Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant, an inmate, applied for reclassification of his custody level from medium custody to minimum custody. The Department of Correctional Services determined that Appellant’s classification should remain at medium custody. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se petition in the district court seeking judicial review of DCS’ decision. The district court sustained the DCS’ motion to dismiss, concluding that DCS’ decision regarding Defendant’s level of custody was not made in a “contested case” and, therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The court of appeals agreed with the district court’s conclusion and dismissed Appellant’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the DCS’ decision was not made in a “contested case” as defined in the APA; and (2) therefore, the district court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review the level of custody decision. View "Purdie v. Neb. Dep’t of Corr. Servs." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of violating Neb. Rev. Stat. 60-6,198(1), which criminalizes the act of proximately causing serious bodily injury to another while driving under the influence of alcohol. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred by failing to strictly construe the proximate cause element of section 60-6,198(1) to require a “but for” causal analysis of proximate cause, and that, had it done so, it could not have found him guilty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State met its burden of proving that Defendant’s act of driving while under the influence was both a “but for” cause and a proximate cause of serious bodily injury; and (2) because the serious bodily injury was a direct and natural result of Defendant’s act of driving while under the influence and there was no efficient intervening cause, a reasonable trier of fact could find that the State met its burden of proof on causation. View "State v. Irish" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit unlawful possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) admitting the testimony of a police officer concerning the meaning of certain cell phone calls and text messages between Defendant and other persons involved in the drug conspiracy; (2) denying Defendant’s motions to continue trial or exclude the testimony of a witness despite the State’s failure to timely disclose the person’s status as a witness; and (3) convicting Defendant of a Class 1B felony instead of a Class II felony and sentencing Defendant to twenty to twenty-five years’ imprisonment. View "State v. Russell" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second degree murder. For reasons not relevant to this appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the cause for another trial. On remand, after a jury-waived trial, Defendant was again found guilty of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a term of imprisonment of forty years to life. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) finding certain witnesses unavailable and admitting transcripts of their testimony from the first trial; (2) admitting hearsay testimony under the excited utterance exception; (3) admitting a transcript of a jail call between Defendant and his father; and (4) sentencing Defendant. View "State v. Trice" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were walking in the direction of Defendants’ home when Defendants’ dogs ran in Plaintiffs’ direction, barking and growling. One of the plaintiffs stumbled and fell when backing away from the dogs, but neither of the dogs touched Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs filed this action under Neb. Rev. Stat. 54-601(1), which imposes liability upon dog owners for damages caused by their dogs “chasing” or “injuring” any person or persons, among other things. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment without considering every relevant definition of the terms “chase” and “injure.” Remanded. View "Grammer v. Lucking" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree sexual assault of a child and related crimes. Defendant was sentenced to forty-one to 110 years of imprisonment, thirty-five of those years being “hard” years. Defendant appealed both his convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and remanded the cause for resentencing, holding (1) the trial court did not err in admitting certain exhibits into evidence; (2) the trial court did not err in admitting testimony regarding Defendant’s photo albums; (3) the trial court did not err in allowing hearsay testimony as prior consistent statements; (4) there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions; (5) Defendant waived his right to assert the issue that the court erred in not declaring a mistrial due to prosecutorial misconduct; and (6) the trial court made a mistake in law in imposing Defendant’s sentences. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was acquitted of first degree sexual assault and convicted of attempted first degree sexual assault. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial. Thereafter, the State filed a motion to amend the information. Defendant filed a plea in bar on double jeopardy grounds. The district court denied the plea in bar. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the operative information, after the amendment, violated Defendant’s right to not be subject to double jeopardy because the primary issue had already been litigated and decided in Defendant’s favor. View "State v. Lavalleur" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of four felonies arising from his assaults of his former wife. Defendant appealed, arguing that the State violated his Sixth Amendment right to confidential communications with his counsel and the right to have appointment of trial counsel without the interference of the prosecutor because a series prosecutors had possession of his confidential trial strategy before his trial. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment and vacated Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) when Defendant’s confidential trial strategy was disclosed to prosecuting attorneys, a rebuttable presumption arose that Defendant’s trial was tainted by a Sixth Amendment violation; and (2) the court’s procedures were inadequate to rebut this presumption and ensure that Defendant received a fair trial. View "State v. Bain" on Justia Law

The Omaha Police Officers Association (Union) and the City of Omaha (City) entered into a collective bargaining agreement that was to remain in effect from 2008 until 2013. In 2014, the Union filed a complaint against the City requesting that the district court declare that the collective bargaining agreement between the Union and the City had rolled over to the 2014 calendar year. In support of its complaint, the Union claimed that the City did not timely provide written notice of its intent to negotiate or modify the terms of the contract for 2014. The City, in turn, argued that the Union’s action was barred by the doctrines of waiver and equitable estoppel. The district court granted summary judgment to the Union. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the City failed to establish the required elements of equitable estoppel; (2) the Union did not waive its stated intention to allow the Contract to extend for another year; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the parties to pay their own attorney fees. View "Omaha Police Union Local 101 v. City of Omaha" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of four counts of criminal nonsupport for failing to pay four months of child support. The district court found Defendant was a habitual criminal and enhanced his sentences accordingly. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s convictions; (2) the district court did not violate the Sixth Amendment when it failed to submit to the jury the issue of whether Defendant’s nonsupport was in violation of any order of the court; (3) there was no error in the court’s failure to require a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense of misdemeanor criminal nonsupport; (4) the State violated Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-2221 in by failing to give Defendant three-day notice of the enhancement hearing, but the violation did not require reversal; and (5) Defendant’s sentences were not excessive and were not in violation of the Eighth Amendment. View "State v. Erpelding" on Justia Law