Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree sexual assault, first degree false imprisonment, strangulation, and third degree domestic assault. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Defendant later filed a motion for return of seized property. At the hearing, the State argued that Defendant had a pending postconviction motion and a pending federal prosecution for child pornography and that many of the items that Defendant pled in his motion were subject to that case. The district court denied the motion to return property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to return seized property; (2) the district judge did not abuse its discretion in failing to parse through the property and determine what portion of the seized evidence would be necessary for the pending proceedings and return the portion that would not be necessary; and (3) Defendant’s arguments that the district court judge was biased were without merit. View "State v. Buttercase" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were three same-sex couples who sought to enjoin Defendants from enforcing a 1995 administrative memorandum and from restricting gay and lesbian individuals and couples from being considered or selected as foster or adoptive parents. Plaintiffs generally alleged that the policy violated equal protection and due process and violated 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court ordered the memorandum rescinded and stricken and enjoined Defendants and those acting in concert with them from enforcing the memorandum and/or applying a categorical ban such as the one at issue in this case. Defendants appealed, arguing that Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring this case, that there was no case or controversy, and that the lawsuit became moot when the policy memorandum was removed from the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) website after Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment was filed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the underlying action was justiciable; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding costs and attorney fees. View "Stewart v. Heineman" on Justia Law

The Nebraska Cooperative Republican Platte Enhancement (N-CORPE), a political subdivision of the State of Nebraska, brought condemnation proceedings against Appellant seeking an easement across Appellant’s real estate. In response, Appellant filed a complaint for injunction against board members of the N-CORPE project and N-CORPE (collectively, Appellees), alleging, inter alia, that N-CORPE does not have the power of eminent domain. In addition, Appellant filed an application for temporary restraining order and a motion for temporary injunction, both of which the district court denied. The district court then granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) N-CORPE had the authority to exercise the power of eminent domain; (2) N-CORPE did not need certain permits and approvals as alleged by Appellant; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant’s motion to amend the complaint; (4) N-CORPE is not prohibited by common law from removing ground water from overlying land; and (5) there is not material issue of fact regarding whether the condemnation is for a public use. View "Estermann v. Bose" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, as an individual and as an assignee, brought this action pro se to recover for wrongs allegedly committed against the assignor, a limited liability corporation (LLC). The district court dismissed the action, concluding (1) Plaintiff was attempting to litigate “the claim of another which has merely been assigned to him” and that Plaintiff was therefore engaging in the unauthorized practice of law because an attorney is required when the action is derived from a wrong to an LLC; and (2) therefore, the pleadings were a nullity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an assignment of a distinct business entity’s cause of action to an assignee who then brings such suit requires that the assignee must be represented by counsel and cannot bring such action pro se; (2) by bringing the assigned claim, Plaintiff engaged in the unauthorized practice of law; and (3) therefore, Plaintiff’s filings were a nullity as a matter of law. View "Zapata v. McHugh" on Justia Law

In two separate cases, Defendant was convicted of two counts of possession of a controlled substance and one count of driving under the influence. In case No. S-16-419, the district court sentenced Defendant to a period of incarceration for twenty months to five years for possession of a controlled substance. In case No. S-16-425, the district court sentenced Defendant to two years’ imprisonment with twelve months of postrelease supervision for possession of a controlled substance and to six months’ incarceration for driving under the influence. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court imposed excessive sentences in both cases. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment in case No. S-16-419; (2) affirmed Defendant’s sentence for driving under the influence in case No. S-16-425; and (3) vacated Defendant’s sentence for possession of a controlled substance in case No. S-16-425 in light of the Court’s application of the doctrine enunciated in State v. Randolph to L.B. 1094. View "State v. Chacon" on Justia Law

The Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC) adjusted upward by eight percent the value of the “land use grass” subclass of the agricultural and horticultural land class of real property in Franklin County not receiving special valuation. Franklin County appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed TERC’s order adjusting the Franklin County grassland value upward by eight percent, holding (1) TERC did not err in relying on the statistics prepared by the Property Tax Administrator; (2) there was no merit to Franklin County’s argument that TERC violated Neb. Const. art. VIII by failing to uniformly and proportionally value grasslands in the state; and (3) Franklin County’s remaining assignments of error were without merit. View "County of Franklin v. Tax Equalization & Review Commission" on Justia Law

In 2004, Michael Burns and Kerry Burns divorced. This appeal involved a contempt proceeding between the parties that was pending before the district court for Adams County. Judge James Doyle, acting as the district judge for Adams County, issued an order requiring Kerry to appear in the Dawson County District Court and show cause why she should not be held in contempt for refusing to comply with prior orders. When Kerry did not appear for the show cause hearing the district court entered an order finding Kerry in contempt and sanctioning her to ten days in jail. Thereafter, Kerry moved the district court to vacate its order on the basis that the court did not have authority to hold an evidentiary hearing outside of the county in which it was sitting. The district court overruled Kerry’s motion to vacate. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court did not act in conformity with the law when it ordered Kerry to appear in Dawson County and when it held the contempt hearing there because Dawson County was outside the pending county of Adams County. Remanded. View "Burns v. Burns" on Justia Law

Defendant was sentenced to not less than two years nor more than two years in prison for possession of a controlled substance - a class IV felony - and to fifteen to twenty years in prison for possession of a stolen firearm - a Class IIA felony. The sentences were ordered to run consecutively. Defendant appealed his sentences. While his appeal was pending, a legislative bill was enacted that amended Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-2204.02 to provide that an indeterminate sentence shall be imposed for Class IV felonies imposed consecutively or concurrently with a sentence for a Class IIA felony “in accordance with the process set forth in section 29-2204.” The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant’s sentence for his Class IV felony was not plainly erroneous and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Defendant’s sentences. View "State v. Artis" on Justia Law

Seller agreed to sell an aerial spraying company to Buyer pursuant to a purchase agreement that contained a covenant not to compete. Seller, his son, and the company (collectively, Seller) subsequently filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment that the covenant not to compete was overbroad and unenforceable. Buyer counterclaimed. After a trial, the district court found that the noncompete agreement was void and unenforceable. The court did not address Buyer’s counterclaims. Buyer appealed. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. After the cause was remanded, the parties filed a stipulated motion to dismiss without prejudice, jointly requesting dismissal of Buyer’s breach-of-contract counterclaims and Seller’s motion for damages and attorney fees. The district court entered an order of dismissal without prejudice that largely mirrored the language of the parties’ stipulated motion. Buyer then appealed the declaratory judgment ruling. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the order appealed from was not a final order, and the Court therefore lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal. View "Last Pass Aviation, Inc. v. Western Cooperative Co." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and use of a firearm to commit a felony. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by (1) failing to grant Defendant’s motion to suppress Defendant’s statements made to law enforcement because the statements were not obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona; (2) denying Defendant’s Batson challenge claiming that the prosecution impermissibly struck prospective jurors on the basis of race; and (3) denying Defendant’s motion for mistrial that alleged that the court improperly allowed testimony in violation of Brady v. Maryland. View "State v. Clifton" on Justia Law