Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2013, Francisco Rodriguez moved to withdraw his guilty plea and to vacate his 2004 conviction for attempted possession of a controlled substance (Class I misdemeanor). He argued that before entering a guilty plea in the 2004 proceedings, he did not receive the proper advisement under Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-1819.02(1) (Reissue 2008), and that he currently faced immigration consequences from the resulting conviction. Because Rodriguez moved to withdraw his plea after he had completed his sentence of 2 years’ probation, the district court concluded that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court concluded that the court did have jurisdiction, and reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Nebraska v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Appellant Angelo Tolbert was convicted of first degree murder, first degree assault, and two counts of use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. He was sentenced to life imprisonment on the murder count and 40 to 50 years’ imprisonment on each of the other three counts, to be served consecutively. Tolbert appealed, arguing: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions; (2) the sentences imposed were excessive; and (3) the district court erred in denying his motion for new trial. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Nebraska v. Tolbert" on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to one count of issuing a bad check. Upon satisfactory completion of the conditions of his probation, the district court entered an order releasing Appellant from probation. Appellant then moved to set aside his conviction pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-2264(2). The district court denied Appellant’s motion, concluding that because the conditions of Appellant’s probation included confinement in the county jail, Appellant did not fall within the class of persons whose convictions may be set aside pursuant to section 29-2264(2). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 29-2264(2) does not preclude relief merely because the person placed on probation was subjected to jail time as a condition of probation. Remanded. View "State v. Kudlacz" on Justia Law

Appellees, husband and wife, entered into an agreement with Appellant under which Appellees were to purchase Appellant’s undivided one-third interest in a 160-acre parcel of real estate. Appellant subsequently backed out of the purchase agreement, and Appellees filed a breach of contract action against Appellant. A bench trial was held, at which time Appellant no longer had title to the property. The district court found in favor of Appellees and awarded damages, concluding that Appellant had breached the purchase agreement by refusing to sell her interest in the property to Appellees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in determining that Appellant breached the purchase agreement and failing to find repudiation of the contract. View "Stauffer v. Benson" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of first degree murder, kidnapping, and first degree sexual assault on a child. Appellant was sentenced to death on the murder conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences on appeal. Appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief, which the district court denied. Appellant then filed a second postconviction petition and sought relief under the common-law writ of error coram nobis. The district court denied postconviction relief, concluding that Appellant failed to raise any ground for relief not previously available to him. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s postconviction claims were procedurally barred because they were or could have been litigated on direct appeal or in his previous postconviction petition; and (2) Appellant failed to raise any basis warranting coram nobis relief. View "State v. Hessler" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sought to quiet title in their favor to a disputed parcel of land of which Defendants were the record owners. Defendants filed a cross-claim seeking a prescriptive easement in the event that title was quieted in Plaintiffs. The district court quieted title in favor of Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) quieting title of the disputed parcel in Plaintiffs where Plaintiffs did not fail to provide an exact and definite description of the land they claimed to have entered and possessed; and (2) quieting title in Plaintiffs where their adverse possession claim was not barred by the doctrine of laches. View "Schellhorn v. Schmieding" on Justia Law

Virginia Jacobson died from complications after choking on a piece of meat. Jacobson was under the care of Dr. Sherry Shresta and Dr. Gaston Cornu-Labat before she died. Virginia’s husband and the special administrator of Virginia’s estate (collectively, the Jacobsons) filed a wrongful death action against the doctors (Defendants). Defendants filed a motion to bifurcate on the issue of whether Defendants were employees of the hospital, a political subdivision. If Defendants were hospital employees, the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act (PSTCA) barred the Jacobsons’ action. Before hearing the bifurcated employment issue, the trial court rejected the Jacobsons’ claim that they were entitled to a jury trial on the employment issue. The district court then dismissed the complaint, finding that Defendants were employees. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the Jacobsons had waived their right to a jury trial because they failed to make a timely objection to the bench trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Jacobsons, by their silence, could not have waived their right to a jury trial; but (2) the Jacobsons did not have a right to have a jury decide whether Defendants were political subdivision employees. View "Jacobson v. Shresta" on Justia Law

A credit union sued former members of the credit union’s board of directors. The former directors submitted the lawsuit to the credit union’s insurer, seeking coverage under the policy. The insurer denied coverage. The former directors sued, seeking a declaratory judgment that the policy covered the credit union’s claims. The district court ruled in favor of the former directors but later reconsidered and granted summary judgment to the insurer. The former directors settled with the credit union while reconsideration was pending. The Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the insurer, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in (1) vacating its earlier judgment granting the former directors’ motion for declaratory judgment, as the former directors did not establish that they were entitled to summary or declaratory judgment; and (2) allowing the insurer to amend its answer, as the settlement potentially gave rise to new policy-based defenses that were not barred by equitable estoppel. View "Breci v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Gloria Correa was involved in a motor vehicle accident with E. Dean Hascall (Hascall). Hascall later died of causes unrelated to the accident. After Hascall’s estate was closed, Correa filed a negligence action against the estate and the estate’s personal representative, Neomi D. Hascall (Neomi). The estate and Neomi moved for summary judgment, arguing that dismissal would be appropriate because Correa filed suit against a closed estate and a discharged personal representative. Correa, however, filed an emergency motion to reopen the estate and assign a special administrator for purposes of service, which was granted. The district court granted summary judgment for the estate and Neomi and denied Correa’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint. The Supreme Court dismissed Correa’s appeal, holding that, because the special administrator was not served within six months of the commencement of this action, the district court lacked jurisdiction over Correa’s claims, and likewise, this Court lacked jurisdiction over Correa’s appeal. View "Correa v. Estate of Hascall" on Justia Law

Beginning in 1974, Douglas County’s retired employees paid the same amount as active employees for health insurance coverage. In 2009, the County Board of Commissioners adopted a resolution that charged retirees premiums that were higher than the rate paid by active employees. Shortly before the change was to take effect, retired employees of the County (Plaintiffs) sued the County. The district court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, concluding that equitable estoppel prohibited the County from increasing the premiums to be paid by the retirees above those paid by active employees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the retirees had no contractual right to pay the same premiums as active employees, the district court erred in using equitable estoppel to create such a contractual obligation. Remanded with direction to enter judgment for the County on Plaintiffs’ claims. View "Christiansen v. County of Douglas" on Justia Law