Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Landlord leased commercial real estate to Tenant, a third party. The lease agreement provided on option to purchase with a condition precedent. At the time Tenant assigned this purchase option to Assignees, Tenant had fully performed all obligations under the lease. When Assignees attempted to exercise the purchase option, Landlord denied the attempt, arguing that because of certain rental underpayments, which were later paid in full, Tenant had failed to satisfy the condition precedent. Assignees filed a complaint seeking specific performance of the purchase option. Landlord later moved for specific performance of the terms and provisions of the purchase option. The district court sustained Landlord’s motion, and Assignees purchased the property. The district court then entered judgment in Assignees’ favor and awarded equitable monetary relief for lost rentals. Landlord appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) Landlord was judicially estopped from asserting the condition precedent in avoidance of equitable monetary relief; and (2) Landlord was entitled to offset the monetary award with the interest on the unpaid purchase price. View "O'Connor v. Kearny Junction, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to kidnapping, a crime he committed when he was sixteen years old. Defendant was initially sentenced to life imprisonment. After the U.S. Supreme Court decided Graham v. Florida and Miller v. Alabama, Defendant filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court determined that Defendant was entitled to relief under Graham and vacated his life sentence. Thereafter, Defendant was resentenced to ninety years to life imprisonment. Defendant appealed that sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the sentence was not excessive, nor did it violate the 8th and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution or the principles set forth in Graham. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted and sentenced for refusing to submit to a chemical test, refusing to submit to a preliminary breath test, and driving without a license. On appeal, Defendant challenged the district court’s determination that Neb. Rev. Stat. 60-6,197, the chemical test implied consent statute, was valid, facially and as applied, and constitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and in part vacated and remanded, holding (1) section 60-6,197 is unconstitutional as applied to Defendant for his conviction for refusing to submit to a chemical blood test; and (2) there was no merit to Defendant’s remaining assignments of error. View "State v. McCumber" on Justia Law

Brayden O. was a seventeen-year-old girl who suffered from Coffin-Lowry Syndrome and other disabilities. Brayden had been receiving home and community-based waiver services through the Medicaid division of the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) for almost a dozen years before the DHHS determined that Brayden no longer met the necessary qualifications for such services. Merie B., Brayden’s mother, appealed DHHS’ determination, which was affirmed after an administrative appeal hearing. The district court affirmed. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded with directions that the district court order DHHS to reinstate waiver services to Brayden, effective as of the date services were originally terminated. On remand, Merie requested reimbursement for expenses she incurred due to the wrongful termination of Brayden’s services, along with attorney fees. The district court granted the request and entered judgment against DHHS in the amount of $76,260.48. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court was without authority to expand the mandate in Merie B. I and hold an evidentiary hearing on Merie’s “Motion to Determine Expenses.” View "Merie B. on behalf of Brayden O. v. State" on Justia Law

Homeowners obtained loans from Bank for the construction of a new home and entered into an agreement with Contractor to complete the new home construction. When Homeowners defaulted on payments owed to Contractor and on both loans, the house was sold at foreclosure, and Homeowners filed for bankruptcy. Contractor filed a fourth amended complaint against Homeowners, who were later dismissed as parties, and Bank. Following a trial the court granted summary judgment for Bank on Contractor’s claims of fraud and civil conspiracy. The Supreme Court reversed. After remand, Contractor filed a fifth amended complaint, which differed from the fourth amended complaint in several respects. The district court determined that the election of remedies doctrine and judicial estoppel required a dismissal of Contractor’s claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Contractor’s claims were consistently premised on the existence of a contract, and therefore, no election was required; and (2) Contractor’s claims were based on different facts and obligations, and therefore, both could be pursued. View "deNourie & Yost Homes, LLC v. Frost" on Justia Law

D.I. was committed for treatment as a dangerous sex offender under the Sex Offender Commitment Act (SOCA). The Supreme Court upheld the commitment. The Douglas County public defender’s office represented D.I. during the SOCA proceedings. Thereafter, D.I. filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking immediate release from his commitment. At some point, attorney Ryan Stover began to represent D.I. and represented him for the remainder of the proceedings before the district court and the Supreme Court. The district court dismissed D.I.’s petition, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Stover subsequently filed an application for an order fixing attorney fees and expenses. The district court ordered Madison County to pay Stover’s fees and expenses in the amount of $6,259. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) statutes authorize the payment of attorney fees incurred by court-appointed counsel representing an indigent subject challenging his custody or treatment under the SOCA via a habeas petition; and (2) Stover’s fees were for services apparently performed in that capacity, and therefore, the district court properly ordered payment of attorney fees in this case. View "D.I. v. Gibson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, first-degree assault, robbery, attempted robbery, and four counts of use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s Batson challenge regarding a prospective juror who had been removed by the State using a peremptory strike; (2) any error in sustaining the State’s objection to evidence Defendant wanted to offer to impeach one of the State’s witnesses was harmless; (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for new trial on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct and newly discovered evidence; and (4) there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s convictions. View "State v. Lester" on Justia Law

Rosemary Henn filed a putative class action in a federal court alleging that American Family Mutual Insurance Company wrongfully failed to compensate her and others similarly situated by depreciating labor costs in calculation of “actual cash value” for loss or damage to a building under its homeowner’s insurance policies. The federal court certified a question to the Nebraska Supreme Court asking whether an insurer, in determining the “actual cash value” of a covered loss, may depreciate the cost of labor when the policy does not state explicitly that labor costs will be depreciated and the terms “actual cash value” and “depreciation” are not defined in the policy. The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative, holding that the term “actual cash value” is unambiguous and that labor can be depreciated. View "Henn v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Appellant was previously married to the decedent. Together, they had a son (Son). After the decedent died, Appellant filed a claim with the estate on Son’s behalf seeking one-half of Son’s reasonable secondary educational expenses not otherwise covered by his savings accounts. The estate disallowed the claim. Thereafter, Appellant filed suit against the estate, seeking that the court order that her previously filed order be “allowed” and that the court confirm the lien of the court’s judgment against real property owned by the estate. Appellant also sought to impose a constructive trust on the estate’s assets. The district court granted the estate’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the issue was not ripe for resolution because it was not possible for know the amount of “reasonable” educational expenses. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant’s action was ripe because the unknowns presented by this case were insufficient to make Appellant’s suit not ripe. View "Harring v. Gress" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and other crimes. Appellant was sentenced to death on each murder conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. Appellant later filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance and that the State had withheld evidence and engaged in prosecutorial misconduct. The district court denied postconviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Appellant’s motion for postconviction relief, holding that Appellant failed to show that his trial counsel was ineffective or that the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct. View "State v. Torres" on Justia Law