Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff and Judy Hoffman were divorced in 1994. Judy died intestate in 2007, and Plaintiff was named personal representative of her estate. Defendant, an attorney and Judy’s friend, was the beneficiary of two of Judy’s life insurance policies and her retirement account and received $236,024 from these accounts. Plaintiff brought an action against Defendant alleging breach of fiduciary duty arising out of the attorney-client relationship, breach of fiduciary duty arising out of the duty of a trustee, and conversion. The district court found for Defendant and dismissed Plaintiff’s claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) determining that an express trust needed to be created in order to find Defendant liable and in placing the burden to prove such trust on Plaintiff; (2) failing to impose a constructive trust on the insurance proceeds; (3) failing to find that Defendant deviated from the standard of care and committed legal malpractice by accepting and retaining Judy’s death benefit funds given his status as her attorney; and (4) admitting into evidence a photocopy of a note purportedly given from Judy to Defendant. View "Gallner v. Larson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person in connection with the 2013 shooting death of Kenneth Gunia. On appeal, Defendant argued as his only assignment of error that there was insufficient evidence of premeditation to convict him of first degree murder. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding that the record contained sufficient evidence to support entry of the jury’s verdict of first degree murder. View "State v. Escamilla" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the construction of the the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between General Drivers & Helpers Union, Local No. 554 (the Union) and Douglas County. The Union filed a grievance, arguing that the CBA prevented the County from hiring a new employee at a wage above the “start,” or the first step, of the pay scale. The parties disputed the interpretation of the word “start” in the CBA, and both parties filed for summary judgment on the meaning of “start” in the CBA pay rates scale. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the County, concluding that “start” is unambiguous and is the minimum wage or “start” of a pay scale. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the meaning of “start” in the CBA is unambiguous, and summary judgment was proper. View "Gen. Drivers & Helpers Union v. County of Douglas" on Justia Law

Castellar Partners LLC was retained by appellees (collectively, the AMP parties) to review a “hedge fund portfolio” and the services being provided by another advisor. Castella and one of the AMP parties - AMP Capital Investors Limited (AMPCI), a subsidiary of AMP incorporated in Australia - executed an “Advisory Agreement” under which Castellar was required to provide its services regarding the fund in exchange for certain fees. The AMP parties terminated their relationship with Castellar the next year. Castellar filed suit, alleging that the AMP parties had “recklessly and willfully” misled it in order to obtain its services with regard to the fund. The district court dismissed one of Castellar’s claims, concluding that due to a forum selection clause, the claim for breach of contract was required to be litigated in New South Wales, Australia. The district court certified the dismissal of that claim as a final judgment, and Castella appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the certification was improper, as Castellar’s claims entailed “similar issues” and “related facts,” and all of the parties remain involved in the litigation before the district court. View "Castellar Partners, LLC v. AMP Ltd." on Justia Law

Defendant pled no contest to one count of aiding and abetting second degree murder. Defendant was sentenced to no less than life imprisonment or more than life imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his sentence was excessive. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding (1) the Court does not reach some of Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims because the record on direct appeal was insufficient for the Court to do so; (2) Defendant’s remaining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were without merit; and (3) the sentence imposed was not an abuse of discretion. View "State v. Casares" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed this personal injury action alleging that Plaintiff was injured after she lost control of her vehicle due to corn mash that had spilled from a truck onto the highway the previous day. Plaintiff brought this action against the driver of the truck, the driver’s employer, and three political subdivisions. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of all named defendants, concluding (1) the political subdivisions were immune from suit under Neb. Rev. Stat. 13-910(12); and (2) the actions of firefighters and a state trooper in conducting the cleanup of the corn mash spill and declaring the road safe for travel eliminated any duty on the part of the driver and his employer to remediate the spill. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court’s judgment with respect to the driver and his employer, holding the actions of the firefighters and state trooper who responded to the spill and opened the road for traffic cut off any duty that these defendants had to remediate the spill or warn of the hazard it posed to other motorists; but (2) reversed the district court’s judgment in favor of the three political subdivisions, holding that these defendants’ sovereign immunity was waived pursuant to section 13-910(12). View "Kimminau v. City of Hastings" on Justia Law

The cotrustees of a trust filed suit against several parties, alleging that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties. The district court dismissed five of the cotrustees’ causes of action. The remaining defendants moved for summary judgment and sought attorney fees. The district court granted the motions for summary judgment. Before the scheduled hearing on the motions for attorney fees, the costrustees filed a notice of appeal. The district court found that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the motions for attorney fees because of the pending appeal. Several defendants appealed from that order. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding (1) because of the absence of a ruling on attorney fees left a portion of the judgment unresolved, the orders from which the cotrustees appealed were not final, and thus, the Court lacked jurisdiction over the first appeal; and (2) because the district court declined to rule on the motions for attorney fees, which were still pending before the district court, the Supreme Court also lacked jurisdiction over the second appeal. View "Murray v. Stine" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle in a willful reckless manner to avoid arrest. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the district court erred by giving a jury instruction on the material elements of the offense that omitted the element of an attempt to arrest or issue a citation to Defendant, but the error was harmless. The State and Defendant petitioned the Supreme Court for further review, arguing that the court of appeals erred in finding that an attempt at an arrest or citation was an essential element of the crime charged. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ decision affirming Defendant’s conviction but disapproved of its ruling that, under Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-905, an attempt to arrest or cite a defendant must be separately identified as an element in jury instructions. Therefore, the district court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury that an attempted arrest or citation was an element of the offense. View "State v. Armagost" on Justia Law

Paul McGill and Michael Henery, the developers of the Lion Place Condominium, both offered to purchase the limited common elements adjacent to Henery’s commercial units. The unincorporated unit owners association that governed the condominium voted to accept Henery’s offer and transferred the limited common elements to Henery. McGill filed a derivative action on behalf of the association against Henery and the association challenging the sale of the limited common elements. The district court concluded that the sale and conveyance were void and that title to the limited common elements remained with the Association because the sale was only approved by 77.7 percent of the association and there was no agreement signed by the requisite number of unit owners. The court awarded McGill his attorney fees and expenses. The Supreme Court (1) concluded that equity allows a derivative suit on behalf of an unincorporated unit owners association; (2) affirmed the judgment invaliding the sale, holding that the governing statute requires both approval by eighty percent of the votes in the association and unanimous agreement by the owners of units to which the limited common elements are allocated; and (3) vacated the award of costs and expenses, as the relevant statute does not permit the recovery of expenses. View "McGill v. Lion Place Condo. Ass’n" on Justia Law

Mother was an enrolled member of the Oglala Sioux Tribe. After Jassenia, who was allegedly eligible for enrollment in the tribe, was removed from Mother’s care, the State filed a petition for adjudication pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a). At issue before the juvenile court was whether the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) applied to the adjudication proceeding. The juvenile court determined that ICWA applied to the proceedings. Jassenia’s guardian ad litem appealed, asserting that Mother’s intent to relinquish custody of Jassenia rendered ICWA inapplicable. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the juvenile court’s order did not constitute a final, appealable order because the mere determination that ICWA applied, without further action, did not affect a substantial right. View "In re Interest of Jassenia H." on Justia Law