Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a nurse formerly employed by the Department of Health and Human Services, filed an action against Defendant, a supervisor who terminated her employment, alleging violations of her due process, free speech, and equal protection rights, among other claims. Defendant moved for summary judgment, claiming that, as a state employee, she was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court reversed in part and dismissed in part, holding (1) Plaintiff did not allege a viable violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights, and Defendant was entitled to qualified immunity on that claim; and (2) because Plaintiff’s alleged First Amendment claim necessitated resolving a fact-related dispute, Defendant’s appeal on this issue was not immediately reviewable under the collateral order doctrine, and the appeal must be dismissed at to this issue. View "Carney v. Miller" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and other offenses arising from three shootings that occurred at three separate locations. Defendant was seventeen years old at the time of the murders. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, vacated all of the sentences, and remanded for resentencing, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motions for mistrial and for new trial; (2) the two life imprisonment sentences without the possibility of parole imposed for the first degree murder convictions were unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama; and (3) the district court committed plain error in regard to the sentences imposed for the convictions of use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, attempted second degree murder, attempted robbery, and criminal conspiracy. View "State v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment for a murder he committed when he was sixteen years old. More than fifteen years later, Defendant filed an amended postconviction motion challenging his life imprisonment sentence. The district court denied the motion. After Defendant appealed, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, which held that the Eighth Amendment forbids a state sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without the possibility of parole for a juvenile offender convicted of homicide. The Supreme Court reversed in this case, holding (1) the rule announced in Miller applied retroactively to Defendant; and (2) Defendant’s sentence was unconstitutional under Miller, and therefore, Defendant was entitled to be resentenced. Remanded. View "State v. Mantich" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree felony murder and other charges arising from three shootings. At the time of the shootings, Defendant was fifteen years old. Defendant was sentenced to two life terms without the possibility of parole for the murder counts. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions in all respects but vacated the sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, holding that the life imprisonment sentences were unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that it is unconstitutional to sentence a juvenile convicted of a homicide to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. View "State v. Castaneda" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to a 2012 driving under the influence (DUI) charge. During a sentence enhancement hearing, the evidence showed Defendant had previously been convicted of DUI in 2003, 2001, and 1999. Defendant argued that the 1999 and 2001 convictions were the same convictions referred to in the 2003 enhancement hearing, and because those convictions did not result in enhancement of the 2003 charge, the State was collaterally estopped from using them for enhancement of the 2012 charge. The trial court found Defendant guilty of fourth-offense DUI, holding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not bar the use of two prior convictions for the purpose of sentence enhancement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that collateral estoppel did not bar the use of Defendant’s 1999 and 2001 DUI convictions as two of the three prior convictions necessary to enhance his 2012 conviction to fourth offense. View "State v. Bruckner" on Justia Law

After an infant boy died in the care of Plaintiff, a daycare provider, Plaintiff was charged with felony child abuse resulting in death. The charge was later dropped after two forensic pathologists retained by Plaintiff concluded that the infant’s cause of death was sudden infant death syndrome. Plaintiff subsequently sued the pathologist whose autopsy report was used to bring the criminal charges against Plaintiff and the pathologist’s wholly owned corporation (collectively, Defendants). The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants on Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Defendants where differing reasonable inferences could be drawn as to whether the pathologist knowingly provided false or misleading information to law enforcement in his autopsy report. View "McKinney v. Okoye" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the State did not have probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of his vehicle based on the odor of marijuana emanating from his person or on a police officer’s alleged knowledge that there were needles used for methamphetamine in Defendant’s vehicle. The court of appeals reversed, concluding (1) standing alone, the fact that Defendant smelled of burnt marijuana did not provide probable cause to search Defendant’s vehicle; and (2) the officer’s alleged knowledge of the needles in Defendant’s car was based solely on testimony that should be disregarded as a matter of law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals should have given deference to the district court’s finding of fact that the officer was told about the needles prior to the search; and (2) probable cause existed for the search based on the combined facts that Defendant smelled of burnt marijuana and that he admitted prior to the search of his vehicle to having needles in the vehicle. View "State v. Dalland" on Justia Law

Appellee injured his back while working for Appellant. The original workers’ compensation judge found that Appellee was permanently and totally disabled. On appeal, a three-judge review panel concluded it could not tell whether the judge had considered the presumption of correctness afforded to a vocational rehabilitation specialist’s opinion of Appellee’s disability and remanded the cause. The court of appeals affirmed. On remand, the case was assigned to a new trial judge, who ruled that Appellee was permanently and totally disabled without holding an evidentiary hearing, finding that Appellee had rebutted the presumption afforded to the specialist’s opinion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that new judge’s ruling on the issues without a new evidentiary hearing violated Appellee’s right to due process because the witnesses’ credibility was relevant to the issues presented at trial. View "Liljestrand v. Dell Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

Rick Wheeler had two liability insurance policies with American Family Mutual Insurance Company. Both Rick and his son Ryan were insureds under the policies. Both policies provided personal liability coverage and included exclusions for abuse and intentional injury. Both policies also contained a severability clause, which required that the insurance be applied separately to each insured. Joshua and Maren McCrary sued Rick and Ryan for Ryan’s alleged sexual assault of the McCrarys’ minor daughter. American Family filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking a judgment that its policies did not provide liability coverage to Rick. The district court granted summary judgment to American Family. At issue on appeal was whether the severability clause changed the effect of, or rendered ambiguous, the exclusions that would otherwise bar coverage for Rick. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the severability clause did not affect the unambiguous language of the policies’ exclusions, which barred coverage for Rick. View "Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wheeler" on Justia Law

After a jury trial in 2008 Appellant was convicted of attempted third degree sexual assault of a child, a Class I misdemeanor. In 2011, Appellant applied for a permit to carry a concealed handgun.The Nebraska State Patrol denied Appellant’s application pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 69-2433(5), which provides that a permit will be denied an applicant convicted a “misdemeanor crime of violence” within the ten years preceding the date of application. On appeal, Appellant contended that his conviction for attempted third degree sexual assault of a child was not a “crime of violence” within the meaning of section 69-2433(5). The district court affirmed the State Patrol’s denial of Appellant’s application for a concealed handgun permit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court and State Patrol did not err in finding that Appellant’s conviction of attempted third degree sexual assault of a child was a crime of violence under section 69-2433(5) and disqualified him from receiving a concealed handgun permit. View "Underwood v. Neb. State Patrol" on Justia Law