Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Various members of the Doty family gave three deeds of trust (DOT) conveying specific tracts of real estate to West Gate Bank, Inc. as security for certain loans. The DOTs also secured future advances given by the Bank. One advance was documented by Promissory Note 257. The Dotys defaulted on Note 257, and therefore, the Bank exercised its power of sale under one DOT and applied the funds generated by the sale to Note 257. The Dotys later brought a declaratory judgment action asking the district court to declare that the Bank was barred by Neb. Rev. Stat. 76-1013 from recovering any amount still owed under Note 257. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Dotys, concluding that the Bank was barred by the three-month statute of limitations in section 76-1013 from taking action to collect amounts due on Note 257. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court (1) correctly determined that section 76-1013 precludes the Bank from bringing a personal deficiency action against the Dotys for the balance owed under Note 275; but (2) erred in determining that the three-month statute of limitations set forth in section 76-1013 applies to successive foreclosures on remaining collateral. Remanded. View "Doty v. West Gate Bank, Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI). After an enhancement hearing, the district court used Defendant’s conviction from a Missouri court in which Defendant pled guilty to driving while intoxicated to enhance his sentence for DUI. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s pretrial motion to suppress evidence, where Defendant’s initial encounter with the police did not implicate the Fourth Amendment; and (2) the district court did not err in using Defendant’s Missouri conviction to enhance his DUI sentence because a suspended imposition of sentence in a previous case qualifies as a prior conviction under Neb. Rev. Stat. 60-6,197.02. View "State v. Gilliam" on Justia Law

Lionel Simeus filed a complaint against RGR Company LLC with the Lincoln Commission on Human Rights for housing discrimination in violation of section 11.06.020(b) of the Lincoln Municipal Code and 42 U.S.C. 3604(b) of the federal Fair Housing Act. The Commission determined that RGR discriminated against Simeus on the basis of race and national origin and, on behalf of Simeus, filed a charge of discrimination against RGR. After a hearing, the Commission found in favor of Simeus. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that RGR’s proffered reasons for its negative treatment of Simeus were a pretext for discrimination or that Simeus was the victim of intentional discrimination. View "RGR Co., LLC v. Lincoln Comm’n on Human Rights" on Justia Law

Anne and Adam have been married since 1995. From 2003 to 2004, Anne and Bryan engaged in an extramarital affair, during which time Anne had regular sexual intercourse with both Bryan and Adam. In 2004, Anne became pregnant and gave birth to T.B. Adam has raised T.B. with the belief that he is T.B.’s father. In 2012, Bryan requested a DNA test, which revealed a 99.9 percent chance that Bryan is T.B.’s biological father. In 2013, Bryan filed a complaint seeking to establish paternity of T.B. and custody, claiming (1) the four-year statute of limitations provided in Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-411 should be tolled based on misrepresentations of Anne that he was not the father, (2) he should be entitled to bring the action as the next friend of T.B., and (3) section 43-1411 is unconstitutional. The district court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Bryan cannot bring this action as the next friend of T.B. under section 43-1411; (2) under the circumstances, Bryan has shown no basis to toll the statute of limitations; and (3) section 43-1411 is constitutional. View "Bryan M. v. Anne B." on Justia Law

The district court found Defendant guilty of possession of a controlled substance. On appeal, Defendant argued that the court erred in (1) finding that he was uncooperative with police and gave a false name during a traffic stop, and (2) overruling his motion to suppress evidence found during a search of his person. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) law enforcement officers had sufficient probable cause to search Defendant and to arrest him for drug possession; and (2) the district court erred in finding that Defendant was uncooperative during the traffic stop, but the error did not affect the propriety of the court’s ultimate holding. View "State v. Perry" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder. The trial court sentenced Defendant to terms of life-to-life imprisonment for each murder conviction. Defendant appealed, arguing, primarily, that because sudden quarrel provocation negates the malice element of murder, the step instruction for first degree murder violated his due process rights because the jury was not instructed that the State had to prove that the killings were not the result of a sudden quarrel brought about by a sufficient provocation. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding (1) when the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant acted with premeditated and deliberate malice, the jury necessarily simultaneously found no sudden quarrel provocation beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) Defendant’s remaining arguments lacked merit. View "State v. Hinrichsen" on Justia Law

After being married for approximately twenty years, Shelley and Kirk Brozek divorced. The divorce decree divided the marital estate and ordered Kirk to buy some of Shelley’s separate property. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the decree and the court’s order awarding Shelley attorney fees, holding that the district court did not err in (1) ordering Kirk to buy Shelley’s shares in a closely held farming corporation for a price higher than the value determined under a stock redemption agreement; (2) dividing the marital estate and declining to give Kirk credit for premarital property he disposed of during the marriage; (3) awarding Shelley attorney fees after Kirk filed a notice of appeal; and (4) not awarding Shelley alimony, a cash award for the inadequacy of the marital estate, or attorney fees in the decree. View "Brozek v. Brozek" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first degree sexual assault of a person at least twelve but less than sixteen years of age. Defendant filed a direct appeal, but his appeal was dismissed due to the untimely payment of a docket fee or the granting of in forma pauperis status. Defendant subsequently filed a motion seeking postconviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a direct appeal and for various actions made or not made at trial. The district court denied most of Defendant’s motion without a hearing. Following an evidentiary hearing, however, the court awarded Defendant a new direct appeal. This was that appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Court had jurisdiction to decide to decide this appeal; (2) Defendant’s sentence was not excessive; and (3) Defendant could not show that he was prejudiced by any deficient conduct on the part of trial counsel. View "State v. Collins" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of terroristic threats, kidnapping, first degree sexual assault, and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments and that Defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely object to the prosecutor’s improper comments. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the prosecutor’s statements, when considered in the context of all the trial proceedings, were not misconduct because they were not misleading and did not unduly influence the jury; and (2) because counsel cannot be deficient for failing to object to statements that were not misconduct, Defendant was not prejudiced by counsel’s performance. View "State v. McSwine" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance and was sentenced to eight to ten years’ imprisonment. Defendant’s direct appeal was dismissed because his poverty affidavit was untimely filed. Thereafter, Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief alleging that his counsel provided ineffective assistance. The district court denied relief, concluding that Defendant failed to show that his counsel’s performance was deficient. Defendant appealed. The court of appeals vacated the district court’s order and remanded the cause for further proceedings after addressing the procedure the district court should follow when considering a postconviction motion that raises both an allegation that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a direct appeal and other ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, while this Court adopted a slightly different procedure than the one proposed by the court of appeals, the proper disposition of the appeal in this case was that the district court’s order denying certain of Defendant’s postconviction claims should be vacated and the cause remanded. View "State v. Determan" on Justia Law