Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The defendant, Clay Y. Bixby, was convicted for driving under the influence (DUI), which was his third offense. He contended that the district court had erred in using evidence of his two prior DUI convictions to enhance his sentence. The Nebraska Supreme Court rejected this claim.The court noted that the state had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the offenses underlying Bixby’s previous convictions occurred within 15 years of the date of his current offense, as required for sentence enhancement. The court also rejected Bixby's claim that his South Dakota DUI offense was not sufficiently similar to his Nebraska DUI offense to be valid for sentence enhancement. The court determined that Bixby’s South Dakota DUI offense, as statutorily defined in South Dakota, would have been a violation of the Nebraska DUI statute and was thus valid to be used for sentence enhancement.Lastly, the court rejected Bixby's argument that the district court failed to consider mitigating factors before sentencing. The court explained that under the precedent set in State v. Vann, any conviction record obtained after Gideon v. Wainwright is entitled to a presumption of regularity. Once the government establishes the existence of a prior conviction, it becomes the defendant’s burden to prove that he or she did not have counsel and did not waive the right to counsel at the time of conviction. The court concluded that Bixby's South Dakota DUI conviction was valid for sentence enhancement under this precedent, even though the record did not show whether Bixby had or waived counsel at the time of his sentencing in that case.The court ultimately affirmed the sentence enhancement and Bixby's conviction for DUI, third offense. View "State v. Bixby" on Justia Law

In this case, the Nebraska Supreme Court had to consider an appeal against a lower court's decision to terminate the parental rights of a mother, Samantha M., to her daughter, Jessalina M. The child had been removed from Samantha's care shortly after her birth due to concerns about Samantha's behavior and mental health issues. The child was placed in foster care and later with her father, Jose M.The court firstly clarified the meaning of "out-of-home placement" for the purposes of the relevant statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-292(7). It held that this term refers to any placement outside the home of the parent whose rights are at issue, including placement with another parent. Therefore, it held that Jessalina’s placement with her father was an “out-of-home placement” as far as Samantha was concerned.The court then considered the point at which the existence of the statutory basis for termination should be determined. It held that this should be determined as of the date the petition or motion to terminate parental rights is filed, not the date of trial or the date of the termination order. This is because the facts supporting the grounds for termination must be set forth in the petition or motion and must be based on facts existing at that time.Based on these interpretations, the court determined that the statutory basis for termination existed in this case, as Jessalina had been in out-of-home placement for more than 15 of the most recent 22 months before the termination petition was filed. It also held that the lower court did not err in finding that Samantha was unfit and that termination of her parental rights was in Jessalina's best interests. Therefore, it affirmed the decision of the lower court to terminate Samantha's parental rights. View "In re Interest of Jessalina M." on Justia Law

The defendant, Anthony W. Earnest, pled no contest to charges of driving under the influence (DUI) causing serious bodily injury and third degree assault. Following a two-vehicle accident, Earnest was charged and released on bond with specific conditions. However, following another incident where he was found driving under influence, his bond was revoked. The district court sentenced Earnest to 3 years’ imprisonment, 18 months’ post-release supervision, a $10,000 fine, and a 15-year license revocation for the DUI causing serious bodily injury, and 1 year’s imprisonment and a $1,000 fine for the third degree assault.On appeal, Earnest argued that the district court erred by imposing a $10,000 fine without considering his ability to pay and by imposing excessive sentences. The Nebraska Supreme Court found that the district court was not required to consider Earnest's ability to pay before imposing fines. The court also noted that while the district court misunderstood the law about imposing consecutive sentences, it was not prejudicial to Earnest; the court would have imposed consecutive sentences even if it had understood concurrent sentences were permissible. Additionally, the court rejected Earnest’s argument that the district court failed to consider factors that weighed in favor of a more lenient sentence. Concluding that the district court did not commit any prejudicial error, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. View "State v. Earnest" on Justia Law

In this case from the Nebraska Supreme Court, the court considered an appeal from a successful will contest. The decedent, Rita A. Walker, died at the age of 84 and her son, Mark E. Walker, filed a petition for formal probate of a will purportedly executed by Rita shortly before her death. This will named Mark as the sole beneficiary and personal representative of Rita's estate, omitting her three other sons. One of these other sons, Michael J. Walker, contested the will, alleging that Rita lacked testamentary capacity at the time of the will's execution and that the will was the product of undue influence.The county court held a bench trial and concluded that while the will was validly executed, it would not admit it to probate because Mark had failed to prove Rita's testamentary capacity at the time of execution and that the will was the product of undue influence. The court ordered the case to proceed intestate and appointed Michael as personal representative.Mark appealed, arguing that the county court erred in excluding from evidence a document purported to be a prior will signed by Rita, which he contended was admissible under a hearsay exception and was relevant to the issues of testamentary capacity and undue influence.The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the document was admissible under a hearsay exception and was relevant. The court found that the document had a tendency to show that Rita had a constant and abiding scheme for the distribution of her property, rebutting charges of undue influence or lack of testamentary capacity. Therefore, the court reversed the county court's order refusing to admit the proposed will to probate and remanded the case for the county court to reconsider the existing record, including the contested document, in determining whether Mark met his burden of proving testamentary capacity and whether Michael met his burden of proving undue influence. View "In re Estate of Walker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Nebraska affirmed the convictions and sentences of Trenton R. Esch for first degree murder, use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person. Esch argued that the jury instructions concerning reasonable doubt and intoxication were in error, and that his counsel was ineffective in failing to object to these instructions. The court found that the instructions, when read as a whole, correctly conveyed the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury and were not misleading. Further, the court ruled that there was no plain error indicative of a probable miscarriage of justice. The court also determined that Esch's counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to the instructions or in his handling of the evidence and arguments related to Esch's intoxication. The court rejected Esch's remaining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel due to an insufficient record. The case centered around Esch's killing of his stepmother, with the primary issue at trial being whether Esch shot her purposely and with deliberate and premeditated malice, or whether he acted impulsively under the influence of alcohol. The jury found Esch guilty of first degree murder. View "State v. Esch" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for possession of a firearm by a prohibited person and unlawful discharge of a firearm, holding that there was no reversible error or abuse of discretion in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a prohibited person; (2) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction for unlawful discharge of a firearm; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Defendant's motion for new trial; (4) Defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were not sufficiently pled; and (5) the cumulative error doctrine did not apply in this case. View "State v. Dap" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court ordering reinstatement of D.H.'s firearm rights, holding that there was no error on the part of the district court.After D.H. attempted suicide in 1995 a mental health board obtained a mental health commitment. As a result of D.H.'s commitment, federal and state statutes restricted his rights to purchase and possess firearms. In 2011, the Legislature enacted Neb. Rev. State. 71-963, which created a procedure whereby those subject to firearm restrictions resulting from a mental health-related commitment or adjudication could petition to have those restrictions removed. D.H. filed a motion to remove his firearm restrictions under section 71-963. The Mental Health Board of the 10th Judicial District of Nebraska denied the petition. The district court initially affirmed the denial but, upon reconsideration, granted the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not commit an error of law or abuse its discretion in sustaining D.H.'s motion to reconsider, alter, or amend. View "In re Interest of D.H." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the order of the district court denying Appellant's motion for postconviction relief without holding an evidentiary hearing, holding that there was no error.Appellant pled no contest to three counts of possession of child pornography and sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment of fifteen to twenty years on each count. Appellant later filed his motion for postconviction relief, asserting various claims for relief. The district court denied summarily denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals (1) did not err when it determined that Appellant's due process claim related to competency was procedurally barred; (2) did not abuse its discretion in affirming the district court's denial of Appellant's claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel; and (3) did not err when it concluded that Appellant's due process claim related to competency was procedurally barred. View "State v. Harms" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed sixteen-year-old Sayrah P.'s appeal from an order for electronic monitoring and an order for staff secure detention, holding that this appeal lacked a final, appealable order.A juvenile probation officer found that Sayrah qualified for an alternative to detention and sent her home with an order for electronic monitoring. Two days after the initial screening the juvenile court held a hearing and ordered that Sayrah's electronic monitoring continue. Because Sayrah was noncompliant with her electronic monitoring she was ordered a month later to "staff secure" detention. Sayrah appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of a final, appealable order, holding that the orders appealed from did not affect a substantial right, and therefore, the orders were not appealable. View "In re Interest of Sayrah P." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of possession of a controlled substance and vacated his sentence, holding that the Nebraska Probation Administration Act (the Act) does not permit the increase of the term of probation to which the offender was sentenced before a hearing where the violation of probation is established by clear and convincing evidence.The State charged Defendant with possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, based on items found in his bedroom following a probation search. The district court denied Defendant's motion to suppress, concluding that Defendant was still on probation and subject to his probation terms at the time of the search. Defendant was subsequently convicted and sentenced. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant did not voluntarily consent to the search, and the special needs exception to the warrant requirement did not apply; (2) Defendant was not subject to conditions of probation and was not obligated to permit the search at issue; (3) the search of Defendant's bedroom was unreasonable, and the items found therein should have been suppressed; and (4) because the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to sustain Defendant's conviction, double jeopardy did not bar a second trial. View "State v. Simons" on Justia Law