Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Otoe County School District 66-0111 (the District) and Facilities Cost Management Group, LLC (FCMG) entered into a contract whereby FCMG provided services in connection with the construction and renovation of three schools within the District. FCMG later filed suit against the District, alleging breach of contract for the District’s failure to pay the full amount due under the contract. The parties filed cross-motions for partially summary judgment on the issue of whether the contract was ambiguous, specifically sections 11.2 and 12.7. The district court determined that sections 12.7 and 11.2 were not ambiguous and granted summary judgment in favor of FCMG. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court did not err when it determined that section 12.7 of the contract is not ambiguous, but the court erred when it determined that section 11.2 is not ambiguous; and (2) therefore, the district court committed prejudicial error when it instructed the jury that “the contract in this case is not ambiguous.” Remanded for a new trial. View "Facilities Cost Mgmt. Group v. Otoe Cty. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant, who is Chinese and only speaks “some English,” was convicted of driving under the influence, third offense. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence of a chemical breath test, arguing he was not properly advised of his right to obtain an evaluation by an independent physician and additional laboratory testing because, despite an obvious language barrier, the arresting officer failed to ensure that he understood his rights in a language he could understand. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction, holding that the district court did not err when it determined that there was neither a statutory nor constitutional requirement for the officer to advise Defendant of his right to independent evaluation and testing under Neb. Rev. Stat. 60-6,199, and therefore, the officer’s failure to give an advisement in a language Defendant understood was not a violation of his due process or equal protection rights. View "State v. Wang" on Justia Law

The County of Sarpy Board of Commissioners adopted a resolution amending an overlay district zoning ordinance. The revised ordinance exempted properties platted before the effective date of the original ordinance. The owner of nonexempt property brought a declaratory judgment action against the county claiming that the exemption was unconstitutional. The district court entered judgment in favor of the county. The owner appealed, arguing that the court erred in determining that the exemption did not constitute special legislation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the exemption was not unconstitutional special legislation because it did not create a closed class and its application was not arbitrary or unreasonable. View "Dowd Grain Co. v. County of Sarpy" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree assault, two counts of second degree assault, and two counts of use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentences, holding (1) Defendant’s convictions and sentences for both first degree assault and second degree assault with respect to each victim did not violate his rights against double jeopardy; (2) the district court’s evidentiary rulings were not erroneous and did not violate Defendant’s right of confrontation or his right to present a complete defense; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant’s motion for a new trial. View "State v. Ballew" on Justia Law

Under Neb. Rev. Stat. 71-1207, a mental health board “shall” hold a hearing within seven days after the subject is taken into emergency protective custody. Appellant was convicted of sexual assault on a child. Before Appellant finished his sentence, the Mental Health Board of the Fourth Judicial District (Board) issued a warrant directing that Appellant remain in custody under the Sex Offender Commitment Act (SOCA) until a commitment hearing. The hearing was held approximately five weeks later. The Board determined that Appellant was a dangerous sex offender and placed him in the custody of the Department of Health and Human Services for inpatient treatment. Appellant petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the Board’s failure to hold a hearing within seven days violated the SOCA and his right to due process. The district court dismissed Appellant’s habeas petition, concluding that the seven-day time limit in section 71-1207 is directory, not mandatory. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the seven-day time limit for holding a hearing under the statute is directory, and therefore, the untimeliness of the commitment hearing in this case did not deprive the Board of jurisdiction. View "D.I. v. Gibson" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with three counts of third degree domestic assault arising from the same incident. Each count alleged that Defendant had violated a different subsection of the same statute. The court subsequently dismissed one count. The jury proceeded to convict Defendant of one count and acquitted her of the other. On appeal, Defendant argued that the State could not charge her with multiple counts under a single statute if each count arose from the same incident. The district court concluded that the presence of multiple counts in the information required it to reverse Defendant’s conviction. The Supreme Court sustained the State’s objection to the district court’s judgment, as the State did not punish Defendant multiple times for the same offense or subject her to multiple prosecutions. View "State v. Kleckner" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with three counts of third degree domestic assault arising from the same incident. Each count alleged that Defendant had violated a different subsection of the same statute. The court subsequently dismissed one count. The jury proceeded to convict Defendant of one count and acquitted her of the other. On appeal, Defendant argued that the State could not charge her with multiple counts under a single statute if each count arose from the same incident. The district court concluded that the presence of multiple counts in the information required it to reverse Defendant’s conviction. The Supreme Court sustained the State’s objection to the district court’s judgment, as the State did not punish Defendant multiple times for the same offense or subject her to multiple prosecutions. View "State v. Kleckner" on Justia Law

While replacing the fence along the property of Tedd Bish Farm and its owner (collectively, Bish) Southwest Fencing Services, LLC damaged a section a pipe that fed the farm's irrigation system . Bish sought damages for repair of the pipe and lost profits from loss of use of the pipe for the 2012 crop year. The county court granted Southwest Fencing’s motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether Bish had made reasonable efforts to mitigate its damages. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, where reasonable minds could not differ concerning Bish’s efforts to mitigate, the district court did not err in affirming the county court’s order granting partial summary judgment for Southwest Fencing with respect to the issue of mitigation. View "Tedd Bish Farm v. Southwest Fencing Servs." on Justia Law

While replacing the fence along the property of Tedd Bish Farm and its owner (collectively, Bish) Southwest Fencing Services, LLC damaged a section a pipe that fed the farm's irrigation system . Bish sought damages for repair of the pipe and lost profits from loss of use of the pipe for the 2012 crop year. The county court granted Southwest Fencing’s motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether Bish had made reasonable efforts to mitigate its damages. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, where reasonable minds could not differ concerning Bish’s efforts to mitigate, the district court did not err in affirming the county court’s order granting partial summary judgment for Southwest Fencing with respect to the issue of mitigation. View "Tedd Bish Farm v. Southwest Fencing Servs." on Justia Law

John Joubert murdered two children in 1983. Mark Pettit was in the process of writing a book about Joubert when he attempted to gain access to two graphic drawings that Joubert had created while Joubert was on death row. The drawing had been confiscated as contraband by authorities with the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services (DCS). The prison warden refused to release the drawings to Pettit, and Joubert was subsequently executed. In 2013, as the thirtieth anniversary of Joubert’s crimes approached, Pettit requested access to the drawings for inspection and reproduction. DCS refused the request, stating that the drawings had been placed in Joubert’s institutional file and were not subject to further disclosure by DCS. The district court ordered DCS to permit Pettit to inspect, examine, and reproduce the confiscated drawings, concluding that Pettit had showed good cause for inspection and reproduction of the drawings. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Pettit failed to demonstrate a legally sufficient reason for inspection of the drawings. View "Pettit v. Neb. Dept. of Corr. Servs." on Justia Law