, Plaintiff asserted claims of discriminatory wage and employment practices based on her sex, as well as claims of employment retaliation arising from occurrences while she was a supervising attorney for the civil clinic law program at the University of Nebraska College of Law. The district court concluded that Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of wage discrimination, failure to promote because of sex, retaliation, and retaliation in violation of public policy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it sustained Defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s claims and did not abuse its discretion when it overruled Plaintiff’s subsequent motion to alter or amend the judgment. View "Knapp v. Ruser" on Justia Law

In this breach of contract action brought by Kelly Armstrong (Plaintiff), a former student at Clarkson College (Defendant), the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to set aside a jury verdict in favor of Plaintiff in the amount of $1 million or, in the alternative, for a new trial. Plaintiff was placed on probation and then administratively withdrawn from the school. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred by refusing to give Defendant’s requested jury instruction on Plaintiff’s alleged failure to fulfill a condition precedent by not exhausting the college’s grievance procedure. The Supreme Court agreed and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the district court committed reversible error in failing to instruct the jury on the issue of Plaintiff’s alleged failure to fulfill a condition precedent by not exhausting Defendant’s grievance procedure. View "Armstrong v. Clarkson College" on Justia Law

The common-law rule in contracts that common-law rule that the release of one joint obligor on a promissory note operates to release all represents settled law in Nebraska and should have been applied by the district court in this case.Eric Cano brought this action against Michael Walker and Billy Claborn alleging that they had failed to pay amounts due on a promissory note, which imposed joint and several liability on Walker and Claborn. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Cano. The court entered judgment on the promissory note. Thereafter, without the consent of Walker, Cano and Claborn entered into a stipulation that operated as an unconditional release of Claborn once he satisfied the terms of the stipulation. Walker filed a motion to discharge the judgment premised on the common-law rule that “[t]he unconditional release of one of several makers of a joint and several promissory note, without the consent of the other makers thereof, operates as a release of all.” The district court overruled the motion for discharge. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with directions to grant the requested discharge, holding that, under the common-law rule, the unconditional release of Claborn from the judgment operated as a release of Walker. View "Cano v. Walker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the probate court denying the application of the decedent’s wife (Wife) to be treated as an omitted spouse under a section of the Nebraska Probate Code after the decedent made no provision for her in his will. The decedent’s estate resisted the application, arguing that Wife waived her rights to the estate in a prenuptial agreement. The probate court found that the prenuptial agreement was valid and that Wife had waived the right to take as an omitted spouse. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the probate court did not err in concluding that Wife executed the waiver voluntarily and in denying her application to take as an omitted spouse. View "In re Estate of Psota" on Justia Law

Defendant pled no contest to first degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Defendant was sixteen years old at the time of the murder. Defendant’s life sentence was later vacated pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Defendant was granted a resentencing. The district court resentenced Defendant to imprisonment for eighty years to life after a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s resentencing, holding (1) the sentencing court did not impose a de facto life sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment and Neb. Const. art. I, 9 and 15; (2) the district court did not err when it did not make specific findings of fact regarding age-related characteristics; and (3) Defendant’s sentence of eighty years’ to life imprisonment with parole eligibility at age fifty-six was not unconstitutionally disproportionate. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

The right of an intervenor to offer evidence in a quiet title action is not restricted by the lis pendens statute.After Jacobsen Land and Cattle Company and the State entered into a purchase agreement for the sale of a parcel of Jacobsen’s land that included property fenced in with Terry Brown’s property, Brown filed and recorded a lis pendens with the county register of deeds. Brown then filed a quiet title action against Jacobsen, alleging ownership by adverse possession of the disputed property. The State moved for leave to intervene in the quiet title action. The court allowed the State to intervene. At trial, the court concluded that the State’s status as a subsequent purchaser under the lis pendens statute prevented the State from presenting evidence related to the adverse possession claim. After a trial, the court quieted title to the disputed property in Brown as against Jacobsen and any other entities claiming any interest therein. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the State was not permitted to offer evidence at trial, the matter remanded for a new trial. View "Brown v. Jacobsen Land & Cattle Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions of terroristic threats, use of a weapon to commit a felony, and negligent child abuse but vacated his sentences and remanded the cause for resentencing, finding plain error in the sentencing.On appeal, Defendant arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in various respects and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of negligent child abuse. The court of appeals rejected Defendant’s claims and affirmed his convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and in part vacated and remanded for resentencing, holding (1) the court of appeals did not err in rejecting Defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and in affirming Defendant’s convictions on all counts; but (2) the district court imposed unauthorized sentences. View "State v. Mendez-Osorio" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision granting Defendant’s motion for DNA testing, holding that it was “plainly evident from the record” that the DNA testing Defendant sought in his motion was not within the purview of the DNA Testing Act (Act).After the district court granted Defendant’s request for DNA testing, Defendant received pharmaceogenetic testing. Based on the results, Defendant asserted that the dosage of the Zoloft medication he was taking at the time of the murder for which he was convicted was too high for his body to properly metabolize, causing him to be violent and homicidal. Defendant argued that he was entitled to relief under the Act because new scientific evidence could contribute to and establish defenses at trial of an inability to formulate intent, intoxication, or insanity. The district court denied Defendant’s motion for new trial or new sentencing hearing based on the pharmacogenetic testing results. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with directions to dismiss Defendant’s motion for DNA testing, holding that the district court committed plain error in granting Defendant’s motion for DNA testing. View "State v. Robbins" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment orders that determined Mutual of Omaha Bank held a valid and enforceable deed of trust against Robert Watson’s homestead property. The court concluded that the primary deed of trust had first priority as an encumbrance on the property, ordered an execution sale, and foreclosed Watson from asserting any interest in the property. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in concluding that Watson and his then-spouse intended to encumber their homestead through the primary deed of trust. The Supreme Court held that, although its reasoning differed from the district court, the court did not err in finding that the primary deed of trust was valid and enforceable. View "Mutual of Omaha Bank v. Watson" on Justia Law