Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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A woman, acting individually and as the special administrator of her late husband’s estate, filed a wrongful death and medical malpractice lawsuit against a hospital and an emergency room physician. She alleged that the physician negligently failed to diagnose and treat her husband’s condition after he presented to the emergency room with head and neck pain following a blow to the head. The physician diagnosed abrasions and a closed head injury, but did not order cardiac tests. The patient was discharged and died that night from an apparent heart attack.The case was filed in the District Court for Douglas County, Nebraska. Over several years, the parties engaged in discovery, and the court issued multiple progression orders setting deadlines for, among other things, the disclosure of expert witnesses. The plaintiff did not disclose a medical expert by the required deadline. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that without expert testimony, the plaintiff could not prove her malpractice claim. Shortly before the summary judgment hearing, the plaintiff disclosed a new medical expert. The district court excluded the expert’s affidavit, both as a discovery sanction and under its inherent authority to enforce its progression orders, and granted summary judgment for the defendants, dismissing the case with prejudice.The Nebraska Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the district court abused its discretion in excluding the expert’s affidavit as a discovery sanction and remanded for further proceedings. On further review, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the late-disclosed expert under its inherent authority to enforce progression orders. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded with directions to affirm the district court’s judgment granting summary judgment to the defendants. View "Ricker v. Nebraska Methodist Health System" on Justia Law

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Nathaniel Deckard, an inmate at the Nebraska State Penitentiary, filed a mandamus action against the Nebraska Board of Parole, alleging that the Board had a clear ministerial duty under the 1971 statutes to provide him with a parole discharge date. Deckard was convicted in 1974 of second-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, with an additional 10-year sentence for escape, to be served concurrently. He was initially released on parole after 12½ years but had his parole revoked in 1995 and again in 2022. Deckard argued that under the statutes and Board practices in effect at the time of his conviction, he should have been discharged from parole after 2 to 3 years of good behavior.The district court for Lancaster County denied Deckard’s petition, finding that the Board had no clear ministerial duty to determine a parole discharge date for an inmate serving a life sentence. The court noted that the 1971 statutes provided the Board with discretion regarding parole discharge and that the 2018 statutory amendments, which introduced a mathematical formula for determining parole discharge, did not apply to life sentences as they are indefinite and cannot be quantified in numerical terms.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that neither the 1971 nor the 2018 statutes created an absolute ministerial duty for the Board to set a mandatory parole discharge date for Deckard. The court also rejected Deckard’s ex post facto argument, concluding that the 2018 amendments did not increase his punishment or affect his parole eligibility. The court emphasized that there is no constitutional or inherent right to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence and that Deckard’s life sentence precludes a mandatory parole discharge date. View "Deckard v. Cotton" on Justia Law

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The defendant was charged with first-degree murder, discharging a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle, and two counts of using a firearm to commit a felony. The charges stemmed from a shooting incident where two vehicles were struck by gunfire, resulting in one death and one injury. The defendant claimed self-defense, stating that he fired shots after being shot at first. Law enforcement found multiple firearms and shell casings at the scene, and the defendant was interviewed after being detained.The district court denied the defendant's motion to suppress statements made during his custodial interrogation, finding that he had not effectively invoked his right to counsel and that his statements were voluntary. The court also denied the defendant's motion challenging the jury panel's racial composition, concluding there was no systematic exclusion of minorities in the jury selection process.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decisions. The court held that even if the defendant had invoked his right to counsel, he reinitiated the conversation with law enforcement, and his Miranda waiver was knowing and voluntary. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court's sentencing, which was within statutory limits and considered relevant factors.The main holdings were that the defendant's statements were admissible, the jury selection process did not systematically exclude minorities, and the sentences imposed were not excessive. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "State v. Sutton" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Jacob Edward Dolinar was charged with various drug offenses in the county court, and the case was later bound over to the district court, where an information was filed on November 16, 2021. Dolinar initially entered a plea of not guilty but later withdrew it and filed a plea in bar, which the district court overruled. Dolinar appealed this decision, and the appellate court affirmed the district court's order on September 15, 2023, issuing a mandate on October 16, 2023. The district court entered its judgment on the mandate on January 31, 2024, and set the trial for June 24, 2024. Dolinar filed a motion for absolute discharge on June 17, 2024, arguing that his right to a speedy trial had been violated.The district court overruled Dolinar's motion for absolute discharge, finding that the State had shown sufficient excludable time periods under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(a). The court identified various proceedings and calculated the number of excludable days, concluding that a total of 715 days were excludable, extending the last day for trial beyond the statutory 6-month period. The court also found that Dolinar had waived his right to a speedy trial under § 29-1207(4)(b) by requesting a continuance that extended the trial date beyond the statutory period.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order, holding that Dolinar was deemed to have waived his right to a speedy trial under § 29-1207(4)(b) when he requested a continuance on March 25, 2022, which extended the trial date beyond the statutory 6-month period. The court found that the district court had properly advised Dolinar of his right to a speedy trial and the consequences of waiving it, and that Dolinar had voluntarily waived his right. The court concluded that the State had met its burden of showing sufficient excludable time periods and that Dolinar was not entitled to absolute discharge. View "State v. Dolinar" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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George Merithew, a former police officer with the City of Omaha Police Department (OPD), sued the City of Omaha under the Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act (NFEPA) for retaliation. Merithew, who began his employment with OPD in 1996 and was promoted to lieutenant in 2009, reported a violation of the Palmer Consent Decree in May 2018 and subsequently claimed retaliation by the police chief. He filed a charge of discrimination with the Nebraska Equal Opportunity Commission (NEOC) in April 2020 after receiving a 20-day suspension. In June 2020, he received a termination letter, was suspended with pay, and later retired in February 2021 under an "Early Delayed Retirement Option."The District Court for Douglas County granted summary judgment in favor of the City, finding that any alleged discriminatory actions before June 25, 2019, were time-barred and that Merithew failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. The court determined that Merithew did not suffer an adverse employment action and lacked evidence of a causal connection between his protected conduct and the alleged retaliation. Additionally, the court found that the City provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, which Merithew failed to prove were pretextual.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's enforcement of the statute of limitations, barring claims for actions before June 25, 2019. However, the Supreme Court found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Merithew was subjected to an adverse employment action, whether there was a causal connection between his protected conduct and the adverse action, and whether the City's reasons were pretextual. The court reversed the summary judgment in part and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Merithew v. City of Omaha" on Justia Law

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During a prison riot at the Tecumseh State Correctional Institution, inmate Michael Galindo was attacked and killed by other inmates. Eric L. Ramos was identified as a primary participant in the attack and was charged with first-degree murder, use of a weapon to commit a felony, and tampering with evidence. A jury convicted Ramos of all charges.Ramos appealed, arguing several procedural and evidentiary errors. He claimed his constitutional right to a speedy trial and due process were violated due to delays caused by a mistrial and subsequent appeals. The Nebraska Supreme Court found that most of the delay was attributable to Ramos' own motions and appeals, and there was no deliberate attempt by the State to delay the trial. The court concluded that Ramos' constitutional rights were not violated.Ramos also challenged the State's peremptory strike of a Latino juror under Batson v. Kentucky, arguing it was racially motivated. The court found the State provided a race-neutral reason for the strike, which was not clearly erroneous.Ramos moved for a mistrial or a continuance after the State disclosed new evidence during his case in chief. The court found no Brady violation as the evidence was disclosed during the trial and was not material enough to change the outcome.Ramos' motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence and juror misconduct was denied. The court found no reasonable probability that the new evidence would have changed the trial's outcome and that the allegations of juror misconduct were unsupported.Finally, Ramos argued that the district court erred in allowing lay witness opinion evidence identifying him in surveillance footage. The court found the testimony admissible as it was rationally based on the witnesses' perceptions and helpful to the jury.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decisions, finding no merit in Ramos' assignments of error. View "State v. Ramos" on Justia Law

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A bank holding company sued two guarantors for breach of their personal guaranties on a $1.5 million loan extended to an entity they were involved with. The guarantors argued that the bank holding company lacked standing to sue because there was no written assignment of the loan documents from the original lender, a bank, to the holding company. The district court admitted the written assignment into evidence and found that the holding company had standing. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of the holding company, finding the guarantors liable under the terms of their guaranties.The guarantors had counterclaimed against the holding company and other parties, alleging fraudulent concealment, fraudulent misrepresentation, civil conspiracy, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. They argued that the bank and its president conspired with a now-deceased individual to conceal the financial instability of the individual’s entities, which led to the guarantors entering into the guaranties. The district court found no genuine issue of material fact regarding these counterclaims and granted summary judgment for the holding company.The guarantors also attempted to file a document in which the personal representative of the deceased individual’s estate confessed judgment against the estate. The district court ruled this filing a nullity, as the personal representative’s appointment had been terminated before the filing, and he was not authorized to act on behalf of the estate.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s rulings, holding that the holding company had standing, the guarantors were liable under the guaranties, and the counterclaims were unsupported by evidence. The court also upheld the ruling that the purported confession of judgment was a nullity. View "Henderson State Co. v. Garrelts" on Justia Law

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Stacy L. Jones and Joshua Colgrove were in a relationship and had a child, B.C. After their separation, Stacy moved to Lincoln, Nebraska, with B.C. and her other children. Joshua, who was diagnosed with Guillain-Barre syndrome, did not initially seek custody. Stacy was later convicted of felony child abuse and placed on probation, leading to juvenile court proceedings where B.C. was placed in foster care. Joshua's request for B.C.'s placement with him was denied due to his non-compliance with DHHS requests. The juvenile court eventually found Stacy rehabilitated and awarded her custody of B.C., issuing a bridge order transferring jurisdiction to the district court.The district court entered a custody decree consistent with the juvenile court's order. Joshua filed a petition for modification, and the State filed a complaint to establish child and medical support. The district court overruled Joshua's motion to dismiss the State's complaint and required him to pay child support. The court also issued an amended custody decree after the juvenile court corrected minor errors in its bridge order. Joshua's motions to reconsider and strike the amended orders were denied.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the district court's findings, including Stacy's compliance with rehabilitative measures and her ability to protect B.C., were supported by evidence. The court also held that the State's intervention to establish child support was permissible under the relevant statutes. The court determined that the issue of the amended orders was moot and did not warrant further review. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding custody to Stacy, requiring Joshua to handle transportation for parenting time, and not awarding Joshua the child tax credit. View "Jones v. Colgrove" on Justia Law

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James Sawyer was involved in two drive-by shootings in Omaha, Nebraska, in February 2019. On February 5, Sawyer, as a passenger in a vehicle driven by Adonus Moses, fired multiple shots from a Draco pistol, injuring Erica Robinson and killing Elijah Foster. Sawyer was charged with seven counts, including first-degree murder and use of a deadly weapon. On February 8, Sawyer again fired the Draco at Aldron Thompson and his brother, missing both. He was charged with five counts, including attempted assault and use of a deadly weapon.The State moved to consolidate the two cases for trial, which the district court granted. A jury trial ensued, and Sawyer was found guilty on all charges. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder conviction and additional consecutive sentences for the other convictions. Sawyer appealed, arguing improper joinder and ineffective assistance of counsel.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that the two cases were sufficiently related to be joined for trial, as both involved Sawyer using a Draco in drive-by shootings within a short time frame and geographical proximity. The court found no prejudice to Sawyer from the joinder, as the evidence against him was overwhelming in both cases.Regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, the court found that Sawyer's claims failed. The court determined that counsel's performance was not deficient in failing to move to suppress cell phone and Facebook evidence, as Sawyer had abandoned the phone and the Facebook warrant was supported by probable cause. Additionally, the court found no prejudice from counsel's failure to object to certain evidence, as it was cumulative or not hearsay. Finally, the court found no basis for a competency evaluation before sentencing, as there was no indication of incompetence post-trial. The court affirmed the convictions and sentences. View "State v. Sawyer" on Justia Law

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A resident taxpayer of Omaha challenged the City of Omaha's contract for residential solid waste collection, alleging it was an illegal expenditure of public funds and violated the Integrated Solid Waste Management Act (ISWMA). The contract, awarded to FCC Environmental Services Nebraska, LLC (FCC-Nebraska), included a yard waste sticker program where residents could purchase stickers for additional yard waste disposal.The district court for Douglas County granted summary judgment in favor of the City and FCC-Nebraska, dismissing the taxpayer's claims. The court found that the City acted within its discretion in seeking a postopening bid clarification from FCC-Spain (the original bidder) to standardize the unit price for yard waste stickers, which did not materially alter the bid or give FCC an unfair advantage. The court also determined that the yard waste sticker fee charged by FCC did not require voter approval under § 13-2020(4) of the ISWMA, as the fee was charged by and paid to the contractor, not the City.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. It held that the City did not act in bad faith or with favoritism in seeking the bid clarification and that the clarification did not result in a material variance from FCC's original bid. The court also agreed that the voter approval requirement in § 13-2020(4) did not apply to the yard waste sticker fee, as it was governed by § 13-2020(5), which allows contractors to charge service rates without voter approval. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the taxpayer's motion to amend the complaint to add a new theory of invalidity based on the identity of the contracting party. View "Johnson v. City of Omaha" on Justia Law