Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the rulings of the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court determining what constitutes the term “employer” under Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-116 of the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act, in imposing liability on CMR Construction & Roofing of Texas, LLC (CMR), and in finding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Texas Mutual Insurance Co., holding that the court did not err.The compensation court concluded that CMR was a statutory employer under section 48-116, thus requiring CMR to compensate Juan Martinez for injuries he sustained while acting as an employee of a CMR subcontractor. The court further found that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Texas Mutual, a workers’ compensation insurance company domiciled and having its principal place of business in Texas. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the compensation court did not err in finding that CMR was the statutory employer of Martinez and in imposing liability; (2) the compensation court lacked personal jurisdiction over Texas Mutual; and (3) the court did not err in awarding Martinez attorney fees and future medical care and in determining that Martinez had sustained an eighty-percent loss of earning capacity. View "Martinez v. CMR Construction & Roofing of Texas, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part the district court's denial of Defendants’ request for attorney fees and dismissed in part Defendants’ appeal from orders vacating summary judgment in favor of Defendants and overruling Defendants’ subsequent motion for summary judgment, holding that Defendants did not qualify as prevailing parties and that this Court lacked jurisdiction to review the summary judgment orders.The State brought claims against Defendants under Nebraska’s Consumer Protection Act, Neb. Rev. Sat. 59-1601 et seq., and the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. 87-301 et seq. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants and then later vacated its order of summary judgment. Defendants moved again for summary judgment, which the district court denied. After years of litigation, the State voluntarily dismissed the claims. The district court denied Defendants’ request for attorney fees, finding that the State’s voluntary dismissal did not make Defendants prevailing parties or purposes of section 59-1608(1). The Supreme Court affirmed in part and dismissed in part, holding that this Court lacked jurisdiction to review Defendants’ claim that the district court’s summary judgment orders were erroneous and that the district court did not err in denying Defendants’ motion for attorney fees. View "State ex rel. Peterson v. Creative Community Promotions, LLC" on Justia Law

In these post-divorce proceedings, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order as modified and vacated the awards of $2,500 in expert witness fees and $117 in overnight camp expenses and modified the order awarding $1,276 in childcare expenses and $3,500 in attorney fees, holding that the court erred in awarding expert witness fees and in concluding that overnight camps constituted daycare expenses.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court (1) did not err in ruling that extracurricular activity costs constituted daycare expenses that Father was required to reimburse Mother for, with the exception of the court’s apportionment of the costs of overnight camps, which must be vacated as an abuse of discretion; (2) did not abuse its discretion in awarding Mother attorney fees; and (3) erred in awarding expert witness fees without finding exceptional circumstances warranting the stipulation entered into between the parties that they would each pay the fees of their respective experts. View "Moore v. Moore" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants - E&A Consulting Group (E&A), Sanitary Improvement District No. 237 (SID No. 237), and the City of La Vista (the City) - in this case alleging that Defendants were negligent in ways that led to Plaintiffs’ homes being flooded, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for Defendants.Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants owed a legal duty to design and build a drainage solution for a 100-year storm or rain event. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) Plaintiffs did not object to the failure of E&A and SID No. 237 to file statements of undisputed fact cited to the record as required by Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-1332(2) and therefore waived this argument on appeal; and (2) the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in this negligence action because Plaintiffs failed to show that any breaches by Defendants were the proximate cause of the flooding. View "Ecker v. E & A Consulting Group, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims seeking a declaratory judgment that a redevelopment project in the City of Falls City was not planned or adopted in accordance with the Community Development Law, Neb. Rev. Stat. 18-2101 to 18-2144, and requesting a permanent injunction to prevent the project from proceeding, holding that all of Plaintiffs’ assignments of error were without merit.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) all of Plaintiffs’ claims challenging the procedure by which the redevelopment project was adopted and the validity and enforceability of the redevelopment agreement and bond were foreclosed by sections 18-2129 and 18-2042.01; and (2) two meetings challenged in this suit did not violate Nebraska’s Open Meetings Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. 84-1407 to 84-1414. View "Salem Grain Co. v. City of Falls City" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court quieting title to certain land in Terry and Linda Brown after finding that the Browns established their entitlement to the disputed land by adverse possession, holding that the Browns’ interest in the disputed land began with permission and did not ripen into adverse possession.On appeal, the State argued that the district court erred when it found that the Browns’ evidence satisfied their burden of proof and established their entitlement to the disputed land by adverse possession. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding that where the Browns’ use of the disputed land began with permission of a lease, the Browns failed to establish that their possession of the disputed land was under a claim of ownership, and therefore, their possession did not ripen into title by adverse possession. View "Brown v. Jacobsen Land & Cattle Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court denying without an evidentiary hearing Appellant’s motion for postconviction relief, holding that the district court did not err in denying postconviction relief without holding an evidentiary hearing.Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and use of a firearm to commit a felony. In his postconviction motion, Appellant alleged that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. The district court denied the motion without a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that counsel provided effective assistance and that the district court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. View "State v. Martinez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Greater Omaha Packing Company, Inc. (GOP) as to Meyer Natural Foods LLC’s breach of contract action following a purported E. coli contamination of beef owned by Meyer and processed by GOP, holding that although the district court incorrectly applied the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) in regard to Meyer’s acceptance of adulterated meat under the parties’ processing agreement, the court nevertheless arrived at the correct result.Under the agreement, GOP would slaughter Meyer’s cattle, process the beef, and fabricate the beef into various beef productions. After testing resulted in a very high percentage of presumptive positive findings for E. coli, Meyer filed suit against GOP. The district court granted summary judgment for GOP. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court erred in finding that Meyer had accepted the contaminated beef under the agreement or under the UCC, but the court’s ultimate conclusion was correct, as Meyer failed to adhere to the terms to properly reject products under the agreement. View "Meyer Natural Foods v. Greater Omaha Packing Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiff’s declaratory judgment action alleging that she had not been notified that her employment contract would not be renewed within the timeframe required by a collective bargaining agreement, holding that Plaintiff’s action was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.Plaintiff brought this action against the Board of the Nebraska State Colleges alleging that the Board had breached the collective bargaining agreement by failing to timely notify her in writing of its intent not to renew her employment contract. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Board. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s judgment and dismissed this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that that Plaintiff’s declaratory judgment action against the Board was an action against the State, and Plaintiff failed to identify any statute that served to waive the State’s sovereign immunity. View "Burke v. Board of Trustees of Nebraska State Colleges" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court dismissing the State’s complaint filed against Walter E.’s father, Mark E., to establish an order of support, holding that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the State’s complaint.The juvenile court adjudicated Walter to be a child within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a) and ordered him to remain in the custody of the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) for placement at the Boys Town main campus. The court rather ordered that DHHS be responsible for all costs required by the placement. The State later filed a complaint on behalf of Walter and against Mark. The State alleged that Walter was in need of financial support from Mark and that Mark had a duty of support for Walter. The district court dismissed the State’s complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because there was an existing support order issued by the juvenile court, the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the State under section 43-512.03(1)(a). View "State ex rel. Walter E. v. Mark E." on Justia Law