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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Defendant’s postconviction motion on the grounds that the motion was filed outside the one-year limitations period under Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-3001(4). In 2011, Defendant pled no contest to one count of attempted assault on an officer and admitted he was a habitual criminal. In 2013, Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief, alleging that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a direct appeal after Defendant asked that he do so. The district court dismissed the motion, finding that that motion was time barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the files and records affirmatively showed that Defendant’s postconvcition motion was time barred. View "State v. Conn" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction for possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person, holding that the district court did not err when it overruled Defendant’s motion to reveal the identity of a confidential informant and when it admitted a gun into evidence over Defendant’s objection. Specifically, the Court held (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that it did not appear that the confidential informant may be able to give testimony necessary to a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence on the charges pending against Defendant; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that there was adequate foundation to allow the gun into evidence. View "State v. Blair" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law

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Because third degree sexual assault is not a lesser-included offense of first degree sexual assault, the juvenile court erred in adjudicating Jordan B. based on its finding that he committed third degree sexual assault when the only law violation alleged in the petition was first degree sexual assault. The county attorney filed a petition asking the juvenile court to adjudicate Jordan as a juvenile who committed an act that would constitute a felony pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(2). The felony alleged was first degree sexual assault, as described in Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-319. The juvenile court found that the State failed to prove Jordan committed acts constituting first degree sexual assault as charged. Nevertheless, the court raised sua sponte the “lesser included offense” of third degree sexual assault and adjudicated Jordan as a child within the meaning of section 43-247(1). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the juvenile court adjudicated Jordan on grounds for which he had no notice, in violation of the Due Process Clauses of the Nebraska and United States Constitutions. View "In re Interest of Jordan B." on Justia Law

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Because third degree sexual assault is not a lesser-included offense of first degree sexual assault, the juvenile court erred in adjudicating Jordan B. based on its finding that he committed third degree sexual assault when the only law violation alleged in the petition was first degree sexual assault. The county attorney filed a petition asking the juvenile court to adjudicate Jordan as a juvenile who committed an act that would constitute a felony pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(2). The felony alleged was first degree sexual assault, as described in Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-319. The juvenile court found that the State failed to prove Jordan committed acts constituting first degree sexual assault as charged. Nevertheless, the court raised sua sponte the “lesser included offense” of third degree sexual assault and adjudicated Jordan as a child within the meaning of section 43-247(1). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the juvenile court adjudicated Jordan on grounds for which he had no notice, in violation of the Due Process Clauses of the Nebraska and United States Constitutions. View "In re Interest of Jordan B." on Justia Law

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At issue in this appeal from a sentence imposing both imprisonment and postrelease supervision was the fees and payments required under the postrelease supervision order. Defendant entered a no contest plea to a felony. The district court imposed a sentence of one year in prison followed by eighteen months of postrelease supervision. The court ordered Defendant to pay a number of fees in connection with the postrelease supervision, including an administrative enrollment fee, a monthly programming fee, and a monthly fee for chemical testing. The court also ordered Defendant to pay costs associated with any counseling, evaluations, or treatment undertaken at the direction of Defendant’s postrelease supervision officer. Defendant appealed, arguing that the court abused its discretion by imposing costs and fees of postrelease supervision upon her. The Supreme Court affirmed the sentence, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its imposition of conditions of postrelease supervision regarding fees and payments. View "State v. Dill" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law

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In this appeal from a default judgment, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision denying Appellant’s motion for reconsideration or, in the alternative, to set aside the default judgment on the basis of several defenses. Appellee filed a breach of contract action against Appellant. When Appellant did not file a responsive pleading, the district court granted Appellee’s motion for default judgment. Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration or, in the alternative, to set aside the default judgment. In support of the motion to set aside, Appellant alleged several defenses, including lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. The district court overruled Appellant’s motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant made a showing sufficient to warrant setting aside the default judgment because Appellant made prompt application to set aside the default and demonstrated at least one meritorious defense in support of its motion. View "Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance Co., Inc. v. Oceanside Laundry, LLC" on Justia Law

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At issue was whether Defendant implicitly consented to a mistrial and, if not, whether there was manifest necessity for a mistrial. In this criminal case, the trial court declared a mistrial after determining that defense counsel’s questioning of a witness was improper and that the prejudice could not be remedied by a curative jury instruction. Defense counsel did not explicitly object to a mistrial but apologized for the improper questioning and presented for the court’s consideration three cases where curative instructions were held to be sufficient to remedy improper references to inadmissible evidence. Defendant then filed a plea in bar alleging that there was no manifest necessity to declare a mistrial. The court denied the plea in bar on the ground that manifest necessity justified the mistrial. The Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds, holding that Defendant consented to the mistrial, and therefore, the district court did not err in denying the plea in bar. View "State v. Leon-Simaj" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentences for first degree murder, unlawful discharge of a firearm, and other crimes, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims of error. Specifically, the Court held (1) the trial court’s instruction regarding transferred intent, when read with all the instructions, did not misstate the law; (2) there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s conviction for unlawful discharge of a firearm; and (3) Defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel were either without merit or could not be determined based on the record. View "State v. Wells" on Justia Law

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A substantial right is not affected until judgment is entered in a garnishment action, and therefore, a judgment debtor who unsuccessfully objects to a garnishment may not immediately appeal. After the district court overruled Appellant’s objection to a garnishment and ordered that “the garnishment may proceed,” Appellant appealed. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction because there was no final order. Appellant filed a petition for further review, asserting that he appealed from a final order because the order that the garnishment “may proceed” affected a substantial right and was determined in a special proceeding. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the order overruling Appellant’s challenge to the garnishment did not affect a substantial right and therefore was not a final, appealable order. View "Shawn E. v. Diane S." on Justia Law

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At issue was the tax exempt status of land purchased by the Upper Republican Natural Resources District (NRD) as part of a ground water integrated management plan. The NRD retired irrigated acres and converted them to grassland to achieve soil conservation and range management objectives and then leased much of the grassland for grazing. The parties here disputed, among other things, the extent to which the lease was at fair market value for a public purpose under Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-202(1)(a) and the scope of the questions properly before the Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC). The Supreme Court affirmed the determination of TERC that certain unimproved parcels of property, portions of two improved parcels, and contiguous parcels were used for a public purpose and therefore exempt and vacated those parts of the TERC’s opinion addressing issues other than whether the property was used for a public purpose. View "Upper Republican Natural Resources District v. Dundy County Board of Equalization" on Justia Law