Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Woodsonia Hwy 281, LLC (Woodsonia) owned a retail shopping mall in Grand Island, Nebraska, and leased space to American Multi-Cinema, Inc. (AMC). Woodsonia planned to redevelop the mall and sought to terminate AMC's lease under the eminent domain provisions of the lease agreement. Woodsonia claimed that the lease was terminated after conveying AMC's leasehold interest to the Community Redevelopment Authority (CRA) under threat of condemnation. AMC disputed the termination, arguing that the conditions for termination under the lease were not met.The County Court for Hall County overruled AMC's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the lease was terminated under the eminent domain provisions and granted Woodsonia restitution of the premises. AMC appealed to the District Court for Hall County, which affirmed the County Court's decision, reasoning that the lease provisions allowed Woodsonia to transfer AMC's leasehold interest under threat of condemnation.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the forcible entry and detainer action presented a title dispute, as the court needed to resolve whether AMC's leasehold interest was validly terminated. The court held that such a title dispute could not be determined in a forcible entry and detainer action, which is limited to determining the immediate right of possession without addressing title issues. Consequently, the County Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and should have dismissed the action.The Nebraska Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the District Court and remanded the case with directions to vacate the County Court's judgment and dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction. View "Woodsonia Hwy 281 v. American Multi-Cinema" on Justia Law

Sidney and Brian Harchelroad, officers of Harchelroad Motors, Inc. (HMI), obtained loans from Waypoint Bank and Western States Bank, signing promissory notes individually and as officers. Sidney and Brian were accommodation parties, meaning they did not personally benefit from the loan proceeds. Sidney died in 2018, and his wife, Carol, was appointed as personal representative of his estate. Waypoint and Western filed claims in Sidney’s estate for unpaid promissory notes, which were allowed. Brian also filed a contingent claim against Sidney’s estate, stating he would seek contribution if he paid more than his share of the debts. Brian died in 2019, and his wife, Michelle, was appointed as personal representative of his estate.Waypoint and Western filed claims in Brian’s estate. Michelle, individually, paid the banks and took assignments of their rights. She then sought contribution from Sidney’s estate for one-half of the amounts paid. The county court largely granted her request, finding that the notes were not extinguished by her payments or the assignments.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that the notes were not extinguished by the judgments against Brian or by Michelle’s payments, as the agreements with the banks were assignments, not payments in full. The court affirmed the county court’s decision, requiring Sidney’s estate to pay Michelle, individually, $459,559.51 for the Waypoint note and $291,263.20 for the Western note, and $300,000 to Brian’s estate for his payments to Western. The court found that Michelle, as an assignee, had the right to seek contribution from Sidney’s estate, and that the proportionate share was correctly determined as one-half, given the joint and several liability of Sidney and Brian. View "In re Estate of Harchelroad" on Justia Law

The appellant was charged with first-degree sexual assault and false imprisonment after an incident involving a 17-year-old victim, A.S., who alleged that the appellant, while intoxicated, forcibly removed her clothes and penetrated her vaginally. The incident occurred after a Fourth of July party at the home of the appellant's then-fiancée, who is also A.S.'s cousin. A.S. reported the assault the next day and underwent a forensic medical examination.The District Court for Hamilton County admitted evidence of the appellant's prior sexual assault conviction involving a 13-year-old victim, M.Z., under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-414, which allows evidence of prior sexual offenses to prove propensity. The court found similarities between the two incidents, including the ages of the victims, the use of force, and the presence of alcohol. The court also admitted a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE) report prepared during A.S.'s examination, which included statements made by A.S. for medical diagnosis and treatment.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decisions. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the prior sexual assault conviction, as the probative value was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The court also found that the SANE report was admissible under the business records exception and the medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule. The appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the SANE report was rejected, as any objection would have been meritless.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the appellant's convictions for first-degree sexual assault and false imprisonment. View "State v. Swartz" on Justia Law

A law firm, Sherrets Bruno & Vogt LLC (SBV), sued Timothy E. Montoya, an Arizona resident, in the District Court for Douglas County, Nebraska, to collect unpaid attorney fees. These fees were part of a divorce settlement agreement from an Arizona court, where Montoya agreed to pay his ex-wife's attorney fees to SBV. Montoya failed to make the payments and did not respond to the lawsuit or appear in court.The District Court for Douglas County overruled SBV's motion for default judgment and dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court found that Montoya's only contact with Nebraska was through phone calls to SBV's Nebraska office, which did not establish sufficient minimum contacts to confer personal jurisdiction. The court gave SBV an opportunity to present facts establishing jurisdiction but found the evidence insufficient.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that an objection to personal jurisdiction is not waived by default when a nonresident fails to respond to process served out of state and does not appear. It also held that a trial court may raise personal jurisdiction on its own motion when deciding whether to enter a default judgment because the defendant has failed to appear. The court concluded that SBV failed to make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction over Montoya, as the limited communications and agreement to pay fees to a Nebraska office did not establish the necessary minimum contacts. Therefore, the dismissal of the case for lack of personal jurisdiction was affirmed. View "Sherrets Bruno & Vogt v. Montoya" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers responded to a minor two-vehicle accident and suspected that Charmayne R. Strong, an occupant of one of the vehicles, was intoxicated. After Strong refused a preliminary breath test, she was arrested and transported to law enforcement headquarters. Officers obtained a search warrant for a chemical blood test and informed Strong that refusal to submit to the test was a separate crime. Strong initially consented but later refused at the hospital, leading officers to determine she had refused the test.The State charged Strong in county court with refusal to submit to a chemical test under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,197. Strong filed a motion to suppress evidence related to her arrest, which the county court overruled. Following a stipulated bench trial, the county court found Strong guilty and sentenced her to six months' probation, a 60-day license revocation, and a $500 fine. Strong appealed to the district court, arguing that one cannot be convicted of refusal to submit to a chemical test if the test is sought pursuant to a search warrant. The district court rejected her arguments and affirmed her conviction. Strong then appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court.The Nebraska Supreme Court held that Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,197(3) criminalizes the refusal to submit to a chemical blood test when the test is sought pursuant to a search warrant. The court found no constitutional barrier to Strong’s conviction, as the blood test was lawful and supported by a valid search warrant. The court affirmed Strong’s conviction. View "State v. Strong" on Justia Law

Marvin T. Jose Mateo filed a petition in the Hall County Court seeking to establish a minor guardianship for his 18-year-old brother, Tomas J. The petition also requested immigration-related factual findings under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). Tomas had been in Marvin's care since 2019, and they had been living in Grand Island, Nebraska, since January 2022. Tomas was attending high school and planned to join the U.S. Marines after graduation. Marvin testified that Tomas' parents were in Guatemala and did not provide financial support.The county court denied the guardianship petition, noting that Tomas was already 18 years old and that Marvin had a power of attorney from Tomas' parents, which allowed him to care for Tomas without a guardianship. The court did not make the requested factual findings under the UCCJEA. Marvin filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, arguing that the court applied the wrong legal standard and failed to consider Tomas' best interests. The court overruled the motion, reiterating that Marvin had been able to care for Tomas without a guardianship and suggesting that the petition was filed primarily to obtain immigration findings.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the UCCJEA did not apply because Tomas was no longer a "child" under the UCCJEA when the petition was filed. The court determined that other Nebraska statutes gave the county court jurisdiction over the minor guardianship proceeding. However, the court found that the appeal became moot once Tomas reached the age of majority, as the relief of appointing a minor guardian was no longer available. The court dismissed the appeal, concluding that none of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied. View "In re Guardianship of Tomas J." on Justia Law

Katrell M. Nelson was charged in two separate criminal cases with possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person. He entered no contest pleas and was sentenced to identical prison terms in each case, to be served concurrently. Nelson had been in custody for a total of 241 days before sentencing, with 9 days related only to the first case and 232 days related to both cases.The district court sentenced Nelson to 6 to 10 years in prison for each case, to be served concurrently. The court applied all 241 days of jail credit to the first case and refused to apply any credit to the second case. Nelson appealed, arguing that the court erred by not applying the 232 days of credit to the second case.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court clarified that when multiple sentences are imposed contemporaneously, whether consecutively or concurrently, all available credit for time served under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-1,106(1) should be applied just once, to the aggregate of all terms imposed. The court found that the district court's sentencing orders were inconsistent with this principle, as they applied all available credit to only one of the concurrent sentences.The Nebraska Supreme Court modified the sentencing order in the second case to state that Nelson is entitled to 241 days of credit for time served against the aggregate of all terms imposed in both cases. The court directed the district court to modify the commitment accordingly. The judgment was otherwise affirmed. View "State v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Nancy Johnson and Domenico Zurini were involved in a motor vehicle accident in Omaha, Nebraska. Just before the 4-year statute of limitations expired, Johnson and her husband filed a negligence complaint against Zurini in the district court for Douglas County. After attempting to serve summons, they discovered that Zurini had died before the complaint was filed. They then had a special administrator appointed and moved to revive the action in the name of the special administrator. The district court initially granted the motion, and the Johnsons filed an amended complaint naming the special administrator as the defendant. The special administrator entered a voluntary appearance and then moved to vacate the order of revivor and dismiss the amended complaint, arguing that no viable action had been commenced within the statute of limitations. The district court agreed and dismissed the action as time barred.The Johnsons appealed, and the case was moved to the Nebraska Supreme Court's docket. The court reviewed whether the Johnsons properly commenced their negligence action within the applicable statute of limitations. The court noted that the original complaint, which named a deceased person as the sole defendant, was a legal nullity and did not validly commence an action under Nebraska law. The court also found that the amended complaint, which named the special administrator as the defendant, was filed after the limitations period expired and did not relate back to the original complaint under Nebraska's relation back statute.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the original complaint was a legal nullity and did not commence an action. The amended complaint was time barred, and the relation back statute did not apply. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to vacate the order of revivor and substitution. View "Johnson v. Antoniutti" on Justia Law

Raymond A. Guenther, Jr. died intestate, and Damon Bechtold was appointed as the personal representative of his estate. Bechtold managed the estate's assets, paid claims, and filed a petition for complete settlement, which included a final accounting and a schedule of distribution listing Raymond A. Guenther, Sr. as the sole heir. The county court approved the final accounting and directed the distribution of the estate's assets to Guenther Sr. The final accounting did not list any personal representative fees.Several months later, Bechtold filed a motion seeking fees for his services as personal representative. The county court denied the motion, stating that the earlier order of complete settlement was a final, appealable order, and Bechtold had not filed a timely appeal. Bechtold then appealed the denial of his motion for fees.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the order of complete settlement, which approved the final accounting and directed the distribution of the estate's assets, was a final, appealable order regarding Bechtold's entitlement to fees. Since Bechtold did not appeal this order within the required timeframe, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of his subsequent motion for fees. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. View "In re Estate of Guenther" on Justia Law

Brant A. Geller pled no contest to three counts of possession of a controlled substance and one count of attempted possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person. The district court orally pronounced his sentences and issued a written sentencing order. A few hours later, the district court issued an amended sentencing order. Geller appealed, challenging his sentences, arguing that the amended sentencing order was contrary to the oral pronouncement and that his sentences were excessive.The district court initially sentenced Geller to 6 months’ imprisonment and 12 months’ post-release supervision for each possession charge, and 18 months’ imprisonment and 12 months’ post-release supervision for the weapon charge. The court stated that the sentences for the possession charges would run concurrently, but the weapon charge would run consecutively. The written sentencing order reflected this, but the amended order clarified that the post-release supervision for the weapon charge would also run consecutively.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that when an orally pronounced sentence is ambiguous, a subsequent written sentencing order can clarify the ambiguity. The court found that the district court’s oral pronouncement was contradictory regarding whether the post-release supervision terms were to run concurrently or consecutively. The amended sentencing order clarified this ambiguity, stating that the post-release supervision for the weapon charge would run consecutively to the other charges.The court also reviewed Geller’s argument that his sentences were excessive. It found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Geller, as the sentences were within statutory limits and the court considered the appropriate factors. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision. View "State v. Geller" on Justia Law