Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

On July 30, 2020, two individuals, Michael Harbour and Nicole Hatten, were shot and killed in the parking lot of a hotel in Omaha, Nebraska. John L. Parks, Sr., was seen on surveillance video with the victims shortly before the shootings. A subsequent search of Parks’ hotel room uncovered a firearm and cocaine. Parks was charged with two counts of first degree murder and several related felonies. Initially represented by appointed counsel, Parks’ case involved multiple pretrial motions, including several continuances and motions to depose witnesses, some of which Parks later claimed were made without his knowledge or consent. Parks also sought personal access to discovery materials while incarcerated, which was denied.The District Court for Douglas County granted the continuances, finding that Parks’ counsel had confirmed Parks’ understanding and consent to tolling his speedy trial rights. Parks later retained new counsel, who also filed pretrial motions and requested further continuances. On the eve of trial, Parks moved for absolute discharge, arguing that his statutory and constitutional speedy trial rights had been violated because delays from his counsel’s motions should not be attributed to him. The district court denied the motion, attributing the delays to Parks and finding no violation of his rights. Parks appealed, and the Nebraska Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the delays were properly excluded and that Parks’ claims regarding his statutory speedy trial rights were without merit. The court also found it lacked jurisdiction to consider his constitutional speedy trial claims on interlocutory appeal.On further appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that Parks’ statutory speedy trial claims were foreclosed by the law-of-the-case doctrine, as they had been conclusively resolved in the prior appeal. The Court further held that Parks had permanently waived his statutory speedy trial rights by seeking discharge and pursuing an interlocutory appeal, which resulted in a trial date outside the statutory period. The Court also found no violation of Parks’ constitutional speedy trial rights, as the delays were attributable to defense motions and not to the State or the court. The denial of Parks’ motions for personal access to discovery and for a mistrial were upheld, and his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were rejected. The Supreme Court affirmed Parks’ convictions. View "State v. Parks" on Justia Law

A married couple with two children entered into a legal separation after signing a settlement agreement that addressed property division, child custody and support, and alimony. The agreement was incorporated into a legal separation decree by the District Court for Scotts Bluff County, which found the agreement fair and not unconscionable. The husband did not appeal this decree. Several months later, the wife filed for dissolution of marriage, and both parties again signed a settlement agreement, which referenced the prior separation decree as resolving all substantive issues. After the husband discovered an undisclosed retirement account, the parties agreed to modify the equalization payment to the wife, and the court approved this modification.The first dissolution decree was entered before the statutory 60-day waiting period had elapsed, rendering it void. The wife moved for a new dissolution decree, and the court entered an operative dissolution decree after the waiting period, incorporating the prior agreements and the modified equalization payment. The husband, now represented by counsel, sought to vacate both the separation and dissolution decrees, arguing the separation decree was void for lack of a required written certification that the parties would live separate and apart, and that the agreements were unconscionable. He also argued that the dissolution decree was barred by issue preclusion and that the settlement agreements should be set aside.The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the absence of a written certification under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-361.01 was not a jurisdictional defect and did not render the separation decree void. The court further held that the separation decree was a final, appealable order, and because it was not timely appealed, its terms could not be collaterally attacked except under limited circumstances such as fraud or gross inequity, which were not present. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s approval of the settlement agreements and affirmed the judgment. View "Benda v. Sole" on Justia Law

After the Nebraska Legislature enacted L.B. 77, which allowed concealed carry without a permit and limited local regulation of weapons, the mayor of Lincoln issued an executive order prohibiting weapons in city-owned properties. This order was quickly amended but maintained similar restrictions, including criminal and civil penalties for violations. Several longstanding city ordinances also regulated firearms and other weapons, such as prohibiting weapons in parks, requiring reporting of firearm sales, and banning certain devices and knives. The Nebraska Firearms Owners Association (NFOA) and four individual plaintiffs, all regular concealed carriers, alleged that these local measures conflicted with state law and deterred them from activities they would otherwise pursue, such as carrying firearms in parks or purchasing certain items.The plaintiffs filed suit in the District Court for Lancaster County, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The City moved to dismiss, arguing lack of standing. The district court dismissed the case entirely, finding that neither the NFOA nor the individuals had standing because none had been prosecuted or directly affected by enforcement of the challenged laws. The court relied on federal precedent, including Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, but concluded that the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries were too speculative or abstract.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the NFOA lacked associational standing because it failed to allege its authority to represent its members. However, the individual plaintiffs had standing to challenge the executive order and most ordinances, as they alleged a credible and imminent threat of prosecution sufficient for a preenforcement challenge. The court affirmed the dismissal as to the NFOA and the challenge to the vehicle storage ordinance, but reversed and remanded as to the individual plaintiffs’ challenges to the executive order and other ordinances. View "Nebraska Firearms Owners Assn. v. City of Lincoln" on Justia Law

After a storm damaged a warehouse owned by Distribution, Inc., D&M Roofing and Siding, Inc. performed a free inspection and damage report. The parties entered into a written agreement stating that D&M would perform repair work approved by Distribution’s insurer, with the contract price to equal the total claim amount agreed to by the insurer. The agreement included a cancellation fee provision, stating that if Distribution did not engage D&M to complete the building after insurance approval, Distribution would pay D&M a fee equal to 20% of the proceeds paid by the insurer for work done by D&M. Distribution ultimately hired a different contractor for the repairs, and D&M sued for breach of contract and unjust enrichment.The District Court for Lancaster County first found the contract enforceable and that Distribution had breached it, but determined D&M was not entitled to damages under the cancellation fee provision because D&M had performed no repair work. The court also granted summary judgment to Distribution on the unjust enrichment claim. In subsequent summary judgment proceedings, D&M attempted to pursue an alternative theory of damages, but the district court refused to consider it, relying on D&M’s earlier concession that its damages were limited to those under the cancellation fee provision. The district court later issued a final order dismissing D&M’s claims in full.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The court held that D&M was not entitled to damages under the cancellation fee provision, as the contract unambiguously limited the fee to work actually performed by D&M. The court further held that D&M was precluded from seeking other damages due to its earlier concession, applying the invited error doctrine. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "D & M Roofing & Siding, Inc. v. Distribution, Inc." on Justia Law

Two landowners initiated mandamus actions challenging an order issued by a local natural resources district (NRD) that permanently reduced certified irrigated acres on their properties under the Nebraska Ground Water Management and Protection Act. One party, a corporation, owned the affected real estate at the time the administrative proceeding began, while the other acquired ownership only after the proceeding and subsequent appeals had concluded. The NRD’s order stemmed from findings that flow meters on wells had been tampered with, violating district rules. Notice of the proceeding was served on the original landowners and published in local newspapers, but not directly on the corporation.The District Court for Harlan County reviewed the case. It dismissed related declaratory judgment actions but granted mandamus relief to both plaintiffs, finding that the NRD’s order was void as to them because they were not served or made parties to the original administrative proceeding. The court ordered the NRD not to enforce the penalties against the plaintiffs and to take steps to restore their rights to irrigate the affected acres. Attorney fees were also awarded to both plaintiffs.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court found that the corporation was entitled to relief because it was not properly served with notice, rendering the order void as to it. However, the individual who acquired property after the administrative proceeding was not entitled to relief, as the reduction of irrigated acres was completed before he obtained an interest, and the statute does not provide for restoration in such circumstances. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment and attorney fee award for the individual, but affirmed as modified the judgment and attorney fee award for the corporation. The main holdings are: due process requires notice to a corporation owning certified irrigated acres, and a reduction completed before a person acquires an interest is not affected by later acquisition. View "State ex rel. Seeman v. Lower Republican NRD" on Justia Law

Westside Community School District was entitled to receive payments in lieu of taxes (PILOT funds) from the Douglas County treasurer, as required by the Nebraska Constitution and statutes. In 2021, the Nebraska Auditor of Public Accounts found that the treasurer had erroneously distributed PILOT funds, resulting in Westside being underpaid by millions of dollars, while other entities, including Omaha Public Schools (OPS), Douglas County, and the city of Omaha, were overpaid. The parties did not dispute the existence of these errors. Westside filed suit seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the treasurer to correct the underpayment.After litigation began, Westside, the treasurer, and the city of Omaha entered into a settlement agreement to rectify the payment errors from 2019 to 2021, agreeing to prospective repayments over six years. OPS declined to participate. Pursuant to the agreement, Westside and the treasurer jointly moved for a peremptory writ of mandamus, which the District Court for Douglas County initially granted. OPS then intervened, arguing the writ was improper and that the statutory provisions did not authorize the proposed remedy. The district court vacated the writ, finding no statutory duty to correct the underpayment in the manner outlined, and left the case pending.Westside renewed its motion for a writ, seeking only correction of the underpayment without specifying the remedy’s form. The treasurer moved to enforce the settlement agreement, arguing the court’s vacation of the writ was equivalent to a denial, requiring dismissal. The district court denied Westside’s renewed motion and dismissed the case with prejudice, enforcing the settlement agreement.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that the treasurer has a ministerial duty to properly distribute PILOT funds according to the statutory formula, and that mandamus is the appropriate remedy to compel correction of erroneous distributions. The court affirmed the vacation of the initial writ but reversed the denial of the renewed motion and the dismissal, remanding with direction to issue an alternative writ of mandamus. View "State ex rel. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Ewing" on Justia Law

Two children of a decedent alleged that their late stepmother wrongfully transferred assets belonging to their father to herself, depriving them of property they would have received under his will. The assets in question included a house and shares in a corporation. The stepmother, who had married their father after both had children from previous marriages, allegedly used a power of attorney to transfer the property to herself during the father’s cognitive decline. After both the father and stepmother died, the children claimed they were not notified of the stepmother’s estate proceedings and that the disputed property was distributed to the stepmother’s descendants.The District Court for Lincoln County dismissed the children’s complaint, citing the doctrine of jurisdictional priority because a similar proceeding was pending in county court. After the county court dismissed the children’s petition for lack of standing, the district court denied the children’s motion to alter or amend its dismissal, without further explanation. The children appealed, arguing that the district court’s reliance on jurisdictional priority was no longer justified after the county court’s dismissal.The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the children had standing to pursue relief under the Nebraska Uniform Power of Attorney Act, which specifically allows a principal’s issue to petition a court to review an agent’s conduct under a power of attorney. The court found that the doctrine of jurisdictional priority no longer applied once the county court proceeding was dismissed. However, the Supreme Court also determined that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, as the children would not have inherited the disputed property under the will or by operation of law, even if the transfers were invalid. Nevertheless, the court ruled that the children should be given leave to amend their complaint and reversed and remanded the case with directions to allow amendment. View "Kimball v. Rosedale Ranch" on Justia Law

A woman, acting individually and as the special administrator of her late husband’s estate, filed a wrongful death and medical malpractice lawsuit against a hospital and an emergency room physician. She alleged that the physician negligently failed to diagnose and treat her husband’s condition after he presented to the emergency room with head and neck pain following a blow to the head. The physician diagnosed abrasions and a closed head injury, but did not order cardiac tests. The patient was discharged and died that night from an apparent heart attack.The case was filed in the District Court for Douglas County, Nebraska. Over several years, the parties engaged in discovery, and the court issued multiple progression orders setting deadlines for, among other things, the disclosure of expert witnesses. The plaintiff did not disclose a medical expert by the required deadline. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that without expert testimony, the plaintiff could not prove her malpractice claim. Shortly before the summary judgment hearing, the plaintiff disclosed a new medical expert. The district court excluded the expert’s affidavit, both as a discovery sanction and under its inherent authority to enforce its progression orders, and granted summary judgment for the defendants, dismissing the case with prejudice.The Nebraska Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the district court abused its discretion in excluding the expert’s affidavit as a discovery sanction and remanded for further proceedings. On further review, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the late-disclosed expert under its inherent authority to enforce progression orders. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded with directions to affirm the district court’s judgment granting summary judgment to the defendants. View "Ricker v. Nebraska Methodist Health System" on Justia Law

Nathaniel Deckard, an inmate at the Nebraska State Penitentiary, filed a mandamus action against the Nebraska Board of Parole, alleging that the Board had a clear ministerial duty under the 1971 statutes to provide him with a parole discharge date. Deckard was convicted in 1974 of second-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, with an additional 10-year sentence for escape, to be served concurrently. He was initially released on parole after 12½ years but had his parole revoked in 1995 and again in 2022. Deckard argued that under the statutes and Board practices in effect at the time of his conviction, he should have been discharged from parole after 2 to 3 years of good behavior.The district court for Lancaster County denied Deckard’s petition, finding that the Board had no clear ministerial duty to determine a parole discharge date for an inmate serving a life sentence. The court noted that the 1971 statutes provided the Board with discretion regarding parole discharge and that the 2018 statutory amendments, which introduced a mathematical formula for determining parole discharge, did not apply to life sentences as they are indefinite and cannot be quantified in numerical terms.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that neither the 1971 nor the 2018 statutes created an absolute ministerial duty for the Board to set a mandatory parole discharge date for Deckard. The court also rejected Deckard’s ex post facto argument, concluding that the 2018 amendments did not increase his punishment or affect his parole eligibility. The court emphasized that there is no constitutional or inherent right to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence and that Deckard’s life sentence precludes a mandatory parole discharge date. View "Deckard v. Cotton" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with first-degree murder, discharging a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle, and two counts of using a firearm to commit a felony. The charges stemmed from a shooting incident where two vehicles were struck by gunfire, resulting in one death and one injury. The defendant claimed self-defense, stating that he fired shots after being shot at first. Law enforcement found multiple firearms and shell casings at the scene, and the defendant was interviewed after being detained.The district court denied the defendant's motion to suppress statements made during his custodial interrogation, finding that he had not effectively invoked his right to counsel and that his statements were voluntary. The court also denied the defendant's motion challenging the jury panel's racial composition, concluding there was no systematic exclusion of minorities in the jury selection process.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decisions. The court held that even if the defendant had invoked his right to counsel, he reinitiated the conversation with law enforcement, and his Miranda waiver was knowing and voluntary. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court's sentencing, which was within statutory limits and considered relevant factors.The main holdings were that the defendant's statements were admissible, the jury selection process did not systematically exclude minorities, and the sentences imposed were not excessive. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "State v. Sutton" on Justia Law