Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of terroristic threats, kidnapping, first degree sexual assault, and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments and that Defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely object to the prosecutor’s improper comments. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the prosecutor’s statements, when considered in the context of all the trial proceedings, were not misconduct because they were not misleading and did not unduly influence the jury; and (2) because counsel cannot be deficient for failing to object to statements that were not misconduct, Defendant was not prejudiced by counsel’s performance. View "State v. McSwine" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance and was sentenced to eight to ten years’ imprisonment. Defendant’s direct appeal was dismissed because his poverty affidavit was untimely filed. Thereafter, Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief alleging that his counsel provided ineffective assistance. The district court denied relief, concluding that Defendant failed to show that his counsel’s performance was deficient. Defendant appealed. The court of appeals vacated the district court’s order and remanded the cause for further proceedings after addressing the procedure the district court should follow when considering a postconviction motion that raises both an allegation that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a direct appeal and other ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, while this Court adopted a slightly different procedure than the one proposed by the court of appeals, the proper disposition of the appeal in this case was that the district court’s order denying certain of Defendant’s postconviction claims should be vacated and the cause remanded. View "State v. Determan" on Justia Law

William Lorenz died in 2010. The county court admitted William’s last will and testament and two codicils to formal probate and also appointed William’s daughter, Theresa Lorenz, as personal representative of the estate. Alice Shea, William’s former wife, filed a petition challenging the rejection of her claims in the estate, seeking the appointment of a special administrator and challenging the second codicil of William’s will. The county court awarded summary judgment to Theresa except in regard to Alice’s claims regarding alimony and interest on a late payment. The court of appeals affirmed the county court’s order but modified the court’s dismissal of Alice’s request for the appointment of a special administrator to reflect that the request should have been dismissed without prejudice. Theresa petitioned for further review, assigning three errors relating to the issue of the special administrator. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the court of appeals (1) erred in concluding that Alice’s filing of her claims and petition for allowance of those claims was sufficient written demand under Neb. Rev. Stat. 30-2726; and (2) erred in modifying the dismissal of Alice’s request for the appointment of a special administrator without prejudice. View "In re Estate of Lorenz" on Justia Law

Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-1502(2) imposes a requirement and specifies a consequence for its violation. In this case, a taxpayer filed a property valuation protest. The taxpayer’s protest form specified the assessed and requested valuation amounts but stated no reason for the requested change. The Lincoln County Board of Equalization dismissed the protest, citing section 77-1502(2). The taxpayer appealed to the Nebraska Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC). TERC dismissed the appeal with prejudice, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction because the Board did not have jurisdiction to hear the protest due to the taxpayer’s failure to state the reason for the protest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board correctly dismissed the taxpayer’s protest because the protest failed to include a reason for the requested change in valuation; and (2) because the Board lacked authority to hear the taxpayer’s property valuation protest on the merits, TERC likewise lacked authority to do so. View "Village at North Platte v. Lincoln County Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

Appellant, an inmate, applied for reclassification of his custody level from medium custody to minimum custody. The Department of Correctional Services determined that Appellant’s classification should remain at medium custody. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se petition in the district court seeking judicial review of DCS’ decision. The district court sustained the DCS’ motion to dismiss, concluding that DCS’ decision regarding Defendant’s level of custody was not made in a “contested case” and, therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The court of appeals agreed with the district court’s conclusion and dismissed Appellant’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the DCS’ decision was not made in a “contested case” as defined in the APA; and (2) therefore, the district court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review the level of custody decision. View "Purdie v. Neb. Dep’t of Corr. Servs." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of violating Neb. Rev. Stat. 60-6,198(1), which criminalizes the act of proximately causing serious bodily injury to another while driving under the influence of alcohol. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred by failing to strictly construe the proximate cause element of section 60-6,198(1) to require a “but for” causal analysis of proximate cause, and that, had it done so, it could not have found him guilty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State met its burden of proving that Defendant’s act of driving while under the influence was both a “but for” cause and a proximate cause of serious bodily injury; and (2) because the serious bodily injury was a direct and natural result of Defendant’s act of driving while under the influence and there was no efficient intervening cause, a reasonable trier of fact could find that the State met its burden of proof on causation. View "State v. Irish" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit unlawful possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) admitting the testimony of a police officer concerning the meaning of certain cell phone calls and text messages between Defendant and other persons involved in the drug conspiracy; (2) denying Defendant’s motions to continue trial or exclude the testimony of a witness despite the State’s failure to timely disclose the person’s status as a witness; and (3) convicting Defendant of a Class 1B felony instead of a Class II felony and sentencing Defendant to twenty to twenty-five years’ imprisonment. View "State v. Russell" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second degree murder. For reasons not relevant to this appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the cause for another trial. On remand, after a jury-waived trial, Defendant was again found guilty of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a term of imprisonment of forty years to life. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) finding certain witnesses unavailable and admitting transcripts of their testimony from the first trial; (2) admitting hearsay testimony under the excited utterance exception; (3) admitting a transcript of a jail call between Defendant and his father; and (4) sentencing Defendant. View "State v. Trice" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were walking in the direction of Defendants’ home when Defendants’ dogs ran in Plaintiffs’ direction, barking and growling. One of the plaintiffs stumbled and fell when backing away from the dogs, but neither of the dogs touched Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs filed this action under Neb. Rev. Stat. 54-601(1), which imposes liability upon dog owners for damages caused by their dogs “chasing” or “injuring” any person or persons, among other things. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment without considering every relevant definition of the terms “chase” and “injure.” Remanded. View "Grammer v. Lucking" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree sexual assault of a child and related crimes. Defendant was sentenced to forty-one to 110 years of imprisonment, thirty-five of those years being “hard” years. Defendant appealed both his convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and remanded the cause for resentencing, holding (1) the trial court did not err in admitting certain exhibits into evidence; (2) the trial court did not err in admitting testimony regarding Defendant’s photo albums; (3) the trial court did not err in allowing hearsay testimony as prior consistent statements; (4) there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions; (5) Defendant waived his right to assert the issue that the court erred in not declaring a mistrial due to prosecutorial misconduct; and (6) the trial court made a mistake in law in imposing Defendant’s sentences. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law