Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance and was found to be a habitual criminal. Defendant later filed an amended motion for postconviction relief, stating that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in various respects. The district court denied Defendant’s claims after an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of postconviction relief, holding (1) the State waived the limitation period for filing the postconviction motion under Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-3001(4) when it failed to raise the defense in the district court; and (2) Defendant’s assignments of error were without merit. View "State v. Crawford" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured when he fell off a truck following a customer appreciation supper held by his employer (Defendant). The Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court concluded that Plaintiff was injured in the course and scope of his employment, thus making Defendant liable for the injury. Defendant appealed, arguing that the compensation court applied the wrong legal standard in its finding that Defendant received a “substantial benefit” from Plaintiff’s attendance at the supper, when the correct legal standard for the test is a “substantial direct benefit.” The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding that the compensation court applied the wrong legal standard. Remanded for an application of the correct standard. View "Jacobitz v. Aurora Coop." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of three counts of first degree murder and one count of theft by deception over $1,500. After a sentencing determination hearing, Defendant was sentenced to three life sentences on the murder counts and twenty years’ imprisonment on the theft by deception count, to be served consecutively. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) not granting Defendant’s Batson challenge; (2) denying Defendant’s request to sequester the jury during the trial; (3) denying Defendant’s motion to suppress; (4) denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss due to the deportation of several witnesses; (5) denying Defendant’s motion for advance ruling on certain evidentiary issues; (6) admitting the testimony of the State’s handwriting expert; (7) not allowing Defendant to admit evidence of his alibi witness; (8) not admitting evidence of a reenactment of the murders; (9) admitting a photograph of the victims; (10) denying Defendant’s motion for a new trail based on newly discovered evidence and based on the State’s opening statements; and (11) not granting a mistrial or striking the testimony of the State’s forensic anthropologist and dentist and in admitting photographs of skeletal remains. View "State v. Oliveria-Coutinho" on Justia Law

An employee at a boiler manufacturing plant sustained permanent hearing loss as a result of his employment. Between the time he was injured and the time he filed his workers’ compensation claim, the plant changed ownership. Twin City Fire Insurance Company insured the plant for the previous owner, and American Insurance Company insured the new owner. Counsel representing American mistakenly believed that American had insured the plant during the time of the injury, and Twin City was not given notice of the claim until after entry of an award. The new owner of the plant filed a declaratory judgment action against the previous owner and both insurers to determine who was liable for payment of the award. The district court determined that Twin City was liable for the employee’s workers’ compensation award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding that Twin City was liable for the award, in rejecting Twin City’s equitable defenses, and in dismissing Twin City’s counterclaims. View "Cleaver-Brooks Inc. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant, a company providing optometric care, as a clinical technician. Defendant terminated Plaintiff on the grounds that Plaintiff consistently failed to meet performance expectations over her five years of employment. Plaintiff filed suit, claiming unlawful discrimination based upon a perceived disability. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that summary judgment was not proper where there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment based upon Defendant’s perception that Defendant had a disability. Remanded. View "Marshall v. EyeCare Specialities, P.C." on Justia Law

Laura Binder and Glenn Binder were in their nineties when the trial court dissolved their marriage. The court ordered Glenn to pay $3,302 per month in alimony. Glenn appealed, arguing that that the amount of alimony was a presumptive abuse of discretion because it drove his net monthly income below the poverty threshold in the Nebraska Child Support Guidelines. In support of his argument, Glenn cited Gress v. Gress, where the Supreme Court held that the subsistence limitation in the Guidelines also applied to an alimony award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Guidelines do not apply in this case because the parties have no minor children; and (2) the alimony award was not an abuse of discretion under the circumstances. View "Binder v. Binder" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of driving during revocation in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. 60-4,108(1). Defendant was sentenced to thirty days of jail time and nine months of probation. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction where the only evidence presented at trial besides Defendant’s driving record was the testimony of a local law enforcement officer who testified that he found Defendant driving in a Wal-Mart parking lot. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction, vacated his sentence, and remanded for resentencing, holding (1) because the Wal-Mart parking lot was open to public access, the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction for violating section 60-4,108(1); and (2) the county court committed plain error when it failed to revoke Defendant’s operator’s license for one year as required by section 60-4,108(1). View "State v. Frederick" on Justia Law

In 2010, Appellant was administratively adjudicated in Kansas to have committed the offense of driving under the influence. In 2013, Appellant was convicted in South Dakota of driving under the influence. Thereafter, the Nebraska Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) revoked Appellant’s commercial driver’s license (CDL) for life pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 60-4,168. The district court affirmed the lifetime revocation. Appellant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in finding that the Kansas administrative license revocation and the South Dakota conviction for driving under the influence were offenses included in section 60-4,168(1)(a) and therefore provided a basis to revoke his CDL. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that out-of-state convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol are included in the provisions of section 60-4,168 pertaining to the revocation of CDLs. View "Klug v. Neb. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sustained injuries at a motel while he was on duty for Union Pacific Railroad Company. Plaintiff sued Union Pacific and the motel. The parties later settled. Thereafter, Union Pacific asserted a contractual right of subrogation to the extent of medical payments made on Plaintiff’s behalf by the Union Pacific Railroad Employees Health Systems. The contract created a lien or right of reimbursement if a third party is liable but not if Union Pacific is liable. The trial court concluded that Union Pacific did not have a valid lien, right of reimbursement or right of subrogation because it was party to the settlement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the unambiguous terms of the contract, Union Pacific did not have a lien or right of reimbursement. View "Kasel v. Union Pacific R.R. Co." on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted in Douglas County of first degree sexual assault. Appellant later filed a pro se complaint in Lancaster County under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against prosecutors, public defenders, and attorneys purportedly involved in the underlying criminal action. Appellant moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The district court, acting sua sponte, objected that venue was not proper in Lancaster County and, on that basis, also objected to the motion to proceed in forma pauperis. The court then denied Appellant’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, opining that if Appellant wished to proceed with the action in forma pauperis, he should make his request in Douglas County. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Iowa law does not permit denial of in forma pauperis based on a sua sponte objection to venue, the district court erred in denying Appellant in forma pauperis status on that basis. Remanded. View "Castonguay v. Retelsdorf" on Justia Law