Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involves the Perkins County Board of Equalization (the Board) and Mid America Agri Products/Wheatland Industries, LLC (Wheatland). Wheatland owns real property in Perkins County, Nebraska, which includes ethanol production facilities. In 2018, 2019, and 2020, Wheatland protested the valuations set by the Perkins County assessor on this property. The Board denied these protests and affirmed the valuations for all three tax years. Wheatland appealed the Board’s decisions to the Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC). TERC reversed the Board’s decisions and adopted lower valuations for each of the three tax years.The Board filed a petition for judicial review in the Nebraska Court of Appeals, alleging it was aggrieved by TERC's final decisions. The Board served summons on Wheatland more than 30 days after filing the petition, which is outside the statutory timeframe. However, before summons was served, the Board emailed a courtesy copy of the summons and petition to Wheatland’s counsel. Wheatland’s counsel then filed an appearance of counsel and a “Response to Petition for Review.”The Nebraska Supreme Court held that a voluntary appearance is not a permissible substitute for strict compliance with the statutory requirement to timely serve summons under § 77-5019(2)(b). The court noted that the Legislature has mandated service of summons as one of the jurisdictional prerequisites for judicial review of administrative decisions. Therefore, the court dismissed the matter for lack of jurisdiction. View "Perkins Cty. Bd. of Equal. v. Mid America Agri Prods." on Justia Law

The case involves Nolan M. King, who was convicted and sentenced for manslaughter and use of a deadly weapon other than a firearm to commit a felony. The incident occurred in a bar in Omaha, Nebraska, where King attacked Rodney Pettit II, causing fatal head injuries. The altercation was triggered by Pettit's interaction with King's girlfriend, Wynter Knight.The case was initially heard in the District Court for Douglas County, where King was found guilty of manslaughter and use of a deadly weapon other than a firearm to commit a felony. The court sentenced King to imprisonment for 19 years 364 days to 20 years on the manslaughter conviction and for 19 to 20 years on the use of a deadly weapon conviction, with the sentences to run consecutively.The case was then appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court. King argued that the district court erred by allowing the testimony of witnesses the State endorsed 2 weeks prior to trial, by prohibiting King from questioning the State’s witnesses about the victim’s toxicology report, and by imposing improper and excessive sentences. King also argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for use of a deadly weapon other than a firearm to commit a felony.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found no merit in King's arguments, stating that the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the endorsement of additional witnesses, and that the evidence was sufficient to support King's conviction for use of a deadly weapon other than a firearm to commit a felony. The court also found that King's sentences were not inconsistent with recent amendments to Nebraska law and were not excessive. View "State v. King" on Justia Law

This case involves a mother, Leah B., who appealed from the order of the county court for Dodge County, Nebraska, sitting as a juvenile court, denying her challenge to the validity of her relinquishment of parental rights to her child, Jordon B. Jordon was removed from Leah's care shortly after his birth in 2020 and placed into the temporary custody of the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). Leah relinquished her parental rights to Jordon in November 2022. The State then filed a motion to terminate Leah's parental rights based on the relinquishment, which the court granted. Leah subsequently filed a pro se motion to rescind the termination order, alleging that she signed the relinquishment involuntarily and under duress and that she was developmentally disabled and should have been appointed a guardian ad litem.The juvenile court denied Leah's motion, finding that she lacked standing to file her motion because she was no longer a party to the action after she relinquished her parental rights. The court also found that Leah's relinquishment was validly executed and that there was no evidence to demonstrate that Leah was under any duress when she signed the relinquishment.Leah appealed, arguing that the juvenile court erred in determining that she lacked standing to file her motion, in denying her motion on the merits, and in not affording her due process by ruling on the motion without providing her with a reasonable opportunity to be heard and a meaningful evidentiary hearing.The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the juvenile court's decision, finding that Leah's motion was a substantive challenge to the validity of the relinquishment of her parental rights and not a challenge to the court's order terminating her parental rights. The court held that Leah had standing to file her motion and that the court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The court also held that Leah was not provided a meaningful hearing on her motion challenging the validity of the relinquishment of her parental rights, and therefore, her due process rights were violated. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Interest of Jordon B." on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between D&M Roofing and Siding, Inc. (D&M), a roofing company, and Distribution, Inc., the owner of a warehouse. D&M had entered into a contract with Distribution to repair hail damage to the roof of Distribution's warehouse. However, Distribution later decided to use a different contractor for the repairs. D&M sued Distribution for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, claiming damages based on a cancellation fee provision in the contract. The district court found that the contract was enforceable and that Distribution had breached it. However, it also found that D&M was not entitled to any damages because it had not performed any work under the contract.The district court's decision was based on D&M's admission that its breach of contract damages were limited to those under the cancellation fee provision in the contract. The court found that under the clear and unambiguous language of the provision, D&M was only entitled to a cancellation fee of 20 percent of the "work done" by D&M. Since D&M had not performed any work, it was not entitled to the cancellation fee. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Distribution on D&M's unjust enrichment claim, explaining that an enforceable contract displaces such a claim.D&M later filed a second motion for summary judgment, this time alleging lost profits as the measure of damages for the breach of contract claim. The district court construed the motion as a motion to reconsider. The court explained that even though its prior order did not use the word "dismissed," it had disposed of the whole merits of the case and left nothing for the court's further consideration. The court denied D&M's motion and granted a cross-motion by Distribution for summary judgment. D&M appealed, but the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the court had not yet issued a final order or rendered a judgment. View "D& M Roofing & Siding v. Distribution, Inc." on Justia Law

The defendant, Allen Evans, was charged with two counts of first-degree sexual abuse of a protected individual. The charges were brought after a resident of the Beatrice State Development Center reported that Evans had sexually assaulted her while he was employed with the Department of Health and Human Services. Evans pleaded no contest to both counts. The district court sentenced him to 18 to 20 years’ imprisonment for each conviction, resulting in an aggregate term of imprisonment of 36 to 40 years. The court ordered the sentences to run consecutively.Evans appealed his sentences, arguing that they were invalid because, under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-1,110 (Supp. 2023), he may be eligible for parole before serving his minimum term of 36 years. He contended that under the parole eligibility criteria of a recent amendment to § 83-1,110(3)(c)(iii), the maximum sentence for an aggregate sentence of 40 years cannot exceed 32 years, because 80 percent of a maximum term of 40 years is 32 years.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that § 83-1,110 concerns parole eligibility calculations and not the permissible sentencing range of the underlying sentence imposed by the trial court. The court's aggregate sentence of 36 to 40 years was valid, and the court did not need to address the correctness of the court's truth-in-sentencing advisement in light of the amendments to § 83-1,110(3)(c)(iii). The court concluded that a truth-in-sentencing advisement containing a miscalculation as to the expected parole eligibility or mandatory release date does not affect the validity of either the sentence or the plea. View "State v. Evans" on Justia Law

In this case, Asia R. Mann, now known as Asia R. Harrison, and Brian L. Mann were disputing modifications to their stipulated dissolution decree. The main issues in the case revolved around child custody, visitation, child support, and attorney fees.Prior to this case, the couple had been granted joint legal and physical custody of their two children. However, after Brian was convicted of stalking Asia, she sought sole legal and physical custody of the children. She argued that Brian's conviction constituted domestic intimate partner abuse under the Parenting Act, and as such, the court should take specific actions to protect her and the children.The Nebraska Supreme Court found that Brian's conviction for stalking did not constitute domestic intimate partner abuse under the Parenting Act, as the act requires that bodily injury be attempted, caused, or credibly threatened. The court found no evidence of this in Brian's conduct. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's decision to deny Asia's request for sole custody of the children.The court also found no error in the lower court's decisions regarding child support, health insurance, and attorney fees. The court affirmed the lower court's decision to allow Brian to choose between two school districts for the children's enrollment.Finally, the court affirmed the lower court's decision to vacate the portion of the dissolution decree that found Brian stood in loco parentis to Asia's child from a previous relationship, Maleah. The court found that the lower court lacked jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act to modify the California child custody judgment as to Maleah. View "Mann v. Mann" on Justia Law

The case involves a medical malpractice claim brought by Ivan J. Konsul against Juan Antonio Asensio, M.D. The claim arose from treatment Konsul received after being admitted to Creighton University Medical Center following a motor vehicle accident. Asensio, a trauma surgeon, placed an inferior vena cava filter (IVC filter) in Konsul to prevent migration of deep vein thrombosis. Konsul alleged that Asensio violated applicable standards of care in various respects, including unnecessary placement of the filter, improper location of the filter, and failing to inform Konsul of the long-term risks of the filter remaining in his body. Konsul claimed that due to Asensio's failures, the filter migrated throughout his body and became lodged behind his heart, causing physical pain, mental suffering, and additional health care costs.The case went to a jury trial. Konsul called Dr. David Dreyfuss as an expert witness to provide testimony regarding the standard of care applicable to Asensio. However, the district court ruled that Dreyfuss could not testify regarding the applicable standard of care in Omaha, as he was not familiar with the standard of care in Omaha or a similar community. Without Dreyfuss' testimony, Konsul provided no evidence of the standard of care, and the district court dismissed Konsul's case.Konsul appealed, claiming that the district court erred when it struck Dreyfuss as an expert witness and when it granted Asensio's motion for a directed verdict and dismissed the case. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that the district court did not err when it struck Dreyfuss as an expert witness and when it granted Asensio's motion for a directed verdict and dismissed Konsul's case. The court also found that any error regarding the deposition issues was harmless considering the proper dismissal of the action based on Konsul's failure to provide evidence of the standard of care. View "Konsul v. Asensio" on Justia Law

The case involves Kevin S. German, who was convicted of second-degree murder, kidnapping, and first-degree false imprisonment. The crimes were based on two separate incidents that occurred over a two-day period in November 2019. German and his girlfriend, Keonna Carter, abducted and assaulted E.A. In the second incident, they abducted, assaulted, and killed Annika Swanson.The District Court for Chase County, Nebraska, heard the case. The court admitted photographic evidence of Swanson's child, gave instructions on aiding and abetting a crime, and refused to give German's tendered instructions. The court also imposed a sentence of life imprisonment for kidnapping.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment. The court found no abuse of discretion in the receipt of photographic evidence and no reversible error related to the jury instructions or kidnapping sentence. With regard to German's ineffective assistance of counsel claims, they either lacked merit, could not be resolved on the existing record, or were not sufficiently alleged. View "State v. German" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over the calculation of postjudgment interest on a series of loans between David Meiergerd and Qatalyst Corporation and Roland Pinto. Meiergerd had filed a complaint in 2007 seeking to recover on a series of loans that occurred between him and the appellees. In 2008, the district court granted Meiergerd’s motion for default judgment, ordering the appellees to pay Meiergerd a certain amount plus postjudgment interest “at the rate of 16% compounded annually ($58.97 per day).”The appellees initiated a separate proceeding in 2022, seeking to vacate or amend the judgment from the earlier proceedings. This new action was ultimately dismissed. Subsequently, in the original case, the court granted the appellees’ motion for revivor. The appellees then filed a “Motion for Satisfaction and Discharge of Judgments” related to the judgment against them. The district court calculated the amount of postjudgment interest due to Meiergerd by multiplying the per diem rate stated in the 2008 order, $58.97, by the number of days between the date of the 2008 order and the date of payment. The court found that the appellees’ checks had satisfied the amount due on the judgment, including postjudgment interest, costs, and attorney fees.Meiergerd appealed to the Nebraska Court of Appeals, asserting that the computation of the amount due and owing in the satisfaction of judgment improperly used the specified per diem rate, but failed to apply compound interest on the postjudgment amount. He contended that the district court’s approval of this daily rate disregards the language in the 2008 order that stated that postjudgment interest would be “compounded annually.” The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the district court, and Meiergerd petitioned for further review.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court concluded that the 2008 order was ambiguous with respect to the manner of calculating postjudgment interest, and determined that the 2008 order provided for simple interest and did not introduce compound interest that had not been requested by Meiergerd or supported by prior conduct between the parties. View "Meiergerd v. Qatalyst Corp." on Justia Law

Salvador Garcia, a garbage truck driver, filed a negligence lawsuit against the City of Omaha under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act (PSTCA) after his truck fell into a sinkhole on a city street, causing him injuries. The City of Omaha claimed sovereign immunity under a provision of the PSTCA that generally immunizes political subdivisions from liability claims relating to localized defects in public thoroughfares unless they have actual or constructive notice of the defect and a reasonable time to repair it. The City argued that it did not have such notice.The City of Omaha filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting its sovereign immunity. The District Court for Douglas County denied the City's motion, finding that while the City had made a prima facie case that it lacked actual or constructive notice of the defect, Garcia had met his burden to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact that precluded summary judgment. The City appealed this decision.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the City had met its initial burden by showing that it did not have actual or constructive notice of the defect. However, the court also found that Garcia had met his burden to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the City had actual or constructive notice of the defect. The court concluded that the evidence created a genuine issue of material fact whether the City received actual or constructive notice of the defect in a public thoroughfare. If the City had received notice within a reasonable time to allow it to make repairs prior to the incident, it would not be immunized under the relevant provision of the PSTCA. View "Garcia v. City of Omaha" on Justia Law