Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Taxpayer timely filed a 2010 personal property tax return properly listing certain taxable property. The property, however, was not placed on the tax rolls. In 2013, the Colfax County Board of Equalization placed the personal property back on the tax rolls. Taxpayer appealed. The Tax Equalization and Review Commission ultimately decided that the Board’s action was void on the grounds that the Board did not have authority to place the items of personal property on the tax rolls, thereby reversing and vacating the Board’s decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Board’s action in placing Taxpayer’s personal property on the tax rolls for 2010 was void because it lacked statutory authority to do so under Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-1507(1). View "Cargill Meat Solutions Corp. v. Colfax County Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

In 2010, Plaintiffs purchased real estate from Charter West National Bank. Plaintiffs later filed suit, alleging that Charter West represented that the property would be free and clear of all liens but manipulated the language of the deed to reflect that the conveyance was subject to liens of record. Charter West moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the real estate purchase agreement, which contained an arbitration clause. Plaintiffs filed an objection asserting that the arbitration clause was void because it failed to comply with Nebraska’s Uniform Arbitration Act, and the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) was inapplicable because the transaction did not involve interstate commerce. The district court denied the motion to compel arbitration without prejudice based on a lack of evidence that the transaction affected interstate commerce as to trigger the provisions of the FAA. Charter West appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on the grounds that there was no final, appealable order entered by the district court capable of appellate review. View "Wilczewski v. Charter West Nat'l Bank" on Justia Law

Chad Johnson and Stewart Minnick entered into an agreement whereby Johnson would purchase farmland he had been renting from Minnick and Minnick’s sister after Minnick’s death. The purchase price of the farmland was to be funded by an insurance policy owned by Johnson on Minnick’s life. After Minnick died, the insurer paid the policy proceeds to Johnson. Johnson tendered the the proceeds of the policy to the personal representative of Minnick’s estate, but the personal representative refused to convey the farmland. Johnson brought this action for specific performance and other relief. The district court concluded that the purchase agreement was unenforceable. The Supreme Court affirmed but under different reasoning from that of the district court, holding (1) the purchase agreement was not specifically enforceable as a matter of law because Johnson lacked an insurable interest in Minnick’s life; and (2) Johnson’s claim for damages was time barred. View "Johnson v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought this legal malpractice action for himself and three other individuals for whom he served as attorney in fact (collectively, Plaintiff). Plaintiff named as defendants an attorney and the firm at which the attorney practiced at the time the alleged malpractice occurred (collectively, Attorney), claiming that Attorney negligently failed to obtain signatures on a guaranty for a loan that Plaintiff made to a third party and failed to inform Plaintiff of the missing signatures. When the third party defaulted on the loan, Plaintiff could not obtain a judgment against the intended guarantors for the full amount of the third party’s obligation. A jury returned a general verdict for Attorney. The district court granted Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial, concluding that plain error permeating the proceedings. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s order sustaining Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial and remanded with instructions to reinstate the judgment for Attorney, holding that the district court incorrectly concluded that plain error permeated the trial and thus abused its discretion in sustaining Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial. View "Balames v. Ginn" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first degree sexual assault and sentenced to imprisonment for thirty to thirty-two years. Defendant filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that because he was a foreign national, he had a right to contact the Mexican consulate for advice and assistance with his criminal prosecution and because he was not informed of his rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the district court lost its jurisdiction to proceed to judgment and lacked the legal authority to impose the sentence. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis on the ground that Defendant’s action was frivolous. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it determined that Defendant’s habeas corpus action was frivolous and therefore denied his request to proceed in forma pauperis. View "Gonzalez v. Gage" on Justia Law

Defendant owed $277 to a cash advance company, which assigned the debt to Plaintiff. Plaintiff filed a complaint for the recovery of money in county court, but prior to the entry of judgment, Defendant voluntarily paid Plaintiff the amount sought. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for costs of the action. The county court overruled the motion for costs and dismissed the complaint, concluding that Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-1708 precludes an award of costs when there have been voluntary payments made after the action was filed but before judgment was entered. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the county and district courts erred in interpreting the statute to provide for an exception where the defendant voluntarily paid the plaintiff’s claim before a judgment was entered; and (2) therefore, Plaintiff was entitled to its costs in this action. View "Credit Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Jefferson" on Justia Law

Donald Peterson, a resident of Kings Gate senior homes, was assaulted by Floyd Wallace on Kings Gate’s premises. Peterson filed suit against Kings Gate, alleging that Kings Gate was negligent by failing to exercise reasonable care in performing a criminal background check of Wallace, by failing to exclude Wallace from the Kings Gate premises, and by failing to warn tenants about Wallace and provide safe premises for tenants. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, reasoning that Kings gate had no duty to protect Peterson from Wallace. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Kings Gate owed a duty to Peterson such as to overcome Kings Gate’s motion to dismiss. View "Peterson v. Kings Gate Partners" on Justia Law

Wife and Husband’s marriage was dissolved via a decree entered in 2013. Prior to the decree, the parties entered into a property settlement agreement that required Wife to leave the marital home and required Husband to “assist” Wife in obtaining a bank loan to purchase a residence. The dissolution decree adopted the agreement. The bank, however, declined to make the loan without Husband’s cosignature. The district court granted Husband’s motion a modify the dissolution decree and vacated Husband’s obligation to assist Wife in obtaining a loan, concluding that Husband’s obligation to assist Wife in obtaining a loan was too vague to be enforceable. The Supreme Court vacated in part, holding that although Husband’s obligation to assist Wife in obtaining a loan was ambiguous, such ambiguity did not provide a basis to modify the dissolution decree, and absent a finding of fraud or gross inequity, the district court abused its discretion in vacating the portion of the decree implementing the assistance clause. Remanded for the district court to determine whether the assistance clause had been satisfied. View "Ryder v. Ryder" on Justia Law

Shasta Linen Supply, a California corporation, applied for workers’ compensation insurance coverage from Applied Underwriters, a Nebraska corporation. Shasta accepted Applied’s proposed policy through an agreement entitled a Request to Bind Coverages & Services. On the same day, Shasta entered into a Reinsurance Participation Agreement (RPA) with Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance Company (AUCRA), Applied’s subsidiary and a British Virgin Islands corporation. The request to bind and the RPA contained conflicting provisions regarding the parties’ arbitration process for resolving disputes. After a dispute arose regarding the amount of money that Shasta owed to Applied, the American Arbitration Association (AAA) acknowledged receipt of AUCRA’s demand for arbitration. Shasta filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the request to bind required arbitration by "JAMS" in Omaha, Nebraska and injunctive relief from the AAA arbitration. The court determined that it had jurisdiction to decide which contract provision controlled and issued a temporary injunction and stay of the AAA arbitration until it decided the parties’ rights. Applied and AUCRA appealed, arguing that the court erred in exercising jurisdiction over the parties’ contract dispute and granting a temporary injunction. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the court’s temporary injunction and stay was an interlocutory order that was not appealable. View "Shasta Linen Supply, Inc. v. Applied Underwriters, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant, a franchisor of professional cleaning and maintenance services, granted Appellee a franchise in the Omaha, Nebraska area. After Appellant discovered that Appellee was diverting Appellant’s customers to his new business, Appellant terminated its relationship with Appellee. Appellant then filed this lawsuit against Appellee seeking to enforce and receive damages from the breach of the noncompete clause in the franchise agreement. The district court entered judgment for Appellee, concluding that the noncompete clause included an unreasonable restraint on competition. In so ruling, the court refused to sever the offending subpart from the larger noncompete clause. The Supreme Court affirmed after reaffirming its stance against severability of noncompete clauses, holding that the noncompete covenant was invalid and unenforceable and that the district court correctly refused to sever the offending subpart from the larger noncompete clause. View "Unlimited Opportunity, Inc. v. Waadah" on Justia Law