Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pled no contest to first degree sexual assault of a child. Defendant did not file a direct appeal. Defendant later filed a second amended motion for postconviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel were ineffective for, among other things, advising him to plead no contest. The district court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing, concluding that Defendant’s claims were procedurally barred due to his failure to file a direct appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant’s claims were not procedurally barred because Defendant’s trial counsel was still serving as counsel during the period in which the direct appeal could have been filed. Remanded. View "State v. Payne" on Justia Law

In 2010, the district court for Boone County issued a default judgment of paternity against the father of a child born out of wedlock. In 2013, the mother filed a complaint for custody in the district court for Madison County, where all parties lived. The district court for Madison County ultimately dismissed the case and vacated its prior orders, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the child’s paternity had been decided by the district court for Boone County. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the district court for Boone County did not transfer the cause or otherwise relinquish its continuing jurisdictional priority, the district court did not err in vacating its orders and dismissing the complaint. View "Charleen J. v. Blake O." on Justia Law

Upon the divorce of Mother and Father, Mother was awarded custody of the parties’ two children, and Father was granted parenting time. Thereafter, Mother joined the military and was assigned to Fort Benning, Georgia for a one-year period. Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-2929.01, which affords procedural protections in cases involving child custody and parenting time to military parents affected by mobilization or deployment, the district court permitted the children to relocate to Georgia with Mother for the remainder of her temporary assignment. Father appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Legislature did not intend for appellate review of truly temporary orders entered pursuant to section 43-2929.01(4)(a), and therefore, the Court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. View "Huskey v. Huskey" on Justia Law

The county court for Madison County, sitting as a juvenile court, committed thirteen-year-old Nathaniel to a youth rehabilitation and treatment center. The Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services appealed, arguing that the court did not have the authority under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-286(1)(b)(i) to commit the juvenile when he was under the age of fourteen. Nathaniel was discharged from the rehabilitation and treatment center after the appeals were filed, causing the appeals to become moot. Acknowledging that the cases were moot, the Department asked the Supreme Court to decide them under the public interest exception to the doctrine of mootness. The Supreme Court declined to do so and dismissed the appeals, holding that, based on the manner in which the cases became moot and the possibility that the issue presented was one of last impression, the public exception to the mootness doctrine did not apply. View "In re Interest of Nathaniel M." on Justia Law

Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-4106(2) provides for retroactive application of its requirement that inmates convicted of a felony sex offense or other specified offense submit a DNA sample before being discharged from confinement. The statute further provides that an inmate will forfeit his past and future good time credit if the inmate refuses to submit a DNA sample. George Shepard was an inmate who was sentenced before the passage of section 29-4106(2) and refused to submit a DNA sample. Facing the impending forfeiture of his good time credit, Shepard filed a complaint for declaratory judgment challenging the application of section 29-4106 as violative of the prohibition against ex post facto laws. The district court declared section 29-4106(2) unconstitutional under the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the federal and state Constitutions as applied to Shepard. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in determining that the retroactive application of section 29-4106(2) violates the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. View "Shepard v. Houston" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of driving under the influence, second offense. Defendant appealed, challenging the county court’s determinations that the Nebraska rules of evidence did not apply to the hearing on her motion to suppress and arguing that the county court erred in failing to sustain her suppression motion because the Nebraska State Patrol checkpoint at which was stopped was unconstitutional. The district court affirmed Defendant’s conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in a criminal case, the rules of evidence do not apply to suppression hearings; and (2) the county court did not err in determining that the checkpoint was constitutional. View "State v. Piper" on Justia Law

In 2003, Appellant was convicted of first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. Appellant’s convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. In 2012, Appellant filed a motion for postconviction relief, alleging, inter alia, ineffective assistance of counsel on several grounds. The trial court dismissed the claims without an evidentiary hearing. Appellant appealed the dismissal of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, given the great weight of the evidence against him, there was no ineffective assistance of counsel because even finding the allegations true would not have been prejudicial to Appellant’s case. View "State v. Fernando-Granados" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first degree sexual assault and sentenced to three to five years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the district court did not err in (1) failing to allow Defendant to inquire on redirect examination into the nature of his witness’ felony conviction after he was impeached by the State; (2) not granting the parties’ joint motion for mistrial; and (3) admitting certain hearsay statements under the excited utterances exception. The Court further held that because the record was incomplete, the Court could not reach Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal. View "State v. Castillo-Zamora" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of discharging a firearm at a dwelling while in or near a motor vehicle, in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-1212.04, and using a firearm to commit a felony. Defendant’s convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal. Defendant subsequently filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the motion for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) counsel could not have been deficient for failing to raise a novel constitutional challenge to section 28-1212.04, and therefore, the district court did not err when it denied this claim; and (2) the record refuted the claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress evidence obtained from the stop and search of Defendant’s vehicle, and therefore, the district court did not err when it denied this claim. View "State v. Sanders" on Justia Law

The State filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights to his daughter based on Father’s abandonment of the child. After a hearing, the juvenile court entered an order terminating Father’s parental rights to his daughter, finding clear and convincing evidence that Father had abandoned the child and that termination was in the child’s best interests. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish that Father intentionally abandoned the child due to Father’s lack of absolute certainty concerning paternity and his incarceration while awaiting trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) clear and convincing evidence supported the finding of abandonment because Father was initially involved in his daughter’s life but later demonstrated no interest in her or in exercising parental responsibilities; and (2) the evidence clearly and convincingly established that termination of Father’s parental rights was in his daughter’s best interests. View "In re Interest of Gabriella H." on Justia Law