Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case is a dispute over the boundaries of two land tracts, Government Lot 1 (GL1) and Government Lot 7 (GL7), located in Howard County, Nebraska, owned by Judith Puncochar and the Rudolfs and the Sacks (GL7 Owners) respectively. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision that the boundary between the properties lay at the thread of the Middle Loup River.The appellant, Puncochar, argued that the original government survey generated a metes and bounds description with four linear sides for GL1, instead of a description with a riparian side. However, the court disagreed and found the original government survey and the accompanying field notes showed GL1 to be riparian, meaning it bordered the river. As a result, the court determined that the boundary between GL1 and GL7 is the thread of the river.The court also addressed Puncochar's argument regarding a fixed acreage of 53 acres for GL1 specified in the patent. The court clarified that the original survey, which depicted a riparian boundary and was part of the patent, was controlling and gave no assurance that the size of the riparian property would remain fixed at any particular size.The court affirmed the district court's entry of summary judgment establishing the boundary between GL1 and GL7 as the thread of the stream of the Middle Loup River. View "Puncochar v. Rudolf" on Justia Law

In the case before the Nebraska Supreme Court, Fountain II, LLC, a commercial real estate development company, disputed the denial of special valuation as agricultural or horticultural land, commonly known as "greenbelt status", for a 19.9-acre property it owned in Douglas County, Nebraska. The Douglas County Board of Equalization had denied the company's application for greenbelt status for the tax year 2018, arguing that the property was not primarily used for agricultural or horticultural purposes. The Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC) affirmed the county board's decision.Upon appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed TERC's decision and remanded the case with instructions to sustain the company's protest. The court found that TERC erred in considering the property's use as of July 15, 2018, instead of as of January 1, 2018, as required by Nebraska law. The court also found that the county board's decision was arbitrary and unreasonable, and TERC's decision was not supported by competent evidence, as the evidence showed that the property was primarily used for agricultural purposes as of January 1, 2018. View "Fountain II, LLC v. Douglas Cty. Bd. of Equal." on Justia Law

In the case involving Sandra Lopez and Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Omaha, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case, holding that the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy for workplace injuries. Lopez, an employee of Catholic Charities, sued her employer alleging assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress following a realistic active shooter drill conducted at her workplace. She claimed physical and mental injuries as a result of the drill. The district court dismissed the suit, asserting that her exclusive remedy was workers’ compensation. On appeal, Lopez argued that she should be able to pursue tort theories of recovery against her employer for injuries suffered if the employer acted with a specific intent to injure the employee. However, the court found that even if an employer acts with a specific intent to injure an employee, the resulting injury is accidental if it is unexpected or unforeseen to the person suffering the injury, and thus compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act. The court also rejected Lopez's constitutional challenge due to non-compliance with procedural requirements and her public policy argument because it was not grounded on any specific statute or recognized legal authority. View "Lopez v. Catholic Charities" on Justia Law

In this case, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed a lower court's decision, finding that the Middle Republican Natural Resources District (NRD) violated the due process rights of two landowners, Merlin Brown and Uhrich & Brown Limited Partnership, by having the same attorneys act as both prosecutors and participants in the adjudicatory process of the case. The court held that such a combination of prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions in the same individuals posed an intolerably high risk of actual bias, thus, infringing on the landowners' right to a fair trial by an impartial tribunal. In this case, the NRD had accused the landowners of violating certain ground water management rules. The case was initially heard by the Board of Directors of the NRD, whose decision to impose penalties on the landowners was informed by the same attorneys who had prosecuted the case on behalf of the NRD. The landowners appealed the Board's decision under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), leading to the district court's reversal. The NRD then appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court, which upheld the lower court's ruling. View "Uhrich & Brown Ltd. Part. v. Middle Republican NRD" on Justia Law

In a divorce case, the appellant, Brian M. Noland, sought to establish that he stood in loco parentis to his stepdaughter, A.B., in order to litigate issues of custody and parenting time. The Nebraska Supreme Court found that the district court had erred in its interpretation of the law when it ruled that the biological mother, Erin N. Yost, had the absolute right to unilaterally terminate the in loco parentis relationship. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that parental preference principles did not give natural parents an absolute right to terminate an established in loco parentis relationship at will. The court reasoned that while the presumption that fit parents act in their child's best interest must be considered, it must give way where the child has established strong psychological bonds with a person who, although not a biological parent, has lived with the child and provided care, nurture, and affection. The court reversed the order of the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Noland v. Yost" on Justia Law

The defendant, Clay Y. Bixby, was convicted for driving under the influence (DUI), which was his third offense. He contended that the district court had erred in using evidence of his two prior DUI convictions to enhance his sentence. The Nebraska Supreme Court rejected this claim.The court noted that the state had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the offenses underlying Bixby’s previous convictions occurred within 15 years of the date of his current offense, as required for sentence enhancement. The court also rejected Bixby's claim that his South Dakota DUI offense was not sufficiently similar to his Nebraska DUI offense to be valid for sentence enhancement. The court determined that Bixby’s South Dakota DUI offense, as statutorily defined in South Dakota, would have been a violation of the Nebraska DUI statute and was thus valid to be used for sentence enhancement.Lastly, the court rejected Bixby's argument that the district court failed to consider mitigating factors before sentencing. The court explained that under the precedent set in State v. Vann, any conviction record obtained after Gideon v. Wainwright is entitled to a presumption of regularity. Once the government establishes the existence of a prior conviction, it becomes the defendant’s burden to prove that he or she did not have counsel and did not waive the right to counsel at the time of conviction. The court concluded that Bixby's South Dakota DUI conviction was valid for sentence enhancement under this precedent, even though the record did not show whether Bixby had or waived counsel at the time of his sentencing in that case.The court ultimately affirmed the sentence enhancement and Bixby's conviction for DUI, third offense. View "State v. Bixby" on Justia Law

In this case, the Nebraska Supreme Court had to consider an appeal against a lower court's decision to terminate the parental rights of a mother, Samantha M., to her daughter, Jessalina M. The child had been removed from Samantha's care shortly after her birth due to concerns about Samantha's behavior and mental health issues. The child was placed in foster care and later with her father, Jose M.The court firstly clarified the meaning of "out-of-home placement" for the purposes of the relevant statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-292(7). It held that this term refers to any placement outside the home of the parent whose rights are at issue, including placement with another parent. Therefore, it held that Jessalina’s placement with her father was an “out-of-home placement” as far as Samantha was concerned.The court then considered the point at which the existence of the statutory basis for termination should be determined. It held that this should be determined as of the date the petition or motion to terminate parental rights is filed, not the date of trial or the date of the termination order. This is because the facts supporting the grounds for termination must be set forth in the petition or motion and must be based on facts existing at that time.Based on these interpretations, the court determined that the statutory basis for termination existed in this case, as Jessalina had been in out-of-home placement for more than 15 of the most recent 22 months before the termination petition was filed. It also held that the lower court did not err in finding that Samantha was unfit and that termination of her parental rights was in Jessalina's best interests. Therefore, it affirmed the decision of the lower court to terminate Samantha's parental rights. View "In re Interest of Jessalina M." on Justia Law

The defendant, Anthony W. Earnest, pled no contest to charges of driving under the influence (DUI) causing serious bodily injury and third degree assault. Following a two-vehicle accident, Earnest was charged and released on bond with specific conditions. However, following another incident where he was found driving under influence, his bond was revoked. The district court sentenced Earnest to 3 years’ imprisonment, 18 months’ post-release supervision, a $10,000 fine, and a 15-year license revocation for the DUI causing serious bodily injury, and 1 year’s imprisonment and a $1,000 fine for the third degree assault.On appeal, Earnest argued that the district court erred by imposing a $10,000 fine without considering his ability to pay and by imposing excessive sentences. The Nebraska Supreme Court found that the district court was not required to consider Earnest's ability to pay before imposing fines. The court also noted that while the district court misunderstood the law about imposing consecutive sentences, it was not prejudicial to Earnest; the court would have imposed consecutive sentences even if it had understood concurrent sentences were permissible. Additionally, the court rejected Earnest’s argument that the district court failed to consider factors that weighed in favor of a more lenient sentence. Concluding that the district court did not commit any prejudicial error, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. View "State v. Earnest" on Justia Law

In this case from the Nebraska Supreme Court, the court considered an appeal from a successful will contest. The decedent, Rita A. Walker, died at the age of 84 and her son, Mark E. Walker, filed a petition for formal probate of a will purportedly executed by Rita shortly before her death. This will named Mark as the sole beneficiary and personal representative of Rita's estate, omitting her three other sons. One of these other sons, Michael J. Walker, contested the will, alleging that Rita lacked testamentary capacity at the time of the will's execution and that the will was the product of undue influence.The county court held a bench trial and concluded that while the will was validly executed, it would not admit it to probate because Mark had failed to prove Rita's testamentary capacity at the time of execution and that the will was the product of undue influence. The court ordered the case to proceed intestate and appointed Michael as personal representative.Mark appealed, arguing that the county court erred in excluding from evidence a document purported to be a prior will signed by Rita, which he contended was admissible under a hearsay exception and was relevant to the issues of testamentary capacity and undue influence.The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the document was admissible under a hearsay exception and was relevant. The court found that the document had a tendency to show that Rita had a constant and abiding scheme for the distribution of her property, rebutting charges of undue influence or lack of testamentary capacity. Therefore, the court reversed the county court's order refusing to admit the proposed will to probate and remanded the case for the county court to reconsider the existing record, including the contested document, in determining whether Mark met his burden of proving testamentary capacity and whether Michael met his burden of proving undue influence. View "In re Estate of Walker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Nebraska affirmed the convictions and sentences of Trenton R. Esch for first degree murder, use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person. Esch argued that the jury instructions concerning reasonable doubt and intoxication were in error, and that his counsel was ineffective in failing to object to these instructions. The court found that the instructions, when read as a whole, correctly conveyed the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury and were not misleading. Further, the court ruled that there was no plain error indicative of a probable miscarriage of justice. The court also determined that Esch's counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to the instructions or in his handling of the evidence and arguments related to Esch's intoxication. The court rejected Esch's remaining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel due to an insufficient record. The case centered around Esch's killing of his stepmother, with the primary issue at trial being whether Esch shot her purposely and with deliberate and premeditated malice, or whether he acted impulsively under the influence of alcohol. The jury found Esch guilty of first degree murder. View "State v. Esch" on Justia Law