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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court affirming the order of the Nebraska Liquor Control Commission granting Abay, LLC a Class D liquor license for its convenience store but restricting Abay from offering "single can sales" and "spirits/wine sales less than .375," holding that there was competent evidence in the record for the district court's decision and that it was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. On judicial review, the district court determined that the Commission's restrictions on Abay's liquor license were within the Commission's authority under the Nebraska Liquor Control Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. 53-101 to 53-1,122, were reasonable, and were not arbitrary or capricious. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Act empowers the Commission to include conditions on a liquor license if those restrictions are consistent with the purpose of the Act and are reasonably necessary to the protection of the health and welfare of the people of the State and to the promotion and fostering of temperance in the consumption of alcohol; and (2) the district court's order was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, and there was competent evidence in the record for its decision. View "Abay, LLC v. Nebraska Liquor Control Commission" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court appointing counsel at public expense for an indigent individual who had signed a notarized acknowledgment of paternity under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-1408.01 but who, in response to the State's suit for child support, challenged the acknowledgment of paternity under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-1409 on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact, holding that such appointment was required by due process. The State filed a child support action against Julio G. and on behalf of Mia G., a minor child, and attached Julio's signed notarized acknowledgement of paternity to its complaint. Thereafter, Julio challenged the acknowledgment of paternity under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-1409, claiming a material mistake of fact. It was then established that Julio was indigent, and the district court appointed counsel for Julio at public expense. The district court found that Julio was the biological father of Mia and ordered child support. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it determined that paternity was at issue in the case and that Julio, who was indigent, was entitled to court-appointed counsel. View "State ex rel. Mia G. v. Julio G." on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Union Pacific Railroad Company on Plaintiff's complaint alleging that Union Pacific's negligence caused him to suffer emotional distress, holding that the district court did not err in disregarding Plaintiff's supplemental affidavit or in granting summary judgment to Union Pacific. Plaintiff sued Union Pacific under the Federal Employers' Liability Act alleging that, while providing aid to an injured fellow employee, he was exposed to the risk of being run over by a railcar, which caused him emotional distress. After Union Pacific moved for summary judgment Plaintiff submitted an affidavit in opposition to Union Pacific's motion. The district court disregarded the affidavit, finding that it was inconsistent with Plaintiff's deposition testimony. The court then entered summary judgment in favor of Union Pacific. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) there was no merit to Plaintiff's arguments as to why the district court erred by disregarding his supplemental affidavit; and (2) summary judgment was proper because Plaintiff failed to present evidence from which a finder of fact could determine, without guesswork or speculation, that he was subjected to an immediate risk of physical harm. View "Kaiser v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

Posted in: Personal Injury

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The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Appellant's motion for postconviction relief following an evidentiary hearing, holding that the district court did not err in denying Appellant's motion for postconviction relief. Appellant pled no contest to first degree assault and tampering with a witness and was sentenced to fifty to fifty years' imprisonment. Following the denial of his direct appeal, Petitioner initiated this postconviction proceeding, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at both the trial and appellate levels. The district court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's claims were either without merit or that Appellant failed to establish prejudice. View "State v. Beehn" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to have his sentence amended to reflect credit for time served, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion. In 1994, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The court did not give Defendant credit for time served. Defendant did not file a direct appeal. In 2018, Defendant, proceeding pro se, filed a "motion/request for jail credit." The district court denied the motion, concluding that it had no authority to amend the 1994 sentencing order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no authority for Defendant's collateral attack on the 1994 judgment through a motion for jail credit. View "State v. Barnes" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed as modified the district court's entry of a judgment for the estates of Arlene L. Pantano and Anthony R. Pantano in the amount of $195,000 in this negligence case brought against American Blue Ribbon Holdings, LLC, holding that there was sufficient evidence that American Blue Ribbon was negligent but that the district court erred in instructing the jury with regard to comparative negligence. Arlene and her husband, Anthony, filed suit against American Blue Ribbon alleging damages for injuries and loss of consortium suffered when Arlene fell at a restaurant owned by American Blue Ribbon. Arlene subsequently died of natural causes, and Anthony died four months earlier. After a trial, the jury found for the estates in the total amount of $260,000 but found Arlene was twenty-five percent negligent. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) American Blue Ribbon's arguments on appeal were unavailing; but (2) the district court erred in instructing the jury on comparative negligence and including comparative negligence on the verdict form and in thus reducing the judgment in favor of the estates by twenty-five percent. View "Pantano v. American Blue Ribbon Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

Posted in: Personal Injury

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court upholding the decision of the City of Omaha Zoning Board of Appeals denying Appellants' request for a variance from the requirements of Omaha's zoning code based on a claim of unnecessary hardship, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion in upholding the Board's decision. Appellants owned a 4.66-acre parcel of land that was zoned for agricultural use. After the City of Omaha Planning Department concluded that the property was being used for activities not permitted by ordinance in an agricultural district Appellants applied for a variance requesting waiver that would allow them to deviate from zoning requirements. The Board denied Appellants' request for a variance. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that competent evidence supported the district court's findings and its conclusion that Appellants' situation did not warrant a variance under Neb. Rev. Stat. 14-411. View "Bruning v. City of Omaha Zoning Board of Appeals" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of murder in the first degree, use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person, holding that the district court did not err in failing to suppress cell phone data content acquired through the execution of a search warrant. On appeal, Defendant argued that the search warrant was unsupported by probable cause and was insufficiently particular. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the search warrant was supported by probable cause and met the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment and article I, 7 of the Nebraska Constitution; and (2) therefore, the district court did not err in refusing to suppress evidence obtained through the execution of the warrant. View "State v. Goynes" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court for Seward County denying the request sought by Jami Hollomon, the mother of a minor child, seeking to register an order by the State of Texas adjudicating parentage and establishing a parenting plan for the child, holding that the district court abused its discretion in denying Hollomon's request to register the Texas order in Nebraska. In its order, the State of Texas adjudicated parentage and established a parenting plan as between Hollomon and Alex Taylor, the unmarried parents of the child. The district court denied Hollomon's request to confirm and register the order in Nebraska, concluding that it should decline jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-1226 to 43-1266. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Texas order may be registered in Nebraska; and (2) concerns about whether the district court for Seward County may exercise jurisdiction over the child custody proceeding were not yet implicated. View "Hollomon v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence for one count of attempted possession fo a controlled substance, a Class I misdemeanor, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion. Specifically, the Court held (1) the district court did not err in finding that Defendant made a free, voluntary, knowing, and intelligent plea; (2) the district court did not err in accepting the plea because it did not violate double jeopardy where Defendant waived his rights in the plea agreement; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant to a term of incarceration; and (4) Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of trial counsel. View "State v. Manjikian" on Justia Law