Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A 10-year-old student at an elementary school in Lincoln, Nebraska, was injured during a game of tag in a physical education class. The student was holding a pool noodle to tag classmates when another student, K.H., grabbed the pool noodle, causing the student to fall and hit her head. The student's mother sued the school district for negligence. The school district claimed sovereign immunity under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act (PSTCA), arguing the claim arose from a battery.The district court overruled the school district's motion for summary judgment, finding a factual dispute about whether the pool noodle was part of the student's body. The court noted that while K.H. intentionally grabbed the pool noodle without the student's consent, it was unclear if this contact constituted a battery since the pool noodle was not necessarily part of the student's person.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court noted that public school districts are political subdivisions under the PSTCA and that if a claim falls within an exemption, the political subdivision is not liable. The court examined whether the contact with the pool noodle could be considered offensive contact with the student's body, which would constitute a battery. The court found that whether an object is part of a person's body is determined on an objective reasonable person basis and that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding this question.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the factual dispute about whether the pool noodle was part of the student's body precluded summary judgment. The case was allowed to proceed to determine if the school district retained sovereign immunity. View "Scott v. Lancaster Cty. Sch. Dist. 0001" on Justia Law

Dennis C. Jackson, a prison inmate, sought judicial review in the district court for Johnson County of an agency’s final decision under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Jackson filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) along with his petition. The district court did not explicitly rule on the IFP application and dismissed Jackson’s APA petition as untimely. Jackson appealed the dismissal.The district court did not grant Jackson’s IFP application, instead deferring its ruling until Jackson filed an amended petition. Jackson complied, but the court dismissed the petition for being untimely, citing incorrect dates. Jackson filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court overruled without addressing the IFP application. Jackson then appealed to the Nebraska Court of Appeals, filing another IFP application for the appeal.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. It found that the district court implicitly denied Jackson’s IFP application by dismissing the petition without ruling on the application. The Supreme Court determined that the district court erred by not following statutory procedures for IFP applications and by incorrectly calculating the timeliness of Jackson’s petition. The court held that Jackson’s petitions were neither frivolous nor malicious and that the denial of IFP status was plainly erroneous.The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the district court’s denial of Jackson’s IFP application and remanded the case with directions to grant the initial IFP application and proceed with further actions consistent with its opinion. View "Jackson v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Clint Seemann and Lisa Seemann, now known as Lisa Newell, married in 2005 and executed a premarital agreement listing their premarital assets, which included land and shares of stock, to be considered marital property. The agreement specified that these assets, along with any property resulting from their efforts during the marriage, should be divided equally in the event of death or divorce. In 2021, Clint filed for divorce.The District Court for Douglas County initially valued Lisa’s retirement accounts at $1,480,720 and included them in the marital estate. It determined that Clint’s membership interest in 75th and L Street, LLC, and its appreciation were nonmarital property. The court found the premarital agreement enforceable and divided the marital estate equally, ordering Lisa to make an equalization payment to Clint. Lisa appealed, and the Nebraska Supreme Court in Seemann v. Seemann (Seemann I) found errors in the district court’s valuation and inclusion of certain assets, remanding the case for redivision of the marital estate.On remand, the district court divided the marital property into two groups: assets listed in the agreement and the remainder of the marital estate. It equally divided the listed assets but awarded Clint all the assets added on remand without ordering an equalization payment, resulting in an unequal division of the total marital estate. Lisa received 45.25% of the total marital estate, while Clint received 54.75%.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and held that the premarital agreement required an equal division of the entire marital estate. The court reversed the district court’s division and remanded with directions to divide the entire marital estate equally. View "Seemann v. Seemann" on Justia Law

Keith L. Allen was convicted of first-degree murder and use of a firearm to commit a felony, resulting in a life sentence plus 20 to 30 years. After his convictions were affirmed on direct appeal, Allen filed a motion in the district court for Lincoln County, Nebraska, seeking the return of over 50 items of personal property allegedly seized from him after his arrest. These items included firearms, video recordings, and bullet slugs. At the hearing, Allen claimed that many of the firearms belonged to other people and that certain items were needed for his criminal case and a wrongful death suit against him. The State argued that some items should remain as evidence.The district court partially denied Allen's motion, categorizing the items into evidence, contraband, or other items. The court ordered that evidence be retained, contraband be sold, and other items be returned to Allen, subject to a prejudgment attachment order from the wrongful death suit. Allen objected to the admission of the prejudgment attachment order and the exclusion of receipts purportedly showing third-party ownership of the firearms. He also argued that the State failed to prove a legitimate reason to retain the property.The Nebraska Supreme Court found that the district court plainly erred in several respects. The court did not require Allen to make an initial showing that the items were seized from him, improperly relied on Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-820, and failed to identify which firearms and ammunition were evidence. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "State v. Allen" on Justia Law

Detron L. Perry was convicted of driving under suspension and operating a motor vehicle to avoid arrest. Officer Molly Coon of the Bellevue Police Department stopped Perry's vehicle after observing it driving slowly and discovering that the owner had a suspended license. Coon also noticed that the vehicle's left rear turn signal was not working properly. During the stop, Perry fled the scene, leading to his arrest later.The district court for Sarpy County denied Perry's motion to suppress evidence obtained from the stop, finding that the stop was justified based on the malfunctioning turn signal. Perry was found guilty of both charges. At sentencing, Perry was sentenced to probation, but the court did not impose a mandatory 2-year license revocation as required by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-905(3)(b).The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of Perry's motion to suppress, finding that the stop was reasonable based on the observed traffic violation. The court also found sufficient evidence to support Perry's convictions for driving under suspension and operating a motor vehicle to avoid arrest. However, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court committed plain error by not imposing the mandatory 2-year license revocation or impoundment as required by § 28-905(3)(b).The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed Perry's convictions but vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing to include the mandatory 2-year license revocation or impoundment. View "State v. Perry" on Justia Law

Woodsonia Hwy 281, LLC (Woodsonia) owned a retail shopping mall in Grand Island, Nebraska, and leased space to American Multi-Cinema, Inc. (AMC). Woodsonia planned to redevelop the mall and sought to terminate AMC's lease under the eminent domain provisions of the lease agreement. Woodsonia claimed that the lease was terminated after conveying AMC's leasehold interest to the Community Redevelopment Authority (CRA) under threat of condemnation. AMC disputed the termination, arguing that the conditions for termination under the lease were not met.The County Court for Hall County overruled AMC's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the lease was terminated under the eminent domain provisions and granted Woodsonia restitution of the premises. AMC appealed to the District Court for Hall County, which affirmed the County Court's decision, reasoning that the lease provisions allowed Woodsonia to transfer AMC's leasehold interest under threat of condemnation.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the forcible entry and detainer action presented a title dispute, as the court needed to resolve whether AMC's leasehold interest was validly terminated. The court held that such a title dispute could not be determined in a forcible entry and detainer action, which is limited to determining the immediate right of possession without addressing title issues. Consequently, the County Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and should have dismissed the action.The Nebraska Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the District Court and remanded the case with directions to vacate the County Court's judgment and dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction. View "Woodsonia Hwy 281 v. American Multi-Cinema" on Justia Law

Sidney and Brian Harchelroad, officers of Harchelroad Motors, Inc. (HMI), obtained loans from Waypoint Bank and Western States Bank, signing promissory notes individually and as officers. Sidney and Brian were accommodation parties, meaning they did not personally benefit from the loan proceeds. Sidney died in 2018, and his wife, Carol, was appointed as personal representative of his estate. Waypoint and Western filed claims in Sidney’s estate for unpaid promissory notes, which were allowed. Brian also filed a contingent claim against Sidney’s estate, stating he would seek contribution if he paid more than his share of the debts. Brian died in 2019, and his wife, Michelle, was appointed as personal representative of his estate.Waypoint and Western filed claims in Brian’s estate. Michelle, individually, paid the banks and took assignments of their rights. She then sought contribution from Sidney’s estate for one-half of the amounts paid. The county court largely granted her request, finding that the notes were not extinguished by her payments or the assignments.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that the notes were not extinguished by the judgments against Brian or by Michelle’s payments, as the agreements with the banks were assignments, not payments in full. The court affirmed the county court’s decision, requiring Sidney’s estate to pay Michelle, individually, $459,559.51 for the Waypoint note and $291,263.20 for the Western note, and $300,000 to Brian’s estate for his payments to Western. The court found that Michelle, as an assignee, had the right to seek contribution from Sidney’s estate, and that the proportionate share was correctly determined as one-half, given the joint and several liability of Sidney and Brian. View "In re Estate of Harchelroad" on Justia Law

The appellant was charged with first-degree sexual assault and false imprisonment after an incident involving a 17-year-old victim, A.S., who alleged that the appellant, while intoxicated, forcibly removed her clothes and penetrated her vaginally. The incident occurred after a Fourth of July party at the home of the appellant's then-fiancée, who is also A.S.'s cousin. A.S. reported the assault the next day and underwent a forensic medical examination.The District Court for Hamilton County admitted evidence of the appellant's prior sexual assault conviction involving a 13-year-old victim, M.Z., under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-414, which allows evidence of prior sexual offenses to prove propensity. The court found similarities between the two incidents, including the ages of the victims, the use of force, and the presence of alcohol. The court also admitted a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE) report prepared during A.S.'s examination, which included statements made by A.S. for medical diagnosis and treatment.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decisions. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the prior sexual assault conviction, as the probative value was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The court also found that the SANE report was admissible under the business records exception and the medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule. The appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the SANE report was rejected, as any objection would have been meritless.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the appellant's convictions for first-degree sexual assault and false imprisonment. View "State v. Swartz" on Justia Law

A law firm, Sherrets Bruno & Vogt LLC (SBV), sued Timothy E. Montoya, an Arizona resident, in the District Court for Douglas County, Nebraska, to collect unpaid attorney fees. These fees were part of a divorce settlement agreement from an Arizona court, where Montoya agreed to pay his ex-wife's attorney fees to SBV. Montoya failed to make the payments and did not respond to the lawsuit or appear in court.The District Court for Douglas County overruled SBV's motion for default judgment and dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court found that Montoya's only contact with Nebraska was through phone calls to SBV's Nebraska office, which did not establish sufficient minimum contacts to confer personal jurisdiction. The court gave SBV an opportunity to present facts establishing jurisdiction but found the evidence insufficient.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that an objection to personal jurisdiction is not waived by default when a nonresident fails to respond to process served out of state and does not appear. It also held that a trial court may raise personal jurisdiction on its own motion when deciding whether to enter a default judgment because the defendant has failed to appear. The court concluded that SBV failed to make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction over Montoya, as the limited communications and agreement to pay fees to a Nebraska office did not establish the necessary minimum contacts. Therefore, the dismissal of the case for lack of personal jurisdiction was affirmed. View "Sherrets Bruno & Vogt v. Montoya" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers responded to a minor two-vehicle accident and suspected that Charmayne R. Strong, an occupant of one of the vehicles, was intoxicated. After Strong refused a preliminary breath test, she was arrested and transported to law enforcement headquarters. Officers obtained a search warrant for a chemical blood test and informed Strong that refusal to submit to the test was a separate crime. Strong initially consented but later refused at the hospital, leading officers to determine she had refused the test.The State charged Strong in county court with refusal to submit to a chemical test under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,197. Strong filed a motion to suppress evidence related to her arrest, which the county court overruled. Following a stipulated bench trial, the county court found Strong guilty and sentenced her to six months' probation, a 60-day license revocation, and a $500 fine. Strong appealed to the district court, arguing that one cannot be convicted of refusal to submit to a chemical test if the test is sought pursuant to a search warrant. The district court rejected her arguments and affirmed her conviction. Strong then appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court.The Nebraska Supreme Court held that Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,197(3) criminalizes the refusal to submit to a chemical blood test when the test is sought pursuant to a search warrant. The court found no constitutional barrier to Strong’s conviction, as the blood test was lawful and supported by a valid search warrant. The court affirmed Strong’s conviction. View "State v. Strong" on Justia Law