Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

J.S., a student at a middle school, was suspended for fifteen days for a post made on a social media website that caused a substantial disruption at her school. J.S. requested an administrative hearing to contest her removal. The superintendent and board of education each upheld J.S.’s suspension. J.S. filed a petition with the district court to appeal the board’s decision. The district court affirmed, concluding that the suspension did not exceed the authority provided by Neb. Rev. Stat. 79-264 and 79-267. J.S. appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that J.S. failed to seek district court review in the mode and manner provided by statute, and therefore, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Student Discipline Act. As a result, the district court’s decision was void. View "J.S. v. Grand Island Public Schools" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of Appellant’s complaint against American Standard Insurance Company of Wisconsin claiming wrongful denial of coverage. American Standard denied underinsured coverage to Appellant, who was in a motorcycle-motor vehicle accident, asserting that Appellant’s motorcycle insurance policy had been canceled prior to the accident. The district court granted partial summary judgment for American Standard. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred when it found that American Standard sent a cancellation notice to Appellant by certified mail in compliance with Neb. Rev. Stat. 44-516, and therefore, American Standard was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Barnes v. American Standard Insurance Co. of Wisconsin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a complaint against William McCoy using the pseudonyms “Jane Doe” and “John Doe.” Plaintiffs alleged that McCoy had sexually abused “Jane Doe” while she was a minor and that John Doe, who later married her, suffered a loss of consortium as a result of McCoy’s alleged sexual abuse of Jane Doe. The district court granted the motion to dismiss on the grounds that the action was time barred under the applicable statutes of limitations and that the complaint was not brought in the real names of the parties in interest. The Supreme Court affirmed on the basis that the action was barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. View "Doe v. McCoy" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court concluding that property owned by Steven and Sara Colford was not subject to the neighboring subdivision’s restrictive covenants by virtue of the doctrine of implied reciprocal negative servitudes. Gary and Denise Walters and three other individuals (collectively, Plaintiffs) lived in a platted subdivision known as the Adamy subdivision. Plaintiffs filed suit against the Colfords and Daniel Adamy alleging that the Colford property was expressly subject to the Adamy subdivision restrictive covenants. The district court granted summary judgment for the Colfords. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the Colfords, holding that the Colford property was not subject to the Adamy subdivision restrictions through the doctrine of implied reciprocal negative servitudes. View "Walters v. Colford" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction for first degree sexual assault of a child under twelve years of age, holding in part that the trial court properly admitted hearsay evidence under the medical diagnosis and treatment exception, Neb. R. Evid. 803(3). Specifically, the court held (1) under the circumstances, the hearsay evidence was properly admitted as evidence under the medical diagnosis and treatment hearsay exception; (2) Defendant’s trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); and (3) there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was guilty of first degree sexual assault of child under twelve years of age. View "State v. Jedlicka" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized during the detention and search of a vehicle in which she was a passenger, as well as the sentence imposed for Defendant’s possession of a controlled substance conviction. In regard to her motion to suppress, Defendant argued that the initial encounter with the lead law enforcement officer amounted to a seizure when she was detained after the officer determined that the wanted individual was not in the vehicle and that the investigatory stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion. The Supreme Court held (1) the lead officer had reasonable suspicion of illegal activity to justify the detention of the vehicle’s passengers after the officer determined that the wanted individual was not in the vehicle; and (2) the sentence imposed did not constitute an abuse of discretion. View "State v. Rogers" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment for the County of Lancaster in this complaint filed by the City of Lincoln seeking reimbursement of expenses paid on its employee’s behalf after a deputy sheriff with the County made contact with the employee, injuring the employee’s shoulder. The district court concluded (1) the County’s procurement of liability insurance did not constitute a waiver of its sovereign immunity for claims less than the policy’s retained insurance limit; and (2) because the amount in controversy was $63,418, the County did not waive its sovereign immunity by obtaining insurance for claims exceeding $250,000. The Supreme Court affirmed for reasons different from those stated by the district court, holding (1) the County’s procurement of insurance did not constitute a waiver of immunity as to a claim arising out of a battery; and (2) therefore, the County’s policy did not cover the underlying event, and there was no waiver of immunity regardless of the retained insurance limit. View "City of Lincoln v. County of Lancaster" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ breach of contract against Defendant but on different grounds than those found by the district court. The district court dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction over Defendant under Nebraska’s long-arm statute and alternatively found that Nebraska was an inconvenient forum. Defendant was a New York corporation with its principal place of business in New York. The Supreme Court held (1) Plaintiffs’ claim that Defendant failed to pay amounts due under a promissory note was moot; and (2) Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the claim for breach of the reinsurance participation agreement (RPA), which Defendant was alleged to have breached, because Plaintiffs were not parties to the RPA. View "Applied Underwriters, Inc. v. S.E.B. Services of New York, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court that overruled Defendant’s motion for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. Defendant pled guilty to five counts of first degree murder and five counts of use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. Defendant’s motion for postconviction relief raised numerous claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The Supreme Court held (1) with respect to each of Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the district court did not err when it concluded that Defendant failed to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate a violation of his constitutional rights and that the record affirmatively showed that Defendant was not entitled to relief; and (2) the district court did not err when it overruled Defendant’s motion for postconviction relief without holding an evidentiary hearing. View "State v. Vela" on Justia Law

In Hike I, Leo and Joanna Hike filed a petition of appeal seeking compensation after the State exercised its power of eminent domain in 2008 to acquire a parcel of the Hikes’ property for an expansion of a highway. The Supreme Court affirmed the jury verdict rendered in the case. In 2011, before the trial in Hike I, the State’s independent contractor began construction on the property taken from the Hikes. That same month, Leo noticed damage to the brick veneer of his and Joanna’s residence. The court precluded the Hikes from offering any evidence concerning the structural damage. In 2015, the Hikes filed the instant action claiming the same structural damage that they attempted to offer as evidence in Hike I. The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding that the claim was barred by the relevant statute of limitations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the two-year statute of limitations period set forth in section 25-218 governs inverse condemnation actions against the State; and (2) the district court did not err in determining that the Hikes’ claim is barred by the two-year statute of limitations. View "Hike v. State" on Justia Law