Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case, Patrick Tvrdy was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to 12 to 16 years' imprisonment following a vehicle-motorcycle collision that resulted in the death of the motorcycle driver, Brady Sweetser. Tvrdy appealed on three grounds: that the district court used erroneous jury instructions relating to motor vehicle homicide instead of manslaughter, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and that the sentence imposed was excessive.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the jury instructions correctly stated the law and were not misleading. The court noted that the law in Nebraska does not consider a victim's negligence as a defense to manslaughter unless that negligence is the sole proximate cause of the death. This principle was correctly reflected in the jury instructions.Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, the court found that there was enough evidence to support Tvrdy's conviction. The court emphasized that an appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence. The court found that there was sufficient evidence of Tvrdy's intoxication and that there was never enough time for Tvrdy to complete his left turn without causing Sweetser, who had the right of way, to collide with him.As to the sentence, the court found no abuse of discretion by the district court. Tvrdy's sentence was within the statutory limits for his offense, and the court noted his criminal history of multiple speeding and possession of marijuana offenses, as well as a driving under the influence offense. View "State v. Tvrdy" on Justia Law

The Nebraska Supreme Court heard an appeal from Angelina M. Clark who was convicted for terroristic threats and third-degree sexual assault. Clark argued that her trial before an all-male jury violated her constitutional rights to a fair trial and an impartial jury. She also contended that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for terroristic threats and that her trial counsel was ineffective.The court held that Clark waived any objection to the all-male jury by failing to challenge the jurors for disqualification during the trial. It also determined that there was sufficient evidence to support Clark's conviction for terroristic threats. The court found that Clark's claim of ineffective counsel was without merit as the statements her counsel failed to object to were not hearsay, and any objection to them on hearsay grounds would have been meritless. Finally, the court rejected Clark’s claim that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion in limine to exclude certain testimony, as she failed to show she suffered prejudice as a result of this alleged failure.The court affirmed the decision of the lower court, holding that Clark's claims were without merit. View "State v. Clark" on Justia Law

The case involves the State of Nebraska's appeal against a juvenile court's order transferring jurisdiction of a child welfare case involving five Native American children to the Oglala Sioux Tribal Court. The case centered on the interpretation of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and the Nebraska Indian Child Welfare Act (NICWA), both of which aim to protect the best interests of Indian children and promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families.The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the juvenile court's order transferring the cases was conditional and not final, hence not appealable. The court found that the order was dependent on the tribal court's subsequent acceptance or declination of the transfer. If the tribal court declined the transfer, the cases would remain under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. The court also noted that under NICWA, the transfer of a case from the juvenile court to a tribal court is subject to the tribal court's declination. Therefore, the court affirmed the Nebraska Court of Appeals' dismissal of the State's appeals due to the lack of a final, appealable order. View "In re Interest of Ricardo T." on Justia Law

A defamation lawsuit was filed by Janet Palmtag, a real estate agent and general candidate for the Nebraska Legislature, against The Republican Party of Nebraska. The case stems from political mailers, sent by the Party, which stated that Palmtag had been disciplined by the Iowa Real Estate Commission for illegal activities and had lost her Iowa real estate license. Palmtag claims these statements are false and defamatory. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Party, finding a genuine issue that the statements were false but no genuine issue that the Party acted with actual malice. Palmtag appealed this decision, and the Party cross-appealed the district court’s conclusion that Palmtag did not have to plead and prove special damages.The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court found that when the facts presented by Palmtag are viewed in the light most favorable to her, those facts are sufficient for a jury to find by clear and convincing evidence that the Party acted with actual malice. The court also rejected the Party's argument that in all public libel cases the plaintiff must prove special damages, finding that Palmtag's action involves defamation per se, for which no proof of actual harm is necessary. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Palmtag v. Republican Party of Nebraska" on Justia Law

In the case, the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Bernard R. Turner for first degree murder. The court found no error in the trial court’s decision to grant the state’s motion to continue the trial due to the discovery of new evidence, a cell phone, a week prior to the original trial date. The Supreme Court stated that the timing of the state’s disclosure of the cell phone and its admission at trial did not violate Turner’s right to due process under Brady v. Maryland or Nebraska Revised Statute § 29-1912. The court also found that Turner waived his right to relief from the state’s belated disclosure by failing to request a continuance.The court further determined that the evidence presented at trial, including the testimony of a key witness who claimed Turner confessed to him, was sufficient to support Turner’s conviction. The court noted that a voluntary confession, with slight corroboration, can establish the corpus delicti as well as the defendant’s guilty participation.Finally, the court rejected Turner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Turner claimed his trial counsel failed to zealously advocate for him and did not present an adequate defense. However, the court found these claims were insufficiently specific and that Turner failed to show that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient or that this deficient performance actually prejudiced his defense. View "State v. Turner" on Justia Law

The case is a dispute over the boundaries of two land tracts, Government Lot 1 (GL1) and Government Lot 7 (GL7), located in Howard County, Nebraska, owned by Judith Puncochar and the Rudolfs and the Sacks (GL7 Owners) respectively. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision that the boundary between the properties lay at the thread of the Middle Loup River.The appellant, Puncochar, argued that the original government survey generated a metes and bounds description with four linear sides for GL1, instead of a description with a riparian side. However, the court disagreed and found the original government survey and the accompanying field notes showed GL1 to be riparian, meaning it bordered the river. As a result, the court determined that the boundary between GL1 and GL7 is the thread of the river.The court also addressed Puncochar's argument regarding a fixed acreage of 53 acres for GL1 specified in the patent. The court clarified that the original survey, which depicted a riparian boundary and was part of the patent, was controlling and gave no assurance that the size of the riparian property would remain fixed at any particular size.The court affirmed the district court's entry of summary judgment establishing the boundary between GL1 and GL7 as the thread of the stream of the Middle Loup River. View "Puncochar v. Rudolf" on Justia Law

In the case before the Nebraska Supreme Court, Fountain II, LLC, a commercial real estate development company, disputed the denial of special valuation as agricultural or horticultural land, commonly known as "greenbelt status", for a 19.9-acre property it owned in Douglas County, Nebraska. The Douglas County Board of Equalization had denied the company's application for greenbelt status for the tax year 2018, arguing that the property was not primarily used for agricultural or horticultural purposes. The Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC) affirmed the county board's decision.Upon appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed TERC's decision and remanded the case with instructions to sustain the company's protest. The court found that TERC erred in considering the property's use as of July 15, 2018, instead of as of January 1, 2018, as required by Nebraska law. The court also found that the county board's decision was arbitrary and unreasonable, and TERC's decision was not supported by competent evidence, as the evidence showed that the property was primarily used for agricultural purposes as of January 1, 2018. View "Fountain II, LLC v. Douglas Cty. Bd. of Equal." on Justia Law

In the case involving Sandra Lopez and Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Omaha, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case, holding that the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy for workplace injuries. Lopez, an employee of Catholic Charities, sued her employer alleging assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress following a realistic active shooter drill conducted at her workplace. She claimed physical and mental injuries as a result of the drill. The district court dismissed the suit, asserting that her exclusive remedy was workers’ compensation. On appeal, Lopez argued that she should be able to pursue tort theories of recovery against her employer for injuries suffered if the employer acted with a specific intent to injure the employee. However, the court found that even if an employer acts with a specific intent to injure an employee, the resulting injury is accidental if it is unexpected or unforeseen to the person suffering the injury, and thus compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act. The court also rejected Lopez's constitutional challenge due to non-compliance with procedural requirements and her public policy argument because it was not grounded on any specific statute or recognized legal authority. View "Lopez v. Catholic Charities" on Justia Law

In this case, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed a lower court's decision, finding that the Middle Republican Natural Resources District (NRD) violated the due process rights of two landowners, Merlin Brown and Uhrich & Brown Limited Partnership, by having the same attorneys act as both prosecutors and participants in the adjudicatory process of the case. The court held that such a combination of prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions in the same individuals posed an intolerably high risk of actual bias, thus, infringing on the landowners' right to a fair trial by an impartial tribunal. In this case, the NRD had accused the landowners of violating certain ground water management rules. The case was initially heard by the Board of Directors of the NRD, whose decision to impose penalties on the landowners was informed by the same attorneys who had prosecuted the case on behalf of the NRD. The landowners appealed the Board's decision under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), leading to the district court's reversal. The NRD then appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court, which upheld the lower court's ruling. View "Uhrich & Brown Ltd. Part. v. Middle Republican NRD" on Justia Law

In a divorce case, the appellant, Brian M. Noland, sought to establish that he stood in loco parentis to his stepdaughter, A.B., in order to litigate issues of custody and parenting time. The Nebraska Supreme Court found that the district court had erred in its interpretation of the law when it ruled that the biological mother, Erin N. Yost, had the absolute right to unilaterally terminate the in loco parentis relationship. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that parental preference principles did not give natural parents an absolute right to terminate an established in loco parentis relationship at will. The court reasoned that while the presumption that fit parents act in their child's best interest must be considered, it must give way where the child has established strong psychological bonds with a person who, although not a biological parent, has lived with the child and provided care, nurture, and affection. The court reversed the order of the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Noland v. Yost" on Justia Law