Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court denying Ariana Bernal Sabino's request for in forma paupers status on appeal from the district court's entry of a decree dissolving her marriage to Juan Carlos Genchi Ozuna, holding that the district court erred in denying Sabino's request to proceed in forma paupers in her appeal from the divorce decree.The district court dissolved the parties' marriage in this case but denied Sabino's petition for findings of fact regarding the abuse, abandonment, and neglect of her children by Ozuna. Sabino filed a motion to appeal accompanied by a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. The district court denied the motion, finding that Sabino was not destitute or not in the condition that she could not pay the appeal expenses. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-2301.02, Sabino lacked sufficient funds to pay costs, fee, or security. View "Sabino v. Ozuna" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed as modified the judgment of the district court finding that Defendant owed Plaintiff $1,214,056 in unpaid profits and that Plaintiff was entitled to prejudgment interest in the amount of $97,582 pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 45-104, holding that there was no error in applying section 45-104 to award prejudgment interest to Plaintiff but that there was an error in calculating prejudgment interest.Ten years after the parties agreed to farm together and share net profits equally Plaintiff brought this action. The district court awarded unpaid profits and prejudgment interest after a bench trial. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in awarding prejudgment interest under section 45-104 without also finding that Plaintiff's claim was liquidated under Neb. Rev. Stat. 45-103.02(2). The Supreme Court modified the amount of prejudgment interest to $460,210, holding (1) section 45-103.02 and section 45-104 provide separate and independent means of recovering prejudgment interest in Nebraska, and when a claim is of the type enumerated in section 45-104, then prejudgment interest may be recovered without regard to whether the claim is liquidated; and (2) prejudgment interest was properly awarded pursuant to section 45-104 in this case, but it was incorrectly calculated. View "Weyh v. Gottsch" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the domestic abuse protection order obtained by Robert M. on behalf of Bella O., holding that the trial court did not err in determining that Bella was a victim of abuse within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. 42-903.Robert and Danielle O. were the parents of Bella. Robert filed a petition and affidavit to obtain a domestic abuse protection order for Bella against Danielle under Neb. Rev. Stat. 42-924. Robert's affidavit stated that Danielle physically attacked two other family members while Bella was present. Danielle, however, did not attack Bella. The trial court determined that Danielle's conduct put Bella in fear of bodily injury by means of a credible threat and thus constituted domestic abuse under section 42-903(1)(b). The Supreme Court affirmed, although its reasoning differed from that of the trial court, holding that Bella did to have to be the target or recipient of a threat in order to be a victim thereof and that Bella was entitled to a protection order under the circumstances of this case. View "Robert M. v. Danielle O." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of delivery of a controlled substance, a class II felony, pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-416, holding that the photographic identification of Defendant by a confidential informant as the person who sold drugs to the informant was reliable even though the confrontation procedure may have been suggestive.During the course of the criminal proceedings Defendant repeatedly sought to suppress the informant's identification of him, arguing that the identification violated his due process rights. During the jury trial, the informant's identification was admitted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly found that the identification of Defendant was unduly suggestive but did not err in its conclusion regarding the reliability of the identification as analyzed with the five factors set forth in United States Supreme Court precedent. View "State v. Cosey" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the juvenile court purporting to transfer a modification proceeding back to the district court, holding that the order was beyond the juvenile court's statutory authority and void.Trevor W. commenced this modification proceeding in the district court. Christine W. counterclaimed seeking to terminate Trevor's parental rights. Christine obtained an order transferring the proceeding to the county court, sitting as a juvenile court. The juvenile court denied the transfer and purportedly returned the proceeding to district court. The Supreme Court vacated the order and remanded the cause to the juvenile court for further proceedings, holding that the juvenile court acted beyond its statutory authority and that its order was void. View "Christine W. v. Trevor W." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the county court's decision ordering Douglas County to pay the balance of the attorney fees owed by a former guardian-conservator to the successor guardian-conservator, holding that the county court's order did not conform to the law and was not supported by competent evidence.In 2007, a guardian-conservatorship was established for Alice H. In Douglas County. Pamela Grimes was appointed her guardian-conservator. In 2012, the court appointed Jodie McGill to serve as Alice's guardian-conservator. In 2016, the county court surcharged Grimes $37,505.70 in attorney fees to McGill. Grimes paid only a portion of the fees. In 2018, McGill asked the county court to order Douglas County to pay the balance. The court granted that request. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the order neither conformed to the law nor was supported by competent evidence. View "In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Alice H." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court affirming Defendant's conviction for driving under the influence, second offense, holding that the district court erred in affirming the conviction after finding that the county court erred in admitting breath test evidence.The district court determined that the county court erred in admitting breath test evidence but affirmed the conviction, concluding that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the county court's consideration of the breath test evidence, which the district court later found inadmissible, was not harmless error. View "State v. McGinn" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court affirming the order of the Nebraska Liquor Control Commission granting Abay, LLC a Class D liquor license for its convenience store but restricting Abay from offering "single can sales" and "spirits/wine sales less than .375," holding that there was competent evidence in the record for the district court's decision and that it was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.On judicial review, the district court determined that the Commission's restrictions on Abay's liquor license were within the Commission's authority under the Nebraska Liquor Control Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. 53-101 to 53-1,122, were reasonable, and were not arbitrary or capricious. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Act empowers the Commission to include conditions on a liquor license if those restrictions are consistent with the purpose of the Act and are reasonably necessary to the protection of the health and welfare of the people of the State and to the promotion and fostering of temperance in the consumption of alcohol; and (2) the district court's order was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, and there was competent evidence in the record for its decision. View "Abay, LLC v. Nebraska Liquor Control Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court appointing counsel at public expense for an indigent individual who had signed a notarized acknowledgment of paternity under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-1408.01 but who, in response to the State's suit for child support, challenged the acknowledgment of paternity under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-1409 on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact, holding that such appointment was required by due process.The State filed a child support action against Julio G. and on behalf of Mia G., a minor child, and attached Julio's signed notarized acknowledgement of paternity to its complaint. Thereafter, Julio challenged the acknowledgment of paternity under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-1409, claiming a material mistake of fact. It was then established that Julio was indigent, and the district court appointed counsel for Julio at public expense. The district court found that Julio was the biological father of Mia and ordered child support. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it determined that paternity was at issue in the case and that Julio, who was indigent, was entitled to court-appointed counsel. View "State ex rel. Mia G. v. Julio G." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Union Pacific Railroad Company on Plaintiff's complaint alleging that Union Pacific's negligence caused him to suffer emotional distress, holding that the district court did not err in disregarding Plaintiff's supplemental affidavit or in granting summary judgment to Union Pacific.Plaintiff sued Union Pacific under the Federal Employers' Liability Act alleging that, while providing aid to an injured fellow employee, he was exposed to the risk of being run over by a railcar, which caused him emotional distress. After Union Pacific moved for summary judgment Plaintiff submitted an affidavit in opposition to Union Pacific's motion. The district court disregarded the affidavit, finding that it was inconsistent with Plaintiff's deposition testimony. The court then entered summary judgment in favor of Union Pacific. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) there was no merit to Plaintiff's arguments as to why the district court erred by disregarding his supplemental affidavit; and (2) summary judgment was proper because Plaintiff failed to present evidence from which a finder of fact could determine, without guesswork or speculation, that he was subjected to an immediate risk of physical harm. View "Kaiser v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law