Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was convicted of possession of a deadly weapon by a felon and found to be a habitual criminal. Defendant was sentenced to ten to fifteen years’ imprisonment, with a mandatory minimum of ten years’ imprisonment due to the habitual criminal enhancement. Petitioner was erroneously discharged from the custody of the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services prior to completing his lawful sentence. Petitioner was subsequently taken back into custody. Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the Department’s continuing exercise of custody. The district court dismissed the habeas petition with prejudice. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot because Petitioner has since been mandatorily discharged and is no longer in the custody of the Department. View "Al-Ameen v. Frakes" on Justia Law

Appellant sustained injuries in an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Appellant filed a petition in the workers’ compensation court seeking temporary and permanent disability benefits. The compensation court awarded Appellant temporary total disability benefits for the period from August 10, 2010 to December 8, 2010 and permanent total disability benefits starting May 2, 2014. The court declined to award Appellant future medical expenses, penalties, attorney fees, or interest. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the compensation court (1) did not commit reversible error in excluding the deposition of a doctor that had been taken in connection with a separate negligence action; (2) did not err when it did not award future medical expenses; but (3) erred in denying temporary total disability benefits for the period from December 9, 2010 through May 1, 2014 without providing an explanation which formed the basis for its ruling. Remanded. View "Tchikobava v. Albatross Express, LLC" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second degree murder. Defendant was fifteen years old at the time of the murder. The district court sentenced Defendant to imprisonment for sixty years to life. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding (1) the district court properly instructed the jury that it would be required to deliberate until 9 p.m. before it could break for the day; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it overruled Defendant’s motion for a new trial based on alleged juror misconduct; and (3) the sentencing process complied with proper juvenile sentencing principles, and the court did not impose an excessive sentence. View "State v. Cardeilhac" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. Defendant appealed, raising fourteen assignments of error. The district court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment for first degree murder. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not commit prejudicial error in (1) overruling Defendant’s evidentiary objections and admitting the challenged evidence; (2) denying Defendant’s first and second motions for mistrial or his motion for a recess and a psychological evaluation; and (3) instructing the jury on intentional manslaughter. Lastly, there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s convictions. View "State v. Grant" on Justia Law

Kim Magana was a parent of a student in the Scottsbluff Public School District (School District) and a member of the School District’s school board (Board). On Magana’s advice, a student authored a letter critical of the curriculum of Patricia Sulu, a teacher at Scottsbluff Senior High School, and mailed it to the School District and the Board. Sulu subsequently resigned. Thereafter, Sulu sued Magana on the theory of tortious interference with a business relationship or expectancy. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Magana. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding that Magana’s actions were “not unjustified” within the meaning of the elements of tortious interference with a business expectancy because Magana provided truthful information and honest advice. View "Sulu v. Magana" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s employment as captain in the Washington County sheriff’s office was terminated after an investigation into his conduct. Plaintiff filed suit against the Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 36 and Michael Robinson, the County sheriff, alleging (1) as against Lodge No. 36, breach of contract arising from the Lodge’s refusal to provide representation after he requested it, and (2) as against Robinson, interference with a business relationship, alleging that Robinson obstructed the Lodge’s ability to fulfill its duty of fair representation. The district court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in dismissing Plaintiff’s amended complaint for failure to file a grievance and in concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction; and (2) did not err in finding that Plaintiff was immune from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. View "Lamb v. Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 36" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s employment as captain in the Washington County sheriff’s office was terminated after an investigation into his conduct. Plaintiff filed suit against the Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 36 and Michael Robinson, the County sheriff, alleging (1) as against Lodge No. 36, breach of contract arising from the Lodge’s refusal to provide representation after he requested it, and (2) as against Robinson, interference with a business relationship, alleging that Robinson obstructed the Lodge’s ability to fulfill its duty of fair representation. The district court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in dismissing Plaintiff’s amended complaint for failure to file a grievance and in concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction; and (2) did not err in finding that Plaintiff was immune from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. View "Lamb v. Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 36" on Justia Law

Appellant was a bystander in an incident where two deputies of the Douglas County Sheriff’s Department took a minor student into custody. Appellant alleged that the deputies injured her by negligently knocking her into a wall and to the ground during the incident. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants - Douglas County and the elected sheriff of the County. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the County and sheriff. The Supreme Court affirmed, albeit on different grounds, holding that there was no issue of material fact in this negligence action that Defendants did not breach their duty, and Defendants were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. View "Phillips v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Landowners filed a complaint for injunctive relief and to quiet title attempting to stop the construction of a home on a lot directly adjacent to their property and asking that title to the lot be quieted in them based on a theory of adverse possession. The district court quieted title to the disputed land in Landowners’ favor, concluding that Landowners had established all of the elements of adverse possession. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Landowners failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that their possession of the subject property was sufficiently notorious to support their claim of adverse possession. View "Poullos v. Pine Crest Homes, LLC" on Justia Law

After EyeCare Specialties, P.C. of Lincoln terminated the employment of Cindy Marshall, Marshall sued, alleging that EyeCare discriminated against her because of her skin condition, tremors, and perceived disability related to her past prescription drug abuse. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of EyeCare. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a genuine issue of material fact existed concerning whether EyeCare discriminated against Marshall because of her skin condition and tremors, both of which EyeCare perceived to substantially limit Marshall’s ability to work; and (2) Marshall failed to present evidence that EyeCare discriminated against her for having a perceived drug addiction that substantially limited one or more major life activities. View "Marshall v. EyeCare Specialties, P.C." on Justia Law