Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment affirming a state agency's denial of Medicaid eligibility after J.S., a noncitizen who was admitted into the bridge to independence program (B2I), reached age nineteen, holding that the statutes and regulations cited by J.S. did not authorize her participation despite her immigration status and age.B2I, Nebraska's extended foster care program, was created by the Young Adult Bridge to Independence Act (YABI), Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-4501 to 43-4514. J.S., a citizen of El Salvador who fled to Nebraska as a minor, was adjudicated in juvenile court and placed into foster care. Upon turning nineteen years old, J.S. was accepted into B2I but was denied Medicaid coverage after her nineteenth birthday. The Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) upheld the denial of Medicaid benefits. At issue on appeal was whether J.S. could receive Medicaid under B2I. The district court concluded that because the Nebraska Legislature did not affirmatively provide for unlawful aliens to receive Medicaid benefits under B2I, J.S. was not entitled to Medicaid benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in determining that J.S. was not eligible for Medicaid. View "J.S. v. Nebraska Department of Health & Human Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court affirming the decision of a state agency ruling several noncitizen applicants ineligible for all public benefits of the Bridge to Independence program (B2I), holding that the district court did not err in determining that applicants were not eligible for B2I.The applicants in this case were Guatemalan citizens who fled to Nebraska as minors. Each applicant was adjudicated pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a) and placed in foster care. The applicants, who had already received special immigration juvenile status, applied to the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) for B2I. DHHS denied the applications because each applicant failed to meet the citizenship and lawful presence requirements. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in determining that the applicants were not eligible for B2I because the applicants were not "lawfully present" and the legislature did not "affirmatively provide[]" for unlawful applicants to be eligible under the Young Adult Bridge to Independence Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-4501 to 43-4514. View "E.M. v. Nebraska Department of Health & Human Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's plea-based conviction for third degree domestic assault, attempted tampering with a witness or informant, and violating a protection order, holding that Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel.On appeal, Defendant asserted that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to move to continue the plea in abatement, failing to file a plea in abatement, failing to move the trial court to require the State to produce the alleged victim for deposition and exclude the alleged victim as a witness, failing to move to suppress Defendant's statement, and counseling Defendant to enter a plea. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to show that his counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance. View "State v. Anderson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for second degree murder, use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and other crimes, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress or in declining to sever certain charges and that sufficient evidence supported the convictions.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not err in failing to suppress statements Defendant made to law enforcement and cell phone data acquired pursuant to a search warrant; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Defendant's motion to sever the two counts of tampering with a witness from the other charges; and (3) there was sufficient evidence to support the verdicts. View "State v. Benson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's motion for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing, holding that the trial court erred in determining that one of Appellant's claims was procedurally barred but that, nonetheless, Appellant was not entitled to relief.Appellant was convicted of first degree murder, attempted first degree, murder, use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and possession of a weapon by a prohibited person. The Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal. In his postconviction motion, Appellant asserted claims of trial court error, prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The district court dismissed the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing, concluding that all of Appellant's claims were procedurally barred because they were known or knowable at the time of his direct appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court erred in determining that Appellant's ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims were procedurally barred, but Appellant failed to show that appellate counsel was ineffective; and (2) the district court did not err in dismissing the remaining claims without an evidentiary hearing. View "State v. Parnell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for two counts of first degree murder, two counts of use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and one count of possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person, holding that Defendant's assignments of error either were without merit or were not adequately preserved for appellate review.On appeal, Defendant argued that two of the district court's jury instructions were incorrect, that the affidavit relied upon by law enforcement to obtain a warrant to collect a sample of Defendant's DNA was insufficient to support probable cause, and that the identification of Defendant by one of the State's witnesses was unreliable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant either waived his right to assert the allege errors on appeal or that his arguments on appeal were without merit. View "State v. Pope" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing this legal malpractice action as time barred, holding that the court did not err in ruling that the continuing representation exception to the two-year statute of limitations in Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-222 did not apply and granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment.Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendants setting forth claims of professional negligence relating to Defendants' representation of Plaintiffs in a personal injury action. The district court dismissed the action with prejudice, concluding that the continuous representation doctrine did not toll the accrual of the action and that the action was time barred because Plaintiffs filed their claim more than one year after discovery of the alleged negligent act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it dismissed the complaint as untimely. View "Dondlinger v. Nelson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court finding that Defendants breached two operating agreements, ordering an accounting for each, declining to dissolve either, and awarding Plaintiff damages, holding that there was no merit to the assignments of error on appeal.Plaintiff, the personal representative of the estate of Mark Benjamin, filed separate complaints against Douglas Bierman (Doug) and Sixth Street Rentals, LLC (collectively, Rentals) and against Doug, Eugene Bierman, and Sixth Street Development, LLC (collectively, Development) generally seeking an accounting to dissolve both Rentals and Development and damages. After the district court entered judgment, Plaintiff appealed and Defendants cross appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Brenda lacked standing to seek dissolution; (2) Defendants' assignments of error regarding fair market value were without merit; (3) there was no merit to Defendants' assignments of error related to breach of contract and specific performance; and (4) there was no merit to Defendants' remaining assignments of error. View "Benjamin v. Bierman" on Justia Law

In this workers' compensation case, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals denying Employee's motion for attorney fees for his counsel's appellate work, holding that the affidavit submitted by Employee's attorney sufficiently justified under Neb. Ct. R. App. P. 2-109(F) reasonable attorney fees to which Employee had a statutory right.Employee was awarded permanent total disability benefits. Employer appealed the award to the court of appeals, which affirmed the award in all respects. Employee then filed a motion for an award of reasonable attorney fees under Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-125(4)(b) for the reason that Employer appealed the trial court's decision and there was no reduction in the amount of the award on appeal. Attached to the motion was the affidavit of Employee's counsel who worked on the appeal. The court of appeals denied the motion on the ground that the affidavit did not provide sufficient information to justify the reasonableness of the attorney fees sought. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the affidavit contained sufficient justification of the extent and value of the appellate attorney services to make a meaningful determination of the amount of "reasonable" attorney fees to which Employee was entitled. View "Sellers v. Reefer Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court granting partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, Doug Bierman and Jim Hoppenstedt, on the issue of the enforceability of a buy-sell agreement, holding that the buy-sell agreement was clearly ambiguous.Mark Benjamin, Doug, and Jim entered into a buy-sell agreement providing for the sale and purchase of BD Construction, Inc. shares. After Mark died, Brenda Benjamin was appointed to serve as president of BD. One year later, Brenda terminated Plaintiffs' employment. Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against Brenda and BD, seeking, among other things, specific performance of the buy-sell agreement. Prior to trial, Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that the buy-sell agreement was enforceable. The district court granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs on that issue. The Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment, holding that the district court's determination that the buy-sell agreement was unambiguous was plain error. View "Bierman v. Benjamin" on Justia Law