Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A married couple with three children sought dissolution of their marriage after nearly two decades together. The parties’ relationship had become highly contentious, with each parent seeking custody of the children and making allegations about the other’s parenting, mental health, and conduct. During the proceedings, a temporary protection order was issued, later modified, and the parties alternated between joint and sole custody arrangements for their children. At trial, both sides presented extensive evidence, including testimony from psychologists, therapists, family members, and friends, regarding the children’s best interests, the parents’ mental health, and allegations of alienation and abuse.The District Court for Lancaster County, Nebraska, conducted a bench trial and ultimately dissolved the marriage. The court awarded joint legal custody but granted primary physical custody and final decision-making authority over medical, educational, and religious matters to the mother. The court found that, while both parents had strengths and weaknesses, the mother generally acted in the children’s best interests, and the father’s actions had contributed to alienation of the children from their mother. The court also divided the marital estate, awarding the mother the marital home and the father a cabin, and ordered the father to pay alimony, a portion of the children’s extracurricular expenses, and attorney fees. Both parties filed post-trial motions, resulting in minor amendments to the decree.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo, applying an abuse of discretion standard. The court affirmed the district court’s rulings, holding that the custody determination, allocation of extracurricular expenses, division of property, alimony, and attorney fee awards were all within the trial court’s discretion and supported by the evidence. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the district court’s order in all respects. View "Scott v. Scott" on Justia Law

A woman was involved in a car accident in which her passenger suffered severe injuries. She admitted to consuming alcohol and marijuana before driving, and chemical tests confirmed her blood alcohol content was above the legal limit. The passenger was hospitalized in a vegetative state and died several months after the accident. Initially, the woman was charged and convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) resulting in serious bodily injury, for which she received a sentence of incarceration, post-release supervision, and license revocation.After the passenger’s death, the State charged her with motor vehicle homicide while operating under the influence. She argued that this subsequent prosecution violated her double jeopardy rights. The District Court for Douglas County agreed and dismissed the new charge, finding the two offenses to be the same under the Blockburger v. United States test. However, the Nebraska Supreme Court, referencing Diaz v. United States, reversed that decision, holding that double jeopardy did not bar the second prosecution because the death, a necessary element of the more serious charge, had not occurred at the time of the first prosecution.On remand, the district court held a bench trial and found her guilty of motor vehicle homicide/DUI, relying on expert testimony that the collision was the proximate cause of the passenger’s death. The court sentenced her to probation, to run concurrently with any other sentence. On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that the expert testimony was admissible, the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, and that cumulative punishment for both offenses was permitted because the legislature clearly authorized it. The court affirmed her conviction and sentence. View "State v. Lewis" on Justia Law

An 11-year-old child with significant disabilities, including autism and other disorders, attended a public elementary school where staff were aware of his special needs and history of leaving school grounds when unsupervised. Despite this knowledge, the child was left alone multiple times, and on May 17, 2021, he walked out of the school unattended and was never seen again. His mother, acting as his legal guardian, alleged that the school district and staff negligently supervised her son, leading to his disappearance and likely death or serious harm. She also claimed severe emotional distress resulting from the incident.The mother filed suit in the District Court for Sarpy County under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act (PSTCA), naming the school district and three staff members as defendants. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the claims were barred by sovereign immunity under the PSTCA’s due care and discretionary function exemptions, and that the complaint failed to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted the motion, finding both exemptions applied and that the emotional distress claim was either barred or insufficiently pled. The court dismissed the complaint without leave to amend.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that, based solely on the complaint’s allegations and reasonable inferences, it could not determine whether the PSTCA exemptions applied, as a more developed factual record was needed. The court also found the complaint alleged sufficient facts to state plausible claims for negligent supervision and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Larsen v. Sarpy Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 77-0027" on Justia Law

On July 30, 2020, two individuals, Michael Harbour and Nicole Hatten, were shot and killed in the parking lot of a hotel in Omaha, Nebraska. John L. Parks, Sr., was seen on surveillance video with the victims shortly before the shootings. A subsequent search of Parks’ hotel room uncovered a firearm and cocaine. Parks was charged with two counts of first degree murder and several related felonies. Initially represented by appointed counsel, Parks’ case involved multiple pretrial motions, including several continuances and motions to depose witnesses, some of which Parks later claimed were made without his knowledge or consent. Parks also sought personal access to discovery materials while incarcerated, which was denied.The District Court for Douglas County granted the continuances, finding that Parks’ counsel had confirmed Parks’ understanding and consent to tolling his speedy trial rights. Parks later retained new counsel, who also filed pretrial motions and requested further continuances. On the eve of trial, Parks moved for absolute discharge, arguing that his statutory and constitutional speedy trial rights had been violated because delays from his counsel’s motions should not be attributed to him. The district court denied the motion, attributing the delays to Parks and finding no violation of his rights. Parks appealed, and the Nebraska Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the delays were properly excluded and that Parks’ claims regarding his statutory speedy trial rights were without merit. The court also found it lacked jurisdiction to consider his constitutional speedy trial claims on interlocutory appeal.On further appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that Parks’ statutory speedy trial claims were foreclosed by the law-of-the-case doctrine, as they had been conclusively resolved in the prior appeal. The Court further held that Parks had permanently waived his statutory speedy trial rights by seeking discharge and pursuing an interlocutory appeal, which resulted in a trial date outside the statutory period. The Court also found no violation of Parks’ constitutional speedy trial rights, as the delays were attributable to defense motions and not to the State or the court. The denial of Parks’ motions for personal access to discovery and for a mistrial were upheld, and his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were rejected. The Supreme Court affirmed Parks’ convictions. View "State v. Parks" on Justia Law

A married couple with two children entered into a legal separation after signing a settlement agreement that addressed property division, child custody and support, and alimony. The agreement was incorporated into a legal separation decree by the District Court for Scotts Bluff County, which found the agreement fair and not unconscionable. The husband did not appeal this decree. Several months later, the wife filed for dissolution of marriage, and both parties again signed a settlement agreement, which referenced the prior separation decree as resolving all substantive issues. After the husband discovered an undisclosed retirement account, the parties agreed to modify the equalization payment to the wife, and the court approved this modification.The first dissolution decree was entered before the statutory 60-day waiting period had elapsed, rendering it void. The wife moved for a new dissolution decree, and the court entered an operative dissolution decree after the waiting period, incorporating the prior agreements and the modified equalization payment. The husband, now represented by counsel, sought to vacate both the separation and dissolution decrees, arguing the separation decree was void for lack of a required written certification that the parties would live separate and apart, and that the agreements were unconscionable. He also argued that the dissolution decree was barred by issue preclusion and that the settlement agreements should be set aside.The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the absence of a written certification under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-361.01 was not a jurisdictional defect and did not render the separation decree void. The court further held that the separation decree was a final, appealable order, and because it was not timely appealed, its terms could not be collaterally attacked except under limited circumstances such as fraud or gross inequity, which were not present. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s approval of the settlement agreements and affirmed the judgment. View "Benda v. Sole" on Justia Law

After the Nebraska Legislature enacted L.B. 77, which allowed concealed carry without a permit and limited local regulation of weapons, the mayor of Lincoln issued an executive order prohibiting weapons in city-owned properties. This order was quickly amended but maintained similar restrictions, including criminal and civil penalties for violations. Several longstanding city ordinances also regulated firearms and other weapons, such as prohibiting weapons in parks, requiring reporting of firearm sales, and banning certain devices and knives. The Nebraska Firearms Owners Association (NFOA) and four individual plaintiffs, all regular concealed carriers, alleged that these local measures conflicted with state law and deterred them from activities they would otherwise pursue, such as carrying firearms in parks or purchasing certain items.The plaintiffs filed suit in the District Court for Lancaster County, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The City moved to dismiss, arguing lack of standing. The district court dismissed the case entirely, finding that neither the NFOA nor the individuals had standing because none had been prosecuted or directly affected by enforcement of the challenged laws. The court relied on federal precedent, including Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, but concluded that the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries were too speculative or abstract.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the NFOA lacked associational standing because it failed to allege its authority to represent its members. However, the individual plaintiffs had standing to challenge the executive order and most ordinances, as they alleged a credible and imminent threat of prosecution sufficient for a preenforcement challenge. The court affirmed the dismissal as to the NFOA and the challenge to the vehicle storage ordinance, but reversed and remanded as to the individual plaintiffs’ challenges to the executive order and other ordinances. View "Nebraska Firearms Owners Assn. v. City of Lincoln" on Justia Law

After a storm damaged a warehouse owned by Distribution, Inc., D&M Roofing and Siding, Inc. performed a free inspection and damage report. The parties entered into a written agreement stating that D&M would perform repair work approved by Distribution’s insurer, with the contract price to equal the total claim amount agreed to by the insurer. The agreement included a cancellation fee provision, stating that if Distribution did not engage D&M to complete the building after insurance approval, Distribution would pay D&M a fee equal to 20% of the proceeds paid by the insurer for work done by D&M. Distribution ultimately hired a different contractor for the repairs, and D&M sued for breach of contract and unjust enrichment.The District Court for Lancaster County first found the contract enforceable and that Distribution had breached it, but determined D&M was not entitled to damages under the cancellation fee provision because D&M had performed no repair work. The court also granted summary judgment to Distribution on the unjust enrichment claim. In subsequent summary judgment proceedings, D&M attempted to pursue an alternative theory of damages, but the district court refused to consider it, relying on D&M’s earlier concession that its damages were limited to those under the cancellation fee provision. The district court later issued a final order dismissing D&M’s claims in full.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The court held that D&M was not entitled to damages under the cancellation fee provision, as the contract unambiguously limited the fee to work actually performed by D&M. The court further held that D&M was precluded from seeking other damages due to its earlier concession, applying the invited error doctrine. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "D & M Roofing & Siding, Inc. v. Distribution, Inc." on Justia Law

Two landowners initiated mandamus actions challenging an order issued by a local natural resources district (NRD) that permanently reduced certified irrigated acres on their properties under the Nebraska Ground Water Management and Protection Act. One party, a corporation, owned the affected real estate at the time the administrative proceeding began, while the other acquired ownership only after the proceeding and subsequent appeals had concluded. The NRD’s order stemmed from findings that flow meters on wells had been tampered with, violating district rules. Notice of the proceeding was served on the original landowners and published in local newspapers, but not directly on the corporation.The District Court for Harlan County reviewed the case. It dismissed related declaratory judgment actions but granted mandamus relief to both plaintiffs, finding that the NRD’s order was void as to them because they were not served or made parties to the original administrative proceeding. The court ordered the NRD not to enforce the penalties against the plaintiffs and to take steps to restore their rights to irrigate the affected acres. Attorney fees were also awarded to both plaintiffs.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court found that the corporation was entitled to relief because it was not properly served with notice, rendering the order void as to it. However, the individual who acquired property after the administrative proceeding was not entitled to relief, as the reduction of irrigated acres was completed before he obtained an interest, and the statute does not provide for restoration in such circumstances. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment and attorney fee award for the individual, but affirmed as modified the judgment and attorney fee award for the corporation. The main holdings are: due process requires notice to a corporation owning certified irrigated acres, and a reduction completed before a person acquires an interest is not affected by later acquisition. View "State ex rel. Seeman v. Lower Republican NRD" on Justia Law

Westside Community School District was entitled to receive payments in lieu of taxes (PILOT funds) from the Douglas County treasurer, as required by the Nebraska Constitution and statutes. In 2021, the Nebraska Auditor of Public Accounts found that the treasurer had erroneously distributed PILOT funds, resulting in Westside being underpaid by millions of dollars, while other entities, including Omaha Public Schools (OPS), Douglas County, and the city of Omaha, were overpaid. The parties did not dispute the existence of these errors. Westside filed suit seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the treasurer to correct the underpayment.After litigation began, Westside, the treasurer, and the city of Omaha entered into a settlement agreement to rectify the payment errors from 2019 to 2021, agreeing to prospective repayments over six years. OPS declined to participate. Pursuant to the agreement, Westside and the treasurer jointly moved for a peremptory writ of mandamus, which the District Court for Douglas County initially granted. OPS then intervened, arguing the writ was improper and that the statutory provisions did not authorize the proposed remedy. The district court vacated the writ, finding no statutory duty to correct the underpayment in the manner outlined, and left the case pending.Westside renewed its motion for a writ, seeking only correction of the underpayment without specifying the remedy’s form. The treasurer moved to enforce the settlement agreement, arguing the court’s vacation of the writ was equivalent to a denial, requiring dismissal. The district court denied Westside’s renewed motion and dismissed the case with prejudice, enforcing the settlement agreement.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that the treasurer has a ministerial duty to properly distribute PILOT funds according to the statutory formula, and that mandamus is the appropriate remedy to compel correction of erroneous distributions. The court affirmed the vacation of the initial writ but reversed the denial of the renewed motion and the dismissal, remanding with direction to issue an alternative writ of mandamus. View "State ex rel. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Ewing" on Justia Law

Two children of a decedent alleged that their late stepmother wrongfully transferred assets belonging to their father to herself, depriving them of property they would have received under his will. The assets in question included a house and shares in a corporation. The stepmother, who had married their father after both had children from previous marriages, allegedly used a power of attorney to transfer the property to herself during the father’s cognitive decline. After both the father and stepmother died, the children claimed they were not notified of the stepmother’s estate proceedings and that the disputed property was distributed to the stepmother’s descendants.The District Court for Lincoln County dismissed the children’s complaint, citing the doctrine of jurisdictional priority because a similar proceeding was pending in county court. After the county court dismissed the children’s petition for lack of standing, the district court denied the children’s motion to alter or amend its dismissal, without further explanation. The children appealed, arguing that the district court’s reliance on jurisdictional priority was no longer justified after the county court’s dismissal.The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the children had standing to pursue relief under the Nebraska Uniform Power of Attorney Act, which specifically allows a principal’s issue to petition a court to review an agent’s conduct under a power of attorney. The court found that the doctrine of jurisdictional priority no longer applied once the county court proceeding was dismissed. However, the Supreme Court also determined that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, as the children would not have inherited the disputed property under the will or by operation of law, even if the transfers were invalid. Nevertheless, the court ruled that the children should be given leave to amend their complaint and reversed and remanded the case with directions to allow amendment. View "Kimball v. Rosedale Ranch" on Justia Law