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The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order granting a directed verdict in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff’s statutory strict liability claim under Neb. Rev. Stat. 54-601(1), holding that allegations that a ranch employee was injured as a result of the ranch’s herding dog nipping at a cow, causing the cow to charge into the employee, fall outside the strict liability statute. In granting a directed verdict for Defendant, the district court concluded that the evidence presented did not fall within the purview of strict liability under Neb. Rev. Stat. 54-601. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that strict liability under section 54-601(1) does not encompass the act of a herding dog nipping at the heels of a cow, causing the cow to move forward and collide with a ranch employee and inflict bodily hurt on the employee. View "Smith v. Meyring Cattle Co., LLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant’s appeal from the district court’s imposition of a fifteen-day custodial sanction after testing positive for drug and alcohol while serving a sentence of probation, holding that the order imposing a custodial sanction did not affect a substantial right and was not final. Appellant was convicted of possessing a controlled substance. While serving probation, Appellant’s probation officer sought the imposition of a custodial sanction. After a hearing, the district court imposed a custodial sanction of fifteen days’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant’s appeal, holding that the order from which Appellant was attempting to appeal was not a final order. View "State v. Thalmann" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law

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In this case stemming from an electrician’s injuries after an aerial lift malfunctioned the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s partial grant of Defendant’s motion to exclude expert testimony and grant of Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on all claims. While Plaintiff, the electrician, was working approximately thirty feet in the air on the raised platform of the aerial lift, the lift malfunction and tipped over. Plaintiff sustained serious injuries. Plaintiff sued Defendant, the manufacturer and designer of the lift, bringing strict liability claims, negligence claims, and an implied warranty claim. The district court partially granted Defendant’s motion to exclude Plaintiff’s expert opinions on the issues of unreasonably dangerous conditions, defect, causation, and alternative design and then entered summary judgment for Defendant on all claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant on the strict products liability design and manufacturing defects claims. View "Pitts v. Genie Industries, Inc." on Justia Law

Posted in: Personal Injury

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The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court on remand in this case involving a claimant’s eligibility for Medicaid funding, holding that the district court erred in its instructions on remand. The Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services determined that Paige V. was ineligible for Medicaid funding through he Nebraska Medicaid Assistance Program and, thus, ineligible for “assistance to the aged, blind, or disabled” (AABD) Medicaid waiver services. Paige’s parents sought review. The district court (1) found that the evidence showed that Paige was disabled for purposes of determining Medicaid benefits, and (2) remanded the matter with directions to award Page AABD waiver services and to reimburse her parents for medical expenses. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the portion of the district court’s order finding that Paige was disabled, but (2) reversed the district court’s order of remanded that awarded Medicaid waiver services because the district court exceeded its scope of review in determining that Paige was eligible for Medicaid waiver services. The Court remanded the case. View "Leon V. v. Nebraska Department of Health & Human Services" on Justia Law

Posted in: Public Benefits

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The Supreme Court vacated in part the judgment of the district court overruling Plaintiff’s motion to recuse and granting summary judgment to Defendants on all of Plaintiff’s remaining claims, holding that the judge should have recused himself. Plaintiff brought suit against Defendant, her former employer, claiming retaliation, hostile work environment, and other claims. The district court granted summary judgment on the latter three claims. Defendant then moved for summary judgment on the retaliation and hostile work environment claims. When the district court judge assigned to the case became aware that his brother-in-law was a potential witness Plaintiff moved for recusal. Plaintiff then amended her complaint and added a claim under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. 206(d). The district court overruled the motion to recuse and granted summary judgment on the remaining claims. The Supreme Court affirmed to the extent of the claims disposed of before the assertion of the Equal Pay Act claim and vacated as to all other claims, holding that because the judge’s brother-in-law was likely to be a material witness, Neb. Rev. Stat. 5-302.11(A)(2)(d) mandated disqualification of the judge. View "Thompson v. Millard Public School District No. 17" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction of second-degree degree murder and other offenses, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress and that Defendant’s other assignments of error lacked merit. On appeal from his convictions and sentences, Defendant argued, among other things, that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress cell site location information (CSLI) in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Carpenter v. United States, __ U.S. __ (2018). The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) even though the acquisition of CSLI violated Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights, the district court did not err by denying Defendant’s motion to suppress because the exclusionary rule did not apply; (2) suppression is not an available remedy for violation of the Stored Communications Act; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing certain testimony; and (4) the district court id not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the determination of the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court that it lacked jurisdiction over Appellant’s petition and dismissing his claim, holding that the compensation court correctly dismissed Appellant’s petition for injuries sustained on the job in Alaska. Appellant was a Nebraska resident when he was hired by Trident Seafoods, a State of Washington corporation without a permanent presence in Nebraska. Appellant sustained a work-related injury while working at Trident Seafoods’ Alaska plant. Appellant filed a petition in the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court claiming benefits under the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act. The compensation court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, finding that Trident Seafoods was not a statutory employer under Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-106(1). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Trident Seafoods was not a statutory employer, and therefore, the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act did not apply. View "Hassan v. Trident Seafoods" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order affirming the findings and modifying a cease and desist order of the Lower Loup Natural Resources District (LLNRD) Board directing Appellant to suspend use of ground water wells, holding that LLNRD had authority to impose a suspension of ground water access for noncompliance with LLNRD’s annual reporting requirements. Specifically, the Court held (1) the district court did not err in determining that LLNRD had authority to impose a suspension of ground water access for noncompliance with reporting requirements; (2) Appellant’s due process rights were not violated in the proceedings before the Board; (3) Appellant was not denied the possibility of competent judicial review; (4) the suspension of Appellant’s ground water access was not a taking without just compensation; (5) the district court did not err in declining to supplement LLNRD’s record and receive exhibits 4 and 5; (6) Appellant was not entitled to attorney fees because he was not the prevailing party; and (7) the district court did not err in its modification of the duration of Appellant’s penalty. View "Prokop v. Lower Loup Natural Resources District" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ dismissal of Appellant’s appeal of a district court order granting temporary visitation of Appellant’s minor children to the children’s maternal grandmother, holding that the order for temporary grandparent visitation was not a final, appealable order. In dismissing the appeal, the court of appeals concluded that the order at issue was a final, appealable order but that the appeal was moot because the order had expired. The court of appeals, however, examined the merits of Appellant’s claims under the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine and concluded that the district court had the authority to issue the temporary order allowing visitation during the pendency of grandparent visitation proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed on other grounds, holding that the district court’s order of temporary grandparent visitation did not affect a substantial right, and therefore, the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction over the case. View "Simms v. Friel" on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim under the State Tort Claims Act (STCA), holding that the district court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff’s action against the State. Plaintiff, an inmate in the custody of the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services (DCS), alleged in his complaint that his personal property was seized and improperly disposed of by DCS personnel. The district court concluded (1) Plaintiff’s claims against the individual defendants were barred by qualified immunity, and (2) as to the State, the claim was barred under Neb. Rev. Stat. 81-8,219(2) because the claim was an exception to the STCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity. Defendant appealed from the portion of the order dismissing his action against the State. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the DCS personnel that detained Defendant’s property were “law enforcement officer[s]” covered by the exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity under section 81-8,219(2), the State did not waive sovereign immunity from Defendant’s claims. View "Rouse v. State" on Justia Law