Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After Child was born to Mother, Appellant agreed to care for Child until Mother was able to do so. Child was later returned to Mother but was subsequently placed temporarily with Appellant by order of the district court. Appellant filed a complaint seeking custody of Child, alleging that she stood in loco parentis to Child. After a custody trial, the district court awarded custody of Child to Appellant and awarded unsupervised visitation to Mother, finding this arrangement to be in the best interests of Child and consistent with parental preference. Mother appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it granted custody of Child to Appellant. View "Windham v. Griffin" on Justia Law

Sandrino T. and Remus M. were each charged in the juvenile court with six counts of ATM “skimming.” In each case, the State moved to transfer to county court. The juvenile court granted the motions. Both Sandrino and Remus appealed. The Supreme Court consolidated the cases on appeal for disposition. The Court then dismissed each appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the orders transferring the cases from juvenile court to county court were not final and appealable because the transfer of the cases from juvenile court to criminal court did not affect the substantial rights of Sandrino and Remus. View "In re Sandrino T." on Justia Law

Bank foreclosed its loan on residential real estate and resold the property to Buyers. The purchase agreement for the transaction contained an arbitration clause. After Buyers learned that another bank had a superior lien against the real estate they sued Bank for damages. Bank filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the purchase agreement. The district court sustained the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the purchase agreement was governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, and Buyers’ claims were subject to the arbitration clause; and (2) there was no merit to Buyers’ other arguments. View "Wilczewski v. Charter West National Bank" on Justia Law

In 1971, David Rice was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In 2012, Rice filed a successive petition for postconviction relief. The petition was filed on Rice’s behalf by attorney Timothy Ashford. Ashford also filed on behalf of Rice a motion to appoint counsel on the basis that Rice was indigent. The court did not rule on the motion to appoint counsel prior to denying postconviction relief. Thereafter, the court entered an order finding that Rice should be allowed to proceed in forma pauperis and appointed Ashford as Rice’s counsel. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed. Thereafter, Ashford filed an application for the allowance of expenses and fees associated with the appeal. The district court denied the application, concluding that the claims for postconviction relief were frivolous, as was the appeal. Ashford appealed. While the appeal was pending, Rice died. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) no substitution of parties was necessary as a result of Rice’s death; and (2) because the district court appointed Ashford as postconviction counsel, the court was statutorily required to fix reasonable expenses and fees. View "State v. Rice" on Justia Law

The State filed an information charging Defendant, a Nebraska prisoner, with assault by a confined person. Defendant later filed two motions seeking relief under the speedy trial provisions of two different legislative acts. Specifically, Defendant filed a motion requesting absolute discharge under Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-1207 and a motion seeking to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction under Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-3805. The district court denied defendant’s motions, concluding that neither time limit required dismissal at the time Defendant filed his motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the speedy trial provisions of section 29-1207 had no application to Defendant; (2) the district court did not clearly err in determining that courtroom unavailability established good cause to extend the time in which to try Defendant; and (3) because the time to try Defendant had not expired when he filed his motion to dismiss the case, the district court properly overruled Defendant’s motion. View "State v. Kolbjornsen" on Justia Law

The maternal grandparents and guardians of Child (together, Grandparents) filed a petition to adopt Child, alleging that Mother had consented to the adoption, that Father had abandoned Child, and that terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights was in Child’s best interests. Father, a non-Indian, answered, alleging that Child was an “Indian child” under the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and the Nebraska Indian Child Welfare Act (NICWA). Neither party disputed that Child met the definition of “Indian child” under those acts. The county court applied both acts, which provide heightened protection to the rights of parents and tribes in proceedings involving adoption of Indian children. Following a hearing, the county court denied the petition because it was unable to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Father had abandoned Child. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) although the ICWA and NICWA apply to this adoption proceeding, not every provision of ICWA and NICWA applies to a non-Indian parent; (2) the county court erred in applying a higher standard of proof to the abandonment element of the NICWA; and (3) the county court erred in finding that Grandparents were not required to show “active efforts” had been made to unite Father and Child. View "In re Adoption of Micah H." on Justia Law

The State filed a petition in juvenile court alleging that sixteen-year-old Tyrone K. committed four counts of theft by receiving stolen property and one count of operating a motor vehicle to avoid arrest. The prosecutor moved to transfer the proceedings to criminal court. The juvenile court granted the motion to transfer after conducting an evidentiary hearing. Tyrone appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence for the juvenile court to transfer his case to criminal court. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the transfer order from which Tyrone appealed was not a final order. View "In re Interest of Tyrone K." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of kidnapping, use of a firearm to commit kidnapping, and conspiracy to commit kidnapping. The district court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment for the kidnapping conviction and ten to thirty years for the use of a weapon to commit a felony conviction, to be served consecutively. The court sentenced Defendant to thirty to fifty years’ imprisonment on the conspiracy conviction, to be served concurrently with the other sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) the district court did not err in overruling Defendant’s motion to quash, in overruling Defendant’s motion for directed verdict, and in sentencing Defendant for kidnapping; (2) Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel; but (3) the trial court plainly erred in sentencing Defendant for the conspiracy conviction. Remanded with directions to resentence Defendant to life imprisonment for the conspiracy conviction. View "State v. Betancourt-Garcia" on Justia Law

The juvenile court adjudicated twin brothers LeVanta S. and LeRonn S. under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(c) as mentally ill and dangerous. The brother were placed in out-of-home care. The juvenile court later changed the brothers’ permanency objective from family reunification to guardianship. Mother and Father appealed from this order in both cases. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the juvenile court’s order affected a substantial right of the parents, and therefore, the order was a final, appealable order; and (2) the juvenile court exceeded its authority by adopting the permanency plan of guardianship in these cases where there had been no adjudication under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a). Remanded. View "In re Interest of LeVanta S." on Justia Law

Defendants in these two cases both pled no contest to the refusal of a chemical test, with three prior convictions for driving under the influence (DUI), under Neb. Rev. Stat. 60-6,197 and Neb. Rev. Stat. 60-6,197.03(8). In both cases, the pleas were accepted and Defendants were found guilty. Defendants filed pleas in bar and motions to quash alleging that application of section 60-6,197.03(8) was inappropriate because the “current violation” referred to therein must mean a current DUI violation and not a refusal violation. The courts denied the motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, contrary to Defendants’ arguments, section 60-6,197.03(8) applies both to persons who violated the DUI statute, section 60-6,196 and to persons who violated the refusal statute, section 60-6,197. View "State v. Wagner" on Justia Law