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The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part an order of the county court resulting from a trust’s beneficiaries’ suit against Lyle A. Forgey, another beneficiary and trustee. The parties were beneficiaries of the Glenn G. Forgey Revocable Trust. Plaintiffs Marvel Forgey and her three children sought to remove Lyle as trustee, secure administration of the trust, value trust assets, divide those assets into separate trusts for the beneficiaries, and determine liabilities for alleged breaches of Lyle’s fiduciary duties. Bessie Forgey-McCoy and her two children, also beneficiaries, joined as interested parties. The county court valued and distributed trust assets, assessed damages against Lyle for estate tax interest and penalties, and declined to award attorney fees or costs. All parties appealed. The Supreme Court held that the county court (1) erred by not awarding damages for Lyle’s untimely reports and accountings of his failure to collect rents on behalf of the trust; (2) abused its discretion in declining to award attorney fees to Marvel, Bessie, and their children; and (3) otherwise did not err in its findings. View "In re Estate of Glenn G. Forgey" on Justia Law

Posted in: Trusts & Estates

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The Supreme Court reversed the order of the Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC) affirming the decision of the Custer County Assessor regarding the 2012 taxable value of Donald V. Cain, Jr.’s agricultural property. On appeal, Cain argued, among other things, that the TERC violated his due process rights by not permitting him to argue how the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof applied to the adduced evidence. The court held (1) Cain waived the due process rights applicable in Liljestrand v. Dell Enterprises, 842 N.W.2d 575 (2014); and (2) TERC erred in affirming the Assessor’s valuations of Cain’s property for the 2012 tax year. View "Cain v. Custer County Board of Equalization" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the order of the Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC) affirming the decision of the Custer County Assessor regarding the 2012 taxable value of Donald V. Cain, Jr.’s agricultural property. On appeal, Cain argued, among other things, that the TERC violated his due process rights by not permitting him to argue how the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof applied to the adduced evidence. The court held (1) Cain waived the due process rights applicable in Liljestrand v. Dell Enterprises, 842 N.W.2d 575 (2014); and (2) TERC erred in affirming the Assessor’s valuations of Cain’s property for the 2012 tax year. View "Cain v. Custer County Board of Equalization" on Justia Law

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The district court erred in concluding that because of arbitration and venue provisions in an employment contract between the parties, it lacked jurisdiction. Nearly three years into the litigation in this case, the Douglas County District Court indefinitely stayed a claim for dissolution of one business entity, a party in the case, and dismissed sua sponte all other claims, noting that the employment contract contained arbitration and venue provisions that were outside the district court’s jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed the stay and dismissal order and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that because no party sought to enforce the arbitration agreement, it was error for the district court to do so on its own accord. View "Boyd v. Cook" on Justia Law

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The district court erred in concluding that because of arbitration and venue provisions in an employment contract between the parties, it lacked jurisdiction. Nearly three years into the litigation in this case, the Douglas County District Court indefinitely stayed a claim for dissolution of one business entity, a party in the case, and dismissed sua sponte all other claims, noting that the employment contract contained arbitration and venue provisions that were outside the district court’s jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed the stay and dismissal order and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that because no party sought to enforce the arbitration agreement, it was error for the district court to do so on its own accord. View "Boyd v. Cook" on Justia Law

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At issue in this custody action was whether the district court’s consent to adoption or the court’s stay of the custody action pending the resolution of the adoption petition presented a final order. Plaintiff, the former partner of the biological mother of the child in this case, brought this custody action, alleging that she had loco parentis status to the child. Approximately one month after Plaintiff’s custody action was filed. Defendant, the biological mother, and her wife then filed a petition in county court for stepparent adoption. The district court consented to the adoption and state the custody action pending the resolution of the adoption petition. Plaintiff appealed the order consenting to the adoption proceeding. The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal, holding that neither that order granting consent to adoption nor the order staying the custody proceedings pending further order of the court presented a final, appealable order. View "Jennifer T. v. Lindsay P." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, entered after a jury trial, in favor of Otoe County School District 66-0111 in this dispute over amounts owed under a contract between the School District and Facilities Cost Management Group (FCMG). In the first appeal in this case, the Supreme Court concluded that the jury had been erroneously instructed and remanded the cause for a new trial. On retrial, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the School District. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) admitting certain evidence; (2) instructing the jury; and (3) ruling on FCMG’s posttrial motions. View "Facilities Cost Management Group v. Otoe County School District 66-0111" on Justia Law

Posted in: Contracts

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The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court finding Father in willful contempt of a support order for failure to pay child support. On appeal, Father argued that he did not willfully disobey the support order and that the purge plan set forth in the contempt order was impossible to perform, making it punitive rather than a coercive sanction. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Father was in contempt; and (2) the contempt order did not impermissibly impose a criminal or punitive sanction in a civil proceeding because it was not impossible to comply with the order. View "State ex rel. Maria B. v. Kyle B." on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law

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An interlocutory appeal is not authorized under Nebraska’s “three strikes” prison litigation statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-3401, which prohibits a prisoner who has previously filed at least three frivolous civil actions from proceeding in forma pauperis (IFP) without leave of court. In this action alleging civil rights violations relating to Appellant’s treatment by prison officials and the conditions of his confinement, the district court initially sustained Appellant’s motion to proceed IFP. Upon Appellees’ motion to reconsider, the district court vacated the prior order allowing Appellant to proceed IFP pursuant to the “three strikes” provision because Appellant had previously filed three district court cases in which he had been denied IFP status. Appellant appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction Appellant’s interlocutory appeal, holding that neither section 25-3401 nor the general IFP statute statute provides a right to interlocutory appeal of a “three strikes” denial. View "Robinson v. Houston" on Justia Law

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In this criminal case, the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s plea in bar to charges of sexual assault of a child. During his criminal trial, Defendant moved for a mistrial based upon the court’s decision to grant the State’s motion to amend the information and a jury instruction after the jury had begun deliberations. The court sustained the motion and declared a mistrial. Thereafter, Defendant filed a plea in bar asserting that a new trial would subject him to double jeopardy because the State created the need for a mistrial. The district court denied the plea in bar. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that double jeopardy did not bar a new trial because Defendant failed to show that the State provoked him into moving for a mistrial and that double jeopardy did not prevent a new trial. View "State v. Bedolla" on Justia Law