Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of knowing or intentional child abuse resulting in death and was sentenced to life in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging errors on the part of the trial court and errors relating to the ineffectiveness of trial counsel and appellate counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing Defendant’s petition for postconviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. View "State v. Robinson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first degree sexual assault. Defendant appealed, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial in several respects and that his conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding, as to three of Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims, they were without merit because Defendant failed to allege how he was prejudiced by his counsel’s performance. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) the court of appeals applied the wrong reasoning in finding that three of Defendant’s ineffective assistance claims lacked merit for failure to allege prejudice, as resolution of ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims requires specific allegations of the deficient conduct, but allegations of prejudice are not necessary on direct appeal; and (2) in these three instances, the record was not sufficient to review Defendant’s claim.View "State v. Filholm" on Justia Law

In 2011, Appellant, who was not a citizen of the United States, pled guilty to attempted sexual assault in the first degree. After Appellant was released from incarceration he filed a motion to withdraw his plea and vacate the judgment, alleging that not allowing him to withdraw his plea would result in “manifest injustice” because his trial counsel failed to advise him of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea. The district court dismissed the motion, determining that Appellant could have brought his Padilla v. Kentucky claim in an earlier postconviction action. Appellant appealed, arguing that postconviction relief was never available to him because he could not have reasonably discovered the factual predicate of his claim while incarcerated, as he did not receive notice of the government’s decision to deport him until after his release. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in the exercise of due diligence, Appellant should have discovered and brought his Padilla claim while incarcerated through a postconviction action; and (2) therefore, the district court properly dismissed Appellant’s claim for manifest injustice relief. View "State v. Mamer" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether federal law preempts Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-2602.01(f)(4), which generally prohibits mandatory arbitration clauses in insurance contracts. Here, Allied Professionals Insurance Company (APIC), which is registered with the Nebraska Department of Insurance as a foreign risk retention group, issued a professional liability insurance policy to Dr. Brett Speece that included a provision requiring binding arbitration. After Speece filed an action seeking a declaration that APIC was obligated to provide coverage for his defense in a Medicaid proceeding, APIC filed a motion to compel arbitration. The district court overruled the motion, concluding that the arbitration clause in the policy was not valid and enforceable pursuant to section 25-2602.01, and that neither the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) nor the Liability Risk Retention Act of 1986 (LRRA) preempted the state statute. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order overruling APIC’s motion to compel arbitration, holding (1) the FAA does not preempt section 25-2602.01(f)(4), but the LRRA does preempt application of the Nebraska statute to foreign risk retention groups; and (2) therefore, the district court erred when it determined that section 25-2602.01(f)(4) prohibited enforcement of the arbitration clause in the parties’ insurance contract in this case. View "Speece v. Allied Prof’ls Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with first degree sexual assault and attempted first degree sexual assault. Before trial, Defendant sought to offer evidence that the complaining witness had an intimate relationship with a third party, arguing that the relationship showed that the complaining witness had a motive to falsely report that she had not consented to sexual activities with Defendant. The district court ruled that the rape shield statute prohibited Defendant from introducing the evidence. The jury found Defendant not guilty of first degree sexual assault but guilty of attempted first degree sexual assault. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that evidence of an intimate relationship, standing alone, is not within the scope of the rape shield statute, the relationship was relevant, the exclusion of the evidence was not harmless. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Lavalleur" on Justia Law

Jose Dominguez was working for D & BR Building Systems, Inc. (D&BR) on the roof of a building being constructed for Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. when he was killed in an accident. D&BR had subcontracted with with Graham Construction, Inc. (Graham), the general contractor on the project, to install the steelwork necessary for the building. Guadalupe Gaytan, the special administrator of Dominguez’s estate, brought this negligence action against Wal-Mart and Graham. The district court granted summary judgment for Wal-Mart and Graham. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) summary judgment was properly granted to Wal-Mart, as no genuine issues of material fact existed as to any of Gaytan’s claims against Wal-Mart; and (2) there were genuine issues of material fact with respect to Gaytan’s direct negligence claim against Graham arising from Graham’s alleged retention of control over the use of safety equipment on the roof. Remanded. View "Gaytan v. Wal-Mart" on Justia Law

In 2011, the district court filed a decree dissolving the marriage of Brenda Rice and Dale Rice that incorporated a property settlement agreement (“agreement”) previously entered into by the parties. Dale died one week later. At the time of his death, Dale owned two life insurance policies, both of which listed Brenda as the primary beneficiary. Brenda subsequently filed claims for the proceeds of the policies. The personal representative of Dale’s estate moved to enforce the dissolution decree, claiming that under the agreement, Brenda relinquished her beneficiary interests in the life insurance policies. The district court ordered Brenda to withdraw her claims under the policies and to renounce her rights to any property or interest in Dale’s estate and proceeds from any insurance policies on Dale’s life. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) as a matter of law, Brenda relinquished all rights to Dale’s life insurance policies in the agreement, which was incorporated into the divorce decree; and (2) therefore, the district court did not err when it enforced the dissolution decree and ordered Brenda to withdraw claims to Dale’s life insurance policies.View "Rice v. Web" on Justia Law

Nicole and Sandra were removed from their family home in 2011 due to its unsanitary condition. The children were later adjudicated and moved to a foster placement. The Department of Health and Human Services’ case plans focused on the unsanitary home condition, as well as Mother and Father’s parenting skills and abuse allegations. In 2013, after a trial, the county court entered an order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the county court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights, as the State rebutted the presumption that Mother was a fit parent and that it was in the children’s best interests for Mother’s rights to remain intact; but (2) reversed the order terminating Father’s parental rights, as the State did not rebut the presumption that Father was a fit parent.View "In re Interest of Nicole M." on Justia Law

Appellant was a temporary employee at the University of Nebraska. After the University considering terminating Appellant’s employment, human resources completed a “threat assessment” in relation to the termination, which noted Appellant’s criminal record and history of becoming upset over discussion of work performance. When the University decided to terminate Appellant, an e-mail was circulated warning coworkers to alert campus police and lock their doors if they saw Appellant. Appellant filed this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the University Board of Regents and two of its managers, making a “stigma plus” claim that he was deprived of a liberty interest in his good name without due process of law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding (1) there was no genuine issue of material fact that Appellant had not sufficiently suffered a constitutional violation; (2) the Board of Regents was shielded by sovereign immunity; and (3) the individual defendants were protected by qualified sovereign immunity because the alleged violation was not clearly established. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in its judgment.View "Potter v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Neb." on Justia Law

In 2009, Defendant was charged with two counts of first degree sexual contact. In 2012, Defendant filed a second motion to discharge based upon his statutory right to a speedy trial. The district court overruled the motion, and Defendant appealed. While the appeal was pending, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw and dismiss his appeal. The Supreme Court sustained Defendant’s motion to discharge without determining how much time remained on the speedy trial clock. The State moved for rehearing of Defendant’s motion to dismiss, claiming that the Court erred by failing to address how much time remained on Defendant’s speedy trial clock after the dismissal of his interlocutory speedy trial appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Defendant’s appeal, holding that Defendant waived his statutory right to a speedy trial and that there was no need to calculate the time remaining to bring him to trial.View "State v. Vela-Montes" on Justia Law