Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), third offense, with a blood alcohol concentration of .15 or greater. The district court sentenced Defendant to a period of twenty-four months’ probation and, as a condition of probation, ordered Defendant to serve sixty days in the county jail. Defendant appealed, arguing that the court erred in imposing a jail term as a condition of probation, as that is no longer permissible under Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-2262. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a jail term is still available as a condition of probation for a felony DUI because Neb. Rev. Stat. 60-6,197.03(6) is more specific and therefore controls over section 29-2262. View "State v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to robbery. In a separate criminal case, Defendant pleaded no contest to attempted robbery, use of a firearm to commit a felony, and manslaughter. A few days before the sentencing hearing, Defendant moved to withdraw his pleas in both cases, citing newly discovered evidence. After a hearing, the court overruled Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty and no contest pleas. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court did not err by overruling Defendant’s motion to withdraw his pleas because of newly discovered evidence; and (2) Defendant entered the pleas freely, intelligently, voluntarily, and understandingly. View "State v. Carr" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a plea of no contest to sexual assault of a child, third degree. At sentencing, the district court considered the effect of certain amendments made to Nebraska’s sentencing laws by 2015 Neb. Laws, L.B. 605, which reduced the penalties for a variety of felonies and amended the indeterminate sentencing scheme for Nebraska felonies. The court eventually sentenced Defendant to a prison term of fifty-nine to sixty months. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in finding that he was not entitled to the reduction in penalties for Class IIIA felonies implemented by L.B. 605. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the reduced penalties for Class IIIA felonies did not apply retroactively to Defendant because he committed his offense before the effective date of L.B. 605; and (2) Defendant’s sentence was within the statutory limits and was not plain error. View "State v. Aguallo" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of theft by unlawful taking, more than $500 but less than $1500, a class IV felony. The conviction was based on the accusation that Defendant unlawfully took two items belonging to Hymark Towing: a vehicle and a combine trailer. Defendant was charged with one Class III felony under the theory that the values of the vehicle and the combine trailer could be aggregated because they were “pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct.” The jury found Defendant guilty of unlawfully taking both items but found that the items were not taken pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a finding of “one scheme or course of conduct” is not an essential element of the crime of theft, regardless of whether the State is attempting to aggregate amounts pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-518(7), and therefore, the district court was correct in determining, based on the jury verdict, that Defendant was guilty of a Class IV felony theft offense; and (2) there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s conviction. View "State v. Duncan" on Justia Law

In 2006, a Colorado court entered a decree for adult adoption making Plaintiff, who was fifty-eight years old at the time, the heir of Merrill Maddocks under the intestacy laws. In 2014, Merrill died without leaving any surviving children. Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint to quiet title to a section of farmland, arguing that he was the owner of the property because he was the “eldest son” of Merrill under the will of Merrill’s great-uncle. Defendant, the person who takes the property if Plaintiff is not Merrill’s “eldest son,” argued that Plaintiff was not Merrill’s eldest son under the will because “it was not legally possible to adopt an adult” in Nebraska when the great-uncle died. The trial court quieted title in the property in Plaintiff, concluding that Plaintiff was Merrill’s eldest son because the Colorado decree was entitled to full faith and credit in Nebraska. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Merrill and Plaintiff did not have a parent-child relationship, Plaintiff was not Merrill’s “eldest son” under the great-uncle’s will. Remanded with directions to quiet title to the property in Defendant. View "Burnett v. Maddocks" on Justia Law

In 2014, Elizabeth Stanosheck filed for divorce from Joseph Jeanette. After a trial in 2015, the district court entered judgment diving the marital estate. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion in valuing the marital estate at the time of trial rather than the date the divorce was filed; (2) did not abuse its discretion in dividing the remaining proceeds from the sale of the marital home equally, rather than awarding the entire sum to Joseph; but (3) erred in classifying, valuing, and dividing the parties’ retirement accounts. Remanded. View "Stanosheck v. Jeanette" on Justia Law

Hilda Graham (Hilda), the owner of a certificate of deposit (CD), changed the payable-on-death beneficiary to Elaine Cisneros (Cisneros) in 2013. That same year, Hilda appointed Gregory Graham (Graham) as her power of attorney. Graham used the power of attorney to cash the CD and deposit the proceeds into a checking account with right of survivorship that he co-owned with Hilda. When Hilda died, the balance in the checking account became Graham’s by operation of law. Cisneros filed a complaint against Graham. The district court entered summary judgment for Cisneros, concluding that Graham’s actions were fraudulent under a theory of constructive fraud. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err (1) when it determined that Graham lacked authority under the power of attorney to cash the CD and deposit the proceeds into a checking account; (2) when it granted summary judgment for Cisneros’ because there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Hilda ratified Graham’s actions; and (3) when it denied an award of attorney fees to Cisneros. View "Cisneros v. Graham" on Justia Law

Appellants filed a complaint challenging a referendum petition. The purpose of the petition was to refer to the voters in the November 2016 general election the question of whether the death penalty should be reinstated. Appellants sought to enjoin the Secretary of State from placing the referendum on the ballot, alleging that the referendum petition was not legally sufficient because a list of sponsors filed with the petition did not include the name of Governor Pete Ricketts, who allegedly engaged in activities that established that he was a sponsor of the referendum. The district court dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Ricketts’ alleged financial or other support of the referendum did not make him a a person “sponsoring the petition,” as that phrase is used in Neb. Rev. Stat. 32-1405(1); and (2) therefore, the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. View "Hargesheimer v. Gale" on Justia Law

Mother and Father divorced in 2002. The parties share legal custody of their two minor children, and Mother has physical custody. Pursuant to a 2011 parenting plan, Father was to have rights of visitation. In 2015, Father filed a motion for an order for Mother to show cause why she should not be held in contempt for her alleged failure to allow Father to exercise parenting time on certain days. After a hearing, the district court found Mother in contempt of court for willful failure to comply with the district court’s order with regard to parenting time. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not commit clear error in its factual findings; (2) did not abuse its discretion in finding Mother in contempt and in imposing a sixty-day jail sentence; and (3) did not abuse its discretion in modifying the parenting plan within the contempt proceeding to require the parties to obtain written consent of the guardian ad litem before changing the parenting schedule. View "Martin v. Martin" on Justia Law

Appellant, a farmer, owned Dunaway Farm and Rehfeld Farm, both of which were located within the jurisdiction of the Lower Elkhorn Natural Resources District. Beginning in 2010, Appellant used the well on Rehfeld Farm to irrigate Dunaway Farm, which was previously not irrigated. In 2013, the District ordered Appellant to cease and desist irrigating Dunaway Farm because the District’s rules prohibited use of ground water for new irrigated acres within the District’s management area without a variance. Appellant appealed using the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and also filed a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of several of the District’s rules related to irrigation. The district court affirmed the District’s decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) on the APA appeal, there were no errors in the district court’s judicial review of the District’s order; and (2) because the District’s rules are constitutional, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment as to Appellant’s request for a declaratory judgment. View "Lingenfelter v. Lower Elkhorn Natural Res. Dist." on Justia Law