Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Marilyn Waldron, a seventy-eight-year-old woman, sustained injuries when Deputy Sheriff James Roark and his partner entered Waldron’s home to serve an arrest warrant on Waldron’s grandson. Waldron brought this action against Roark pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the entry was in violation of the Fourth Amendment and that Roark used excessive force against her. The district court granted summary judgment to Roark, concluding that the circumstances justified the deputies’ entry into the home and that Roark’s use of force was objectively reasonable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a question of fact existed as to whether Roark’s entry into Waldron’s home violated her rights under the Fourth Amendment; and (2) a question of fact existed as to whether the force Roark used was excessive. Remanded. View "Waldron v. Roark" on Justia Law

Opal Lowman was injured in an automobile accident. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company provided underinsured motorist coverage to Opal and her husband. The Lowmans sued State Farm, seeking damages. The jury returned a verdict for the Lowmans in the amount of $0. The Lowmans filed a motion for a new trial, which was overruled. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err when it entered judgment on the jury’s verdict where the jury awarded the Lowmans no money damages; and (2) the district court did not err in denying the Lowmans’ motion for new trial. View "Lowman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of felony murder, use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and conspiracy to commit robbery. Defendant was sentenced to consecutive terms of life imprisonment, forty to fifty years’ imprisonment, and ten to twenty years’ imprisonment, respectively. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) overruling various pretrial motions, including a motion in limine and a motion to suppress; (2) instructing the jury; (3) overruling Defendant’s motion for a motion for a bill of particulars; (4) overruling Defendant’s motion to sever the conspiracy to commit robbery count from the other three counts for trial; and (5) admitting and handling certain evidence. View "State v. Henry" on Justia Law

The district court dissolved the marriage of Kimberly and Michael, awarded Kimberly custody of the parties’ minor children, and ordered Michael to pay child support. After Michael became disabled, the State, as intervenor, filed a complaint to modify the child support order. A child support referee recommended that the court reduce Michael’s child support payments. The court entered an order purporting to approve the recommendations contingent on neither party’s filing exceptions during the next two weeks. Kimberly appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the order from which Kimberly appealed was conditional and therefore not a final, appealable order. View "Stevens v. Stevens" on Justia Law

The juvenile court found Tavian B. to be a child who lacks proper parental care by reason of the fault or habits of his parents and to be in a situation dangerous to life or limb or injurious to his health or morals. The State subsequently filed a motion to terminate the parental rights of both parents. Father filed a motion to transfer jurisdiction to the Oglala Sioux Tribal Juvenile Court pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Before the juvenile court ruled on Father’s motion to transfer, the State withdrew its motion to terminate parental rights. Thereafter, the juvenile court concluded that good cause existed to overrule Father’s motion to transfer jurisdiction to the tribal court because the proceedings were in “an advanced stage.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State did not meet its burden of establishing good cause to deny transfer to tribal court, and therefore, the district court abused its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion to transfer. View "In re Interest of Tavian B." on Justia Law

Various members of the Doty family gave three deeds of trust (DOT) conveying specific tracts of real estate to West Gate Bank, Inc. as security for certain loans. The DOTs also secured future advances given by the Bank. One advance was documented by Promissory Note 257. The Dotys defaulted on Note 257, and therefore, the Bank exercised its power of sale under one DOT and applied the funds generated by the sale to Note 257. The Dotys later brought a declaratory judgment action asking the district court to declare that the Bank was barred by Neb. Rev. Stat. 76-1013 from recovering any amount still owed under Note 257. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Dotys, concluding that the Bank was barred by the three-month statute of limitations in section 76-1013 from taking action to collect amounts due on Note 257. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court (1) correctly determined that section 76-1013 precludes the Bank from bringing a personal deficiency action against the Dotys for the balance owed under Note 275; but (2) erred in determining that the three-month statute of limitations set forth in section 76-1013 applies to successive foreclosures on remaining collateral. Remanded. View "Doty v. West Gate Bank, Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI). After an enhancement hearing, the district court used Defendant’s conviction from a Missouri court in which Defendant pled guilty to driving while intoxicated to enhance his sentence for DUI. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s pretrial motion to suppress evidence, where Defendant’s initial encounter with the police did not implicate the Fourth Amendment; and (2) the district court did not err in using Defendant’s Missouri conviction to enhance his DUI sentence because a suspended imposition of sentence in a previous case qualifies as a prior conviction under Neb. Rev. Stat. 60-6,197.02. View "State v. Gilliam" on Justia Law

Lionel Simeus filed a complaint against RGR Company LLC with the Lincoln Commission on Human Rights for housing discrimination in violation of section 11.06.020(b) of the Lincoln Municipal Code and 42 U.S.C. 3604(b) of the federal Fair Housing Act. The Commission determined that RGR discriminated against Simeus on the basis of race and national origin and, on behalf of Simeus, filed a charge of discrimination against RGR. After a hearing, the Commission found in favor of Simeus. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that RGR’s proffered reasons for its negative treatment of Simeus were a pretext for discrimination or that Simeus was the victim of intentional discrimination. View "RGR Co., LLC v. Lincoln Comm’n on Human Rights" on Justia Law

Anne and Adam have been married since 1995. From 2003 to 2004, Anne and Bryan engaged in an extramarital affair, during which time Anne had regular sexual intercourse with both Bryan and Adam. In 2004, Anne became pregnant and gave birth to T.B. Adam has raised T.B. with the belief that he is T.B.’s father. In 2012, Bryan requested a DNA test, which revealed a 99.9 percent chance that Bryan is T.B.’s biological father. In 2013, Bryan filed a complaint seeking to establish paternity of T.B. and custody, claiming (1) the four-year statute of limitations provided in Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-411 should be tolled based on misrepresentations of Anne that he was not the father, (2) he should be entitled to bring the action as the next friend of T.B., and (3) section 43-1411 is unconstitutional. The district court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Bryan cannot bring this action as the next friend of T.B. under section 43-1411; (2) under the circumstances, Bryan has shown no basis to toll the statute of limitations; and (3) section 43-1411 is constitutional. View "Bryan M. v. Anne B." on Justia Law

The district court found Defendant guilty of possession of a controlled substance. On appeal, Defendant argued that the court erred in (1) finding that he was uncooperative with police and gave a false name during a traffic stop, and (2) overruling his motion to suppress evidence found during a search of his person. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) law enforcement officers had sufficient probable cause to search Defendant and to arrest him for drug possession; and (2) the district court erred in finding that Defendant was uncooperative during the traffic stop, but the error did not affect the propriety of the court’s ultimate holding. View "State v. Perry" on Justia Law