Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant, who was convicted of violating Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-1212.04 and other offenses, appealed the district court’s denial of his motion for postconviction relief, arguing that he should have received an evidentiary hearing on his allegations. Defendant’s arguments were premised on the constitutionality of section 28-1212.04. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of postconviction relief, holding (1) the district court properly found that Defendant’s allegations raising direct constitutional challenges to section 28-1212.04 were procedurally barred; and (2) Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim did not entitle him to an evidentiary hearing because the allegations could not support a finding of deficient performance. View "State v. Ross" on Justia Law

After a stipulated bench trial, Defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. Defendant was sentenced to three to five years’ imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence against him should be suppressed because there was no probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when his house and vehicle were searched because the application and warrant established probable cause; and (2) officers did not exceed the scope of the search warrant when they searched a vehicle parked outside the house described in the search warrant. View "State v. Hidalgo" on Justia Law

In 2000, doctors Strohmyer, Naegele, and Mantler formed Papillion Family Medicine, P.C. (PFM). In 2013, Strohmyer provided notice that he was leaving PFM to start his own medical practice. Strohmyer then sued PFM, Naegele, and Mantler (collectively, Defendants), alleging that Defendants failed to “buy out” Strohmyer and pay associated director fees following his departure and improperly calculated the value of PFM’s stock, assets, and goodwill. Defendants counterclaimed. The district court found (1) PFM was not a corporation under the laws of Nebraska; (2) the buyout clause was so ambiguous as to be unenforceable; (3) the value of Strohmyer’s stock was $104,200; (4) Strohmyer was due $9,389 in unpaid compensation; and (5) Strohmyer damaged PFM in the amount of $30,673. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err in its valuation of Strohmyer’s shares, finding that PFM had no goodwill for which Strohmyer was entitled to compensation, and failing to award compensation for director fees and salary; but (2) erred in finding that Strohmyer breached a fiduciary duty by continuing to accept Medicaid patients, in holding Strohmyer liable for a physical assistant’s continuing treatment of Medicaid patients, and in its calculation of damages based on those claims. View "Strohmyer v. Papillion Family Medicine" on Justia Law

ACI Worldwide Corp. sued Baldwin Hackett & Meeks, Inc., its cofounders, and other company principals (collectively, BHMI), alleging that BHMI misappropriated its trade secrets. BHMI counterclaimed, alleging that ACI tortiously interfered with a business relationship and violated provisions of Nbraska’s unlawful restraint of trade statutes. In 2014, a jury found against ACI on its misappropriation claim. In 2015, a jury found in favor of BHMI on all of its counterclaims. ACI then filed posttrial motions to vacate the jury’s judgments, reopen the evidence, and grant a new trial on the basis that ACI had discovered new evidence. The district court overruled ACI’s posttrial motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion in overruling ACI’s motion to vacate the 2014 and 2015 judgments; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in awarding BHMI $2,732,962.50 in attorney fees. View "ACI Worldwide Corp. v. Baldwin Hackett & Meeks, Inc." on Justia Law

The State filed a petition against Mother and Father alleging that Child lacked prenatal care due to the fault or habits of Mother and Father. The juvenile court filed an ex parte order granting the State’s motion for temporary custody of Child with the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). More than eight months later, the juvenile court entered an order ordering that Child remain in the temporary custody of DHHS until further order of the court. The Supreme Court vacated the juvenile court’s order, holding that Mother’s procedural due process were violated by the unreasonable delay of more than eight months between the filing of the ex parte order for immediate temporary custody and the filing of the protective custody order. View "In re Interest of Carmelo G." on Justia Law

In this dispute arising from a party’s failure to perform on a promissory note Steven Anderson filed a complaint against Steve Finkle alleging breach of contract and quantum meruit or unjust enrichment. After trial but before the trial court issued its order, Anderson died. Thereafter, the district court issued an order awarding Anderson the amount of the promissory note plus interest. Finkle filed a motion for new trial and then the estate filed a motion for revivor. The district court overruled Finkle’s motion and granted the estate’s motion reviving the matter in the name of the personal representative of the estate. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals in both cases, holding (1) because of Anderson’s death, the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment and deny Finkle’s motion for new trial, and therefore these orders were void, and Finkle’s first appeal did not divest the district court of its jurisdiction; and (2) this court was without jurisdiction to entertain Finkle’s appeal of the order of revivor because it was not a final order. View "Anderson v. Finkle" on Justia Law

Defendant and his father were both charged with criminal conspiracy to commit felony theft. The district court joined the two cases for trial. Before trial, Defendant filed a motion for absolute discharge alleging that his speedy trial time had run. The district court overruled Defendant’s motion, concluding that the codefendant exclusion of Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-1207(4)(e) applied to exclude additional time. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court correctly interpreted and applied the codefendant exclusion under section 29-1207(4)(e); and (2) the trial court did not clearly err in finding that all three factors under the statute were proved by a preponderance of the evidence or in computing Defendant’s speedy trial time. View "State v. Beitel" on Justia Law

Douglas County challenged a district court order that required the County to pay an appointed attorney’s costs in the underlying divorce pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 42-358 because the spouse who was responsible for the payment of the appointed attorney’s fees was not indigent. The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court and remanded with directions to vacate its order granting attorney fees and costs, holding that the district court lacked the statutory authority to order the County to pay fees in a dissolution action where neither party was indigent. Therefore, the district court erred in ordering the County to pay the appointed attorney for his appellate work in the underlying divorce case. View "White v. White" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed a Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC) order adjusting value that increased the “majority land use grass” subclass of the agricultural and horticultural land class of real property not receiving special value within Webster County in the amount of six percent. The Supreme Court held that, in adjusting the level of value for grassland upward by six percent, TERC did not improperly rely on Nebraska’s Property Tax Administrator’s statistical reports and opinion, as (1) the Administrator’s required reports under Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-1327 are competent evidence to support a TERC equalization order without setting out information about each real property transaction that was used for the statistical analysis; and (2) Webster County failed to meet its burden that TERC should not rely on the Administrator’s reports. View "County of Webster v. Nebraska Tax Equalization & Review Commission" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her conviction of first degree sexual assault of a protected individual, arguing that the evidence did not support the jury’s finding that Defendant “subjected” the victim to sexual penetration because the victim effectuated the sexual penetration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-322.04, the word “subject” means to cause to undergo the action of something specified, and under this definition, there was sufficient evidence that Defendant caused the victim to undergo sexual penetration by willingly participating in the sexual act; and (2) Defendant did not preserve for appeal her argument that the district court erred in allowing the jury to consider evidence that Defendant attended Sexaholics Anonymous. View "State v. Wood" on Justia Law