Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In one proceeding, the juvenile court of Douglas County terminated Mother’s parental rights to four of her children and Father’s parental rights to all of those children with the exception of Jahon. In a separate proceeding underlying this appeal, the same court terminated Father’s parental rights to Jahon. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the juvenile court in this case correctly determined that statutory grounds for termination existed as to Jahon; and (2) the separate juvenile court did not err in finding that termination of Father’s parental rights was in Jahon’s best interests. View "In re Interest of Jahon S." on Justia Law

Devin Witt allegedly drove a pickup truck over Benjamin Carrel’s foot in a parking lot in Beatrice, Nebraska. The truck was registered to Serco, Inc. Carrel brought a personal injury action against Serco and Witt. When Serco did not respond to a service of summons, a show cause order, or notice of Carrel’s motion for a default judgment, the district court entered a default judgment against Serco. The district court denied Serco’s motion to vacate the default judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in denying Serco’s motion to vacate the default judgment, holding that, where Serco placed Carrel on notice of its meritorious defense that it did not employ Witt or own the vehicle he was driving at the time of the incident and where any negligence on the part of Serco in responding to the suit was excusable, permitting the default judgment to stand would unfairly deprive Serco of a substantial right and produce an unjust result. Remanded with directions to vacate the default judgment and to give Serco a reasonable time in which to file an appropriate responsive pleading. View "Carrel v. Serco Inc." on Justia Law

Ellen Panec died after being injured in a motor vehicle accident. Ellen’s husband, William, was appointed the personal representative of her estate. The majority of Ellen’s estate passed to her daughter, Rebecca Griffin, as the remainder beneficiary. A lawsuit was filed against the driver of the other vehicle. William also made a claim against his and Ellen’s underinsurance carrier. Both the driver’s liability insurer and the underinsurance carrier offered to settle the claims. After a hearing, the county court approved the settlements and distributed the majority of the settlement proceeds to William. Although the proceeds flowed from both a survival claim and a wrongful death claim, the county court applied Neb. Rev. Stat. 30-810 - the wrongful death statute - to govern all distributions. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the county court with directions to allocate the settlement proceeds between the wrongful death and survival claims, to direct distribution of the wrongful death settlement proceeds, and to direct distribution of the survival claim proceeds to Griffin as the sole beneficiary of Ellen’s residuary probate estate, holding that because the proceeds included the settlement of the survival claim, the proceeds for the survival claim were wrongly distributed in accordance with section 30-810. View "In re Estate of Panec" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded no contest to the charge of sexual assault of a child in the first degree. At the sentencing hearing, the district court stated that the offense carried a mandatory minimum of at least twenty years. The court proceeded to impose a sentence of forty to fifty years’ imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred by not properly advising him of the crime’s range of penalties before accepting his plea. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court incorrectly advised Defendant that the range of penalties was twenty years’ to life imprisonment, but the error was not prejudicial and did not affect the validity of Defendant’s plea. View "State v. Russell" on Justia Law

Mother and Father were the biological parents of four children. In one proceeding, the juvenile court terminated the parents' parental rights to three of the children. In separate proceedings, the juvenile court also terminated their parental rights to their fourth child. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the juvenile court in each case, holding (1) the juvenile court did not err in terminating Father’s parental rights to the three children involved in the first case; and (2) Mother’s sole assigned error that the State violated her due process rights on both cases by failing to base termination on Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-292(5) was not preserved for appellate review. View "In re Zanaya W." on Justia Law

David and Pamela Fisher, as “Husband and Wife,” sued U.S. Bank National Association to terminate severed mineral interests, alleging that they had owned the land since 1986. In its answer, US Bank argued that the Fishers, as husband and wife, were not the real parties in interest because, in 2001, the Fishers conveyed the land to themselves as trustees for the David and Pamela Fisher Living Trust. The Fishers subsequently filed an amended complaint adding themselves as plaintiffs in their capacity as trustees. Before the complaint was amended, however, US Bank recorded a verified claim of mineral interest. The district court granted summary judgment for US Bank, concluding that the Fishers’ amended complaint did not relate back to the original complaint under Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-301. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the amended complaint related back under the plain language of section 25-301 because it joined the real parties in interest. Remanded. View "Fisher v. Heirs & Devisees of Lovercheck" on Justia Law

In 2007, Ryan Hanzlick and his wife acquired two tracts of land through treasurer’s tax deeds. A trust controlled by Hanzlick subsequently acquired title to the two tracts by quitclaim deed. Selma Hauxwell, the adjacent property owner, had allegedly been using those tracts since 1971 but did not appear in the official records of the county register of deeds as the owner of the tracts. Hauxwell filed a complaint seeking to quiet title to the two tracts by claim of adverse possession. The Hanslicks counterclaimed, requesting that the court find the Hanzlicks were the owners of the tracts and to eject and enjoin Hauxwell from the property. The district court quieted title in favor of Hauxwell but did not address any other issues regarding the tax deeds. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred (1) by not dismissing Hauxwell’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction due to the Hauxwell’s failure to establish standing; and (2) in failing to address the Hanzlicks’ counterclaims. Remanded. View "Hauxwell v. Henning" on Justia Law

Two days after Teresa S. gave birth to an infant, Teresa and Monty S., the infant’s biological father, each signed separate documents relinquishing their parental rights to the child and consenting to the child’s adoption by Jason W. and Rebecca W., the friends of Teresa and Monty. The parties had previously agreed to an “open” adoption. Nearly one year later, Teresa and Monty (together, Petitioners) filed a petition for habeas corpus seeking return of the child. As grounds for the writ, Petitioners alleged that their consents and relinquishments were invalid due to fraud, duress, and the failure to present the nonconsent adoption forms prior to signing the relinquishments. The district court rejected all of Petitioners’ allegations but nevertheless invalidated the relinquishments, concluding that the parties’ plan for an “open” adoption invalidated the relinquishments as conditioned upon the retention of some parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) excluding evidence of post relinquishment visits by Petitioners and why those visits were discontinued; and (2) concluding that the consents were conditioned upon the retention of parental rights and were therefore invalid. View "Monty S. v. Jason W." on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to multiple convictions of felon in possession of a firearm and attempted felon in possession of a firearm. The only evidence offered by Defendant’s attorney during the sentencing hearing was a local newspaper in which the police chief described Defendant as a hunting enthusiast who was not a threat to the community. The district court refused to enter the article into evidence, noting that the statement would “essentially be hearsay.” Defendant appealed from his sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err (1) in refusing to consider the newspaper article; and (2) in failing to grant Defendant credit for 369 days previously served within in federal custody on a federal sentence. View "State v. Hunnel" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol. Witnesses for the State testified that Defendant intentionally withheld air from the testing device, resulting in a sample size that the device labeled “Deficient Sample, Incomplete Test.” Nevertheless, the printout from the device reported a breath alcohol content of .218. The jury found Defendant guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol and also found that his breath alcohol content was .15 or greater. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the results of a chemical test for which the motorist gives a “deficient” sample are inadmissible. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) evidence of a chemical breath test that records a deficient sample is admissible if the State lays sufficient foundation; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant; and (3) the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. View "State v. McIntyre" on Justia Law