Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Randy and Helen Strode owned real property in the City of Ashland, Saunders County. Since the time of the purchase, the Strodes operated a business for the manufacture of agricultural fencing and the storage of salvage on the property. In 2003, the district court held that Randy’s use of the property to store salvage was in violation of the zoning ordinance but found that the manufacture of agricultural fencing was permitted. In 2013, the Strodes filed suit against the City and the County for inverse condemnation based on the zoning ordinance and the load limit regulation of a bridge used by the Strodes for transporting commercial goods. The district court concluded (1) Randy’s zoning takings claim was barred by claim preclusion because the matter was litigated in the 2003 case, (2) determined that Helen’s regulatory taking lain was barred by the statute of limitations because she was aware of the effect of the zoning ordinance after 2003; (3) found that the regulation of the bridge structure was not a regulatory taking, and (4) the City and County were entitled to summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding in favor of the City and the County. View "Strode v. City of Ashland" on Justia Law

Clarence Devney petitioned for the dissolution of his marriage to Elizabeth Devney. The district court dissolved the marriage and divided the parties’ assets and debts and, in so doing, found that a postnuptial property agreement entered into by the parties was valid and enforceable and that the division of the martial estate was fair and reasonable. The Supreme Court reversed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) Nebraska statutes do not authorize postnuptial agreements to allocate the parties’ property rights upon separation or divorce unless such agreements are attendant upon the spouses’ separation or divorce, and therefore, the district court erred in enforcing the property agreement provision of the parties’ postnuptial agreement; and (2) the district court erred in its determinations of the marital residence’s value, the appropriate setoff for the marital residence, and the division of the marital debts and assets. Remanded. View "Devney v. Devney" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and use of a weapon to commit a felony. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err (1) in finding that Defendant was not deaf or hard of hearing under Neb. Rev. Stat. 20-152, and therefore, in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress statements he made to law enforcement; (2) in finding Defendant competent to stand trial at a competency hearing; and (3) in instructing the jury regarding the definition of the term “deliberation” and regarding sudden quarrel manslaughter. View "State v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Two taxpayers sold their capital stock of a corporation and structured the transaction to comply with the terms of a definitional statute in order to qualify for a special capital gains election. The Nebraska Department of Revenue disallowed the taxpayers’ special capital gains election. The taxpayers filed a petition for redetermination, and the Tax Commissioner denied the petition. The district court affirmed. The taxpayers appealed, asserting that the district court erred in applying the “economic substance” and “sham transaction” doctrines in determining whether they were entitled to the special capital gains election. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the economic substance doctrine and the sham transaction doctrines did not provide a basis to disallow the taxpayers’ election. Remanded. View "Stewart v. Nebraska Dep’t of Revenue" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence and refusing to submit to a chemical test. Both convictions were second offenses. Defendant appealed, challenging the county court’s refusal to grant his motion to quash the charge of refusal to submit to a chemical yes and his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of his arrest. Specifically, Defendant argued that criminalizing refusal was a violation of the constitutional rights to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures and that there was not probable cause to support his arrest. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the county court did not err when it overruled Defendant’s motion to quash and his motion to suppress; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions. View "State v. Pester" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of knowing and intentional child abuse resulting in serious bodily injury for abusing his girlfriend’s three-year-old daughter. The court of appeals reversed Defendant’s conviction and vacated his sentence, concluding that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction, and the Double Jeopardy Clause barred retrial. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding (1) the evidence was legally sufficient to support the conviction; (2) there was no abuse of discretion in Defendant’s sentence of fifteen to thirty years’ imprisonment; and (3) there was no merit to Defendant’s remaining assignments of error. View "State v. Olbricht" on Justia Law

Appellant pled no contest pursuant to a plea agreement to distribution of a controlled substance, a Class III felony. After a hearing, the district court imposed four years of probation. On appeal, Appellant challenged the terms of probation, arguing that the district court exceeded its authority by sentencing him to 180 days’ incremental jail time as part of his sentence of probation, contingent upon any potential future violations of the terms of probation. The Supreme Court agreed with Appellant and vacated the disputed portion of his sentence, holding that, at the time of sentencing, the court had no statutory authority to impose jail time, conditional or otherwise, as part of a sentence of probation for Appellant, a felony offender. Remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Kantaras" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and two counts of use of a weapon to commit a felony. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging various claims of actual innocence, ineffective assistance of trial counsel, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, trial court error, and prosecutorial misconduct. The district court dismissed Appellant’s petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that either Appellant’s claims failed to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate a violation of his constitutional rights or were procedurally barred, or the record showed Defendant was entitled to no relief. View "State v. Dubray" on Justia Law

After a jury-waived trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree sexual assault committed while he was a juvenile. The district court sentenced Defendant to one year’s imprisonment, ordered him to register under Sex Offender Registration Act for life, and found that Defendant was subject to lifetime community supervision. Defendant appealed, arguing that the lifetime requirements were cruel and unusual punishments because he was a juvenile while the crime was committed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) sentencing Defendant to lifetime sex offender registration and lifetime community supervision when he committed the aggravated offense as a juvenile; and (2) sentencing Defendant to lifetime community supervision. View "State v. Boche" on Justia Law

In June 2015, Defendant committed domestic assault of a pregnant female. In August 2015, the Legislature’s enactment of L.B. 605, which changed many sentencing provisions, became effective. One of L.B. 605’s provisions requires courts to impose a sentence of probation for Class IV felony convictions unless an exception applies. This requirement is codified as Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-2204.02(2). In November 2015, the district court sentenced Defendant to a term of twelve to eighteen months’ incarceration for a Class IV felony conviction of domestic assault of a pregnant female. Defendant appealed, arguing that the court erred in failing to apply section 29-2204.02 in sentencing him and in sentencing him to a term of incarceration instead of probation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) was not required retroactively to apply the sentencing requirements under section 29-2204.02; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in imposing a sentence of incarceration instead of probation. View "State v. Benavides" on Justia Law