Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of one count of third degree sexual assault of a child and three counts of first degree sexual assault of a child. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions; (2) the district court did not err in admitting evidence of other bad acts/uncharged misconduct; (3) the district court did not err in answering the jury’s question about the exact time of the commission of the offense alleged in count one; and (4) there was plain error in the sentences given by the district court, and the sentences are hereby amended by reducing the mandatory minimum sentence that Defendant must serve before he is eligible for good time from twenty-five years imposed by the district court to fifteen years as provided by Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-319.01(2). View "State v. Samayoa" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for the first degree murder conviction. Defendant later filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief, alleging that she received ineffective assistance of counsel, that the district court erred when it admitted evidence related to prior bad acts and other evidence, and that she was actually innocent. The district court denied the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no merit to Defendant’s assignments of error. View "State v. DeJong" on Justia Law

Thirteen-year-old Efrain Ramos-Domingo was struck and killed by a Union Pacific Railroad Company train in Schuyler. Plaintiff, Efrain’s mother, as personal representative of Efrain’s estate, filed a wrongful death action against Union Pacific. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Union Pacific, concluding that Union Pacific did not breach its standard of care and that Efrain violated his duty to look and listen for the approaching train and to obey the crossing gate. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in concluding as a matter of law that Union Pacific was not negligent and that Efrain was contributorily negligent sufficient to bar his recovery. Remanded. View "Gonzalez v. Union Pacific R.R. Co." on Justia Law

After Eric Zornes won a lottery, Eric and his wife, Julia, commenced a gifting plan to Andy Wolfe, Jason Wolfe, and Jason Reed. These gifts were structured as loans, and each borrower made a promissory note for his loan, payable to Julia’s and Eric’s revocable trusts jointly. Andy’s note was secured by a deed of trust for real property. Julia and Eric later divorced pursuant to a settlement agreement. When Eric found that Andy’s house had been sold and that Julia had retained the proceeds of the sale, Eric filed this complaint alleging that Julia had converted the proceeds of Andy’s note. Julia counterclaimed for partition of the Jason Wolfe and Jason Reed notes. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Julia, concluding that even if Julia had converted the proceeds, the settlement agreement operated as an accord and satisfaction. The court also ordered partition of the promissory notes for Jason Wolfe’s and Jason Reed’s loans. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Eric was not entitled to summary judgment on his conversion claim; (2) the settlement agreement did not constitute an accord and satisfaction; and (3) the lower court erred in the method by which it partitioned the Jason Wolfe and Jason Reed notes. View "Zornes v. Zornes" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded no contest to second degree sexual assault. Defendant appealed, claiming that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the State’s alleged breach of the plea agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the State materially breached the plea agreement but that the Court could not resolve Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim because the record did not show if Defendant’s trial counsel had a strategic reason for not objecting. Thereafter, Defendant moved for postconviction relief. After an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court overruled the motion, concluding that the State’s breach of the plea agreement had not made the proceeding “fundamentally unfair” and that an objection would have “no merit.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to object to the State’s material breach of the plea agreement. Remanded. View "State v. Sidzyik" on Justia Law

The decedent in this case died in 2011. The contestants of her will objected to the petition to admit to probate either the decedent’s February 2011 will or her August 2001 will, alleging that the wills were invalid because the decedent lacked testamentary capacity and because the devises were the result of undue influence. After a trial, the jury found that the 2011 will was valid. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly refused to instruct the jury regarding a “presumption of undue influence”; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion responding to a jury question or in admitting, in part, a video of the execution of the 2001 will. View "In re Estate of Clinger" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant, a maintenance supervisor at the Nebraska Correctional Center for Women, was convicted of first degree sexual abuse of an inmate. Defendant was sentenced to one to two years’ imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made during a polygraph examination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress, because while Defendant may have had a subjective belief that he was compelled to take the polygraph examination on threat of the loss of his job, the belief was not objectively reasonable. View "State v. Weichman" on Justia Law

Defendant’s dump truck struck the rear of a car that had stopped or slow due to highway construction. The collision forced the car off the highway, causing it to roll. The driver was killed as a result. Defendant was subsequently convicted of “unlawful act manslaughter” in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-305. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of manslaughter. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with directions to vacate Defendant’s conviction and sentence, holding that the State did not prove that Defendant acted with the mens era required to convict him under section 28-305. View "State v. Carman" on Justia Law

This appeal was the third appeal from a judicial dissociation of four partners from a family agricultural partnership. The partnership had assets consisting primarily of real estate. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the district court, in recalculating the buyout distributions, correctly implemented the Court’s mandate from the second appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the district court did not err in (1) excluding certain evidence; (2) calculating the buyout distribution on remand; and (3) ordering that such distributions be paid to the clerk of the district court. View "Robertson v. Jacobs Cattle Co." on Justia Law

In 1999, Appellant was convicted by a jury of first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. Appellant was sentenced to life in prison for the murder conviction. In 2009, Appellant filed a second motion for postconviction relief, along with a motion for new trial and a motion for writ of error coram nobis, alleging newly discovered evidence. In 2010, Appellant was permitted to file a third amended motion for postconviction relief adding allegations of newly discovered evidence. The district court dismissed the postconviction action pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-3003 because the motions for new trial and for writ of error coram nobis were still pending in the district court, concluding that Appellant’s simultaneous motions were an acknowledgement that the postconviction motion was not the exclusive remedy available to him as required by section 29-3003. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Appellant had no possibility of obtaining relief through his motion for new trial and motion for writ of error coram nobis that were filed simultaneously with the postconviction motion, the district court erred in dismissing the postconviction action under section 29-3003. View "State v. Harris" on Justia Law