Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a bench trial on stipulated facts, Defendant was found guilty of refusal of a chemical test in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. 60-6,197. Defendant appealed, arguing, primarily, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the traffic stop was conducted without reasonable suspicion and that section 6-6,197.09 and related statutes are unconstitutional because they are void for vagueness. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress; (2) section 60-6,197.09 is not unconstitutionally vague; and (3) Defendant was not denied due process when he was denied probation. View "State v. Arizola" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of intentional child abuse resulting in death. Defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for eighty years to life. Defendant appealed, assigning numerous errors addressed to the grand jury process and trial rulings. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction and sentence, holding that the district court did not commit prejudicial error when it (1) overruled Defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of probable cause; (2) overruled Defendant’s motion to quash the indictment due to errors relating to the special prosecutor; (3) overruled Defendant’s motion in limine to prohibit the State from presenting evidence regarding DNA testing of certain evidence; and (4) overruled Defendant’s motions for mistrial. View "State v. Chauncey" on Justia Law

In 2001, Appellant was convicted of first degree murder and use of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Appellant was sixteen years old when he committed the crimes leading to his convictions. Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment on the murder conviction. In 2013, Appellant filed a motion for postconviction relief seeking resentencing on his murder conviction pursuant to Miller v. Alabama. The district court granted postconviction relief. After a resentencing hearing, Appellant was sentenced to ninety to ninety years’ imprisonment on the first degree murder conviction. Appellant appealed, arguing that the district court imposed an excessive sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a sentence within the statutory limits and supported by the record, and there was no merit to Appellant’s claim that his sentence was excessive. View "State v. Garza" on Justia Law

Farm Bureau Property & Casualty Insurance Company issued a homeowner’s insurance policy to Howard Hunter that prohibited an assignment of “[a]ll rights and duties” without Farm Bureau’s consent. After a storm damaged the roof of Hunter’s home, he assigned his claim to Millard Gutter Company, the company that repaired the roof. Millard Gutter sued Farm Bureau and obtained a county court judgment. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the postloss assignment of a claim under a homeowner’s insurance policy was valid despite the nonassignment cause. View "Millard Gutter Co. v. Farm Bureau Property & Casualty Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In 1994, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and use of a weapon to commit a felony. Defendant was fifteen years old at the time of the commission of the acts leading to his convictions. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment on the murder conviction. Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief. The motion was granted and Defendant’s life sentence was vacated and the cause remanded. Upon resentencing, Defendant was sentenced to ninety years’ to ninety years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the sentence imposed upon Defendant on resentencing was not erroneous; and (2) the sentencing court properly considered Defendant’s youth and used adequate procedural safeguards when sentencing him. View "State v. Mantich" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of second degree murder. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction on direct appeal. In 2009, Defendant filed a motion under the DNA Testing Act for retesting of biological material related to Defendant’s prosecution. After a hearing, the district court overruled the 2009 motion for DNA testing. Defendant’s appeal from that order was summarily dismissed by the court of appeals. In 2015, Defendant filed another motion for DNA testing under the Act. The State objected to the motion on the ground of res judicata. The district court dismissed the DNA motion without an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court did not err in dismissing Defendant’s successive motion for DNA testing on the ground that it was governed by the determinations made under the 2009 motion. View "State v. Marrs" on Justia Law

Lindsay and Jennifer were involved in a committed relationship for several years but were never married. During their relationship, Lindsday gave birth to a son conceived by artificial insemination using an anonymous donor. After Lindsay and Jennifer separated, they continued to coparent Chase. Lindsay later married Jessica. Jennifer subsequently filed a complaint seeking to establish custody of Chase. Thereafter, Lindsay and Jennifer filed a petition for stepparent adoption. Jennifer sought to intervene in the adoption proceeding and also to stay the adoption proceeding pending resolution of the district court custody action. The county court denied relief. Jennifer appealed and moved to stay the adoption proceeding pending the outcome of her appeal. The court of appeals sustained the motion. The Supreme Court vacated the county court’s order, holding (1) the adoption statutes require that necessary consents, including the consent of the district court involved in a custody case involving the same child, be filed before a county court entertains the merits of any issue in the adoption proceeding; and (2) because the record in this case does not reflect the district court’s consent, the county court lacked the statutory authority to exercise jurisdiction over the adoption proceeding and lacked authority to rule on the merits of Jennifer’s intervention claim. Remanded. View "In re Adoption of Chase T." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute underlying a judgment is permitted in a habeas corpus proceeding after the judgment becomes final. In 2011, Petitioner was convicted of unlawful discharge of a firearm under Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-1212.04 and use of a firearm to commit a felony. Petitioner was sentenced to ten to fifteen years’ imprisonment on each conviction, to run consecutively. The court of appeals affirmed. Petitioner later filed a habeas petition in district court making a facial challenge to the constitutionality of section 28-1212.04. The district court dismissed Defendant’s petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when used to challenge a final conviction and sentence, habeas corpus is a collateral attack; (2) therefore, habeas corpus is not a proper remedy to challenge a petitioner’s detention pursuant to a final conviction and sentence on the basis that the statute underlying the conviction is unconstitutional; and (3) therefore, a final conviction and sentence entered upon an allegedly facially unconstitutional statute is not absolutely void, but is voidable only, and may not be attacked in a habeas corpus proceeding. View "Sanders v. Frakes" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with robbery and use of a weapon to commit a felony. Defendant was fifteen years old at the time he allegedly committed the crimes. Defendant filed a motion to transfer his case to the separate juvenile court of Douglas County. The district court denied the motion to transfer. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the district court’s denial of the motion to transfer is not a final, appealable order because no substantial right was affected by the denial of Defendant’s motion to transfer. View "State v. Bluett" on Justia Law

The State moved to terminate the parental rights of both parents to Darryn C. Sharon J., the paternal grandparent of Darryn, filed a motion for custody after the mother and father had relinquished their parental rights to Sharon. As for the proceedings on the State’s motion to terminate parental rights, those proceedings were continued, and the record did not reflect the court’s disposition of the motion. After a hearing, the juvenile court issued an order overruling Sharon’s motion for custody. Sharon appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed Sharon’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the juvenile court’s order was not final and appealable because the court had not completely disposed of the custody issue, and Sharon may still gain custody. View "In re Interest of Darryn C." on Justia Law