Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The State filed a petition against Mother and Father alleging that Child lacked prenatal care due to the fault or habits of Mother and Father. The juvenile court filed an ex parte order granting the State’s motion for temporary custody of Child with the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). More than eight months later, the juvenile court entered an order ordering that Child remain in the temporary custody of DHHS until further order of the court. The Supreme Court vacated the juvenile court’s order, holding that Mother’s procedural due process were violated by the unreasonable delay of more than eight months between the filing of the ex parte order for immediate temporary custody and the filing of the protective custody order. View "In re Interest of Carmelo G." on Justia Law

In this dispute arising from a party’s failure to perform on a promissory note Steven Anderson filed a complaint against Steve Finkle alleging breach of contract and quantum meruit or unjust enrichment. After trial but before the trial court issued its order, Anderson died. Thereafter, the district court issued an order awarding Anderson the amount of the promissory note plus interest. Finkle filed a motion for new trial and then the estate filed a motion for revivor. The district court overruled Finkle’s motion and granted the estate’s motion reviving the matter in the name of the personal representative of the estate. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals in both cases, holding (1) because of Anderson’s death, the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment and deny Finkle’s motion for new trial, and therefore these orders were void, and Finkle’s first appeal did not divest the district court of its jurisdiction; and (2) this court was without jurisdiction to entertain Finkle’s appeal of the order of revivor because it was not a final order. View "Anderson v. Finkle" on Justia Law

Defendant and his father were both charged with criminal conspiracy to commit felony theft. The district court joined the two cases for trial. Before trial, Defendant filed a motion for absolute discharge alleging that his speedy trial time had run. The district court overruled Defendant’s motion, concluding that the codefendant exclusion of Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-1207(4)(e) applied to exclude additional time. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court correctly interpreted and applied the codefendant exclusion under section 29-1207(4)(e); and (2) the trial court did not clearly err in finding that all three factors under the statute were proved by a preponderance of the evidence or in computing Defendant’s speedy trial time. View "State v. Beitel" on Justia Law

Douglas County challenged a district court order that required the County to pay an appointed attorney’s costs in the underlying divorce pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 42-358 because the spouse who was responsible for the payment of the appointed attorney’s fees was not indigent. The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court and remanded with directions to vacate its order granting attorney fees and costs, holding that the district court lacked the statutory authority to order the County to pay fees in a dissolution action where neither party was indigent. Therefore, the district court erred in ordering the County to pay the appointed attorney for his appellate work in the underlying divorce case. View "White v. White" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed a Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC) order adjusting value that increased the “majority land use grass” subclass of the agricultural and horticultural land class of real property not receiving special value within Webster County in the amount of six percent. The Supreme Court held that, in adjusting the level of value for grassland upward by six percent, TERC did not improperly rely on Nebraska’s Property Tax Administrator’s statistical reports and opinion, as (1) the Administrator’s required reports under Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-1327 are competent evidence to support a TERC equalization order without setting out information about each real property transaction that was used for the statistical analysis; and (2) Webster County failed to meet its burden that TERC should not rely on the Administrator’s reports. View "County of Webster v. Nebraska Tax Equalization & Review Commission" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her conviction of first degree sexual assault of a protected individual, arguing that the evidence did not support the jury’s finding that Defendant “subjected” the victim to sexual penetration because the victim effectuated the sexual penetration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-322.04, the word “subject” means to cause to undergo the action of something specified, and under this definition, there was sufficient evidence that Defendant caused the victim to undergo sexual penetration by willingly participating in the sexual act; and (2) Defendant did not preserve for appeal her argument that the district court erred in allowing the jury to consider evidence that Defendant attended Sexaholics Anonymous. View "State v. Wood" on Justia Law

Janice M. Hinrichsen, Inc. (JMH) had a judgment against Risk Assessment and Management, Inc. (RAM) in a previous action. In the instant action brought under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA), JMH alleged that RAM had fraudulently transferred certain assets to Messersmith Ventures, LLC. The district court entered judgment in favor of JMH in the amount of $250. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court did not err when it implicitly found that, under the UFTA, a fraudulent transfer of assets had occurred; and (2) the monetary judgment awarded by the district court was not appropriate relief under the UFTA in this case, as the court instead should have ordered that MJH may levy execution on the assets that were transferred to Messersmith Ventures or the proceeds of such assets. View "Janice M. Hinrichsen Inc. v. Messersmith Ventures, LLC" on Justia Law

While Tyler Thomas and Joshua Keadle were both students at Peru State College, Keadle allegedly abducted, raped, and murdered Thomas. Appellants filed a fifth amended complaint against the Board of Trustees of the Nebraska State Colleges under the State Tort Claims Act, seeking damages for the wrongful death of Thomas, for Thomas’ pain and suffering prior to her death, and for the severe emotional distress of Appellants as Thomas’ parents and next of kin. The causes of action were premised upon the Board’s alleged negligence. The district court granted summary judgment for the Board. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the risk of Keadle’s alleged abduction, rape, and murder of Thomas was not foreseeable as a matter of law. View "Thomas v. Board of Trustees of Nebraska State Colleges" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for first degree sexual assault of a child, rendered after a jury trial, and his conviction of thirty-five to fifty years’ imprisonment with credit for 129 days served. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) although Defendant was represented at trial by an individual who failed to meet the substantive requirements to be a licensed attorney at trial, there was no per se violation of Defendant’s constitutional right to trial because the lead attorney for Defendant’s trial was a qualified, licensed attorney; (2) Defendant’s counsel were not constitutionally ineffective; (3) there was sufficient evidence to sustain a guilty verdict; and (4) there was no abuse of discretion in the sentence imposed. View "State v. Loding" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that “medical assistance” provided to Medicaid recipients includes costs for room and board and other “nonmedical” expenses at nursing facilities, and therefore, those costs can be recovered from the recipient’s estate. In this case, the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed a petition for allowance of a claim for services provided to the decedent while he resided at two different nursing homes. The county court sustained DHHS’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that the services defined as room and board fell within the parameters of services provided under the Medical Assistance Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that DHHS was statutorily authorized to recover the sums it paid for room and board costs and other expenses from the decedent’s estate. View "In re Estate of Vollmann" on Justia Law