Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Matthew Kim was working at a retail clothing store when the store was robbed and Kim was shot multiple times. Kim filed for workers’ compensation benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Court found (1) Kim was entitled to temporary total disability (TTD) benefits; (2) Kim’s inpatient treatment for chemical dependency, as well as an emergency room visit were compensable; and (3) Kim was entitled to payment of future medical expenses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the compensation court (1) was not clearly wrong in finding Kim temporarily totally disabled and awarding him TTD benefits; (2) did not err in finding that the emergency room visit was related to the shooting and was compensable; (3) did not err in concluding that the inpatient treatment was compensable; and (4) did not err in finding that Kim was entitled to future medical expenses.View "Kim v. Gen-X Clothing, Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony stemming from Defendant’s involvement in a fatal shooting that occurred during a home invasion robbery. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred when it restricted his cross-examination of three key prosecution witnesses and otherwise violated his constitutional rights of confrontation and due process by impeding his efforts to impeach the witnesses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by limiting the cross examination of the witnesses; (2) Defendant’s argument that the State violated his rights by failing to disclose tacit plea agreements between the State and the witnesses was without merit; and (3) evidence of prior home invasion robberies committed by two of the witnesses was not admissible in this case because it was not relevant for any legitimate purpose, including impeachment.View "State v. Patton" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony for the death of her husband. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting certain statements Defendant made while in police custody as volunteered statements. Specifically, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress the statements because Defendant had invoked her constitutional right to end the interrogation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) statements Defendant made from 3:43 to 4 a.m. should have been suppressed because Defendant had invoked her right to remain silent, but the district court’s error was harmless; and (2) statements Defendant made after 4:18 a.m. were not required to be suppressed as involuntary due to Defendant’s earlier invocation of her right to end questioning, as the statements Defendant made after 4:18 a.m. were initiated by Defendant and were not the product of interrogation.View "State v. DeJong" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree assault. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction, (2) the sentence was excessive, and (3) his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. The court of appeals affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, (2) the sentence was not excessive, and (3) Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims were without merit because Defendant made insufficient allegations of fact that would support findings of prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the evidence supported Defendant’s conviction and sentence; and (2) Defendant failed to make sufficiently specific allegations of deficient conduct regarding one of his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, but the merits of Defendant’s remaining two ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims could not be reviewed upon the trial record, and therefore, the court of appeals erred in determining that these claims were alleged with insufficient specificity and thus lacked merit. View "State v. Abdullah" on Justia Law

In 1998, a trust was established for the care of Evelyn A. Nabity. In 2011, Evelyn amended the trust agreement that changed the identity of the trustees. In 2012, Evelyn’s son, Robert, petitioned for the appointment of a guardian, conservator, and guardian ad litem for Evelyn and for registration and administration of the trust. Robert argued that Evelyn had not been competent to amend the trust agreement and requested a determination of the proper trustees. In the trust administration proceeding, the county court found that Evelyn was not competent to execute the trust amendment and entered an order declaring Robert and his brother cotrustees. In the guardianship proceeding, the county court set aside a health care power of attorney Evelyn executed in 1998 and ordered Robert to serve as Evelyn’s permanent guardian and conservator. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was clear and convincing evidence that Evelyn was incompetent to execute the amendments to the trust agreement; and (2) the appointment of a permanent guardian and conservator for Evelyn did not deny her the benefit of a valid health care power of attorney. View "In re Trust Created by Nabity" on Justia Law

In 2007, Plaintiff was hired as a salesperson at Planet Group, Inc. As part of his employment, Plaintiff signed a Sales Compensation Plan, which set out the requirements for when a commission was earned and how it would be paid. In 2009, Plaintiff’s employment was terminated. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint against Planet Group, alleging that he was owed commissions on four of the projects he was working on that were ongoing at the time of his termination. The district court granted partial summary judgment to Planet Group on three of the projects, finding that the Compensation Plan required a signed contract prior to a commission’s being paid. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-1229(4) does not permit an employer and an employee to contractually define when a commission becomes payable as “wages,” and therefore, he was entitled to commissions for two of the three projects at issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the 2007 legislative amendments to section 48-1229(4) allow an employer and employee to contractually define when a commission becomes payable; and (2) therefore, the commissions for the two projects were not payable to Plaintiff under the Compensation Plan.View "Coffey v. Planet Group, Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine. The district court sentenced Defendant to imprisonment for 300 days and payment of a fine. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction and sentence, holding that the district court did not err when, during deliberations, it granted the jury’s request to rehear an eight-minute recording of an investigator’s interview of Defendant, as the evidence was not testimony, and therefore, the heightened procedures for a jury request for “any part of the testimony” pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-1116 were not required. View "State v. Vandever" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. Defendant moved to suppress the statements he made to police during the murder investigation. The district court overruled Defendant’s motion, and, at a bench trial, the State received evidence of the statements challenged in Defendant’s motion to suppress. The district court found Defendant guilty of both charges and sentenced him to life imprisonment for the murder conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court erred in admitting evidence of Defendant’s confession during a pre-Miranda interrogation, but this evidence was cumulative to other admissible evidence, and its admission was harmless error; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions. View "State v. Juranek" on Justia Law

Debtors contracted with Builder to finish construction on a house. After Debtors defaulted on progress payments, Builder sued Debtors and Bank, claiming that Defendants falsely represented or concealed material information about whether Debtors could pay for the work. The district court sustained Defendants’ motions for summary judgment on Builder’s fraud and conspiracy claims. Debtors then confessed judgment on Builder’s breach of contract claim. After a bench trial, the district court ruled for Defendants on Builder’s equitable and promissory estoppel claims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the court erred in granting summary judgment to Debtors on Builder’s fraud claim and to Debtors and Bank on Builder’s civil conspiracy claim; and (2) during trial, the court did not err in finding that Builder had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Bank promised to fund Builder’s work that was definite enough to induce Builder’s foreseeable reliance on the statement, but these factual findings did not preclude Builder’s proof of the same facts for its fraud claims. Remanded. View "deNourie & Youst Homes, LLC v. Frost" on Justia Law

Rodehorst Brothers, a partnership, applied for several building permits for its apartment building. A building inspector granted the first two permits but denied the third, concluding that Rodehorst had forfeited its right to continue its nonconforming use of a fourplex in an area zoned R-2 for one- and two-family use. On appeal, the city’s Board of Adjustment determined (1) Rodehorst had forfeited its right to continue its nonconforming use by not having more than two apartments occupied for more than one year, and (2) the Board lacked authority to grant a use variance to otherwise allow the use to continue. The district court affirmed, concluding that the Board did not err in its judgment and that the Board’s ruling was not an unconstitutional taking. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the record showed that Rodehorst discontinued the noncomforming use for one year, it forfeited its right to continue the use; (2) the Board lacked authority to grant a use variance; and (3) there was no taking of Rodehorst’s property. View "Rodehorst Bros. v. City of Norfolk Bd. of Adjustment" on Justia Law