Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After Eric Zornes won a lottery, Eric and his wife, Julia, commenced a gifting plan to Andy Wolfe, Jason Wolfe, and Jason Reed. These gifts were structured as loans, and each borrower made a promissory note for his loan, payable to Julia’s and Eric’s revocable trusts jointly. Andy’s note was secured by a deed of trust for real property. Julia and Eric later divorced pursuant to a settlement agreement. When Eric found that Andy’s house had been sold and that Julia had retained the proceeds of the sale, Eric filed this complaint alleging that Julia had converted the proceeds of Andy’s note. Julia counterclaimed for partition of the Jason Wolfe and Jason Reed notes. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Julia, concluding that even if Julia had converted the proceeds, the settlement agreement operated as an accord and satisfaction. The court also ordered partition of the promissory notes for Jason Wolfe’s and Jason Reed’s loans. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Eric was not entitled to summary judgment on his conversion claim; (2) the settlement agreement did not constitute an accord and satisfaction; and (3) the lower court erred in the method by which it partitioned the Jason Wolfe and Jason Reed notes. View "Zornes v. Zornes" on Justia Law

Damian and Tiffany, who were never married, had a child together, Jakai, born in 2009. In 2011, the district court filed a decree awarding joint legal custody to the parties and awarded primary physical custody to Tiffany. The decree also incorporated a previous order requiring Damian to pay child support. Damian subsequently filed a complaint to modify the decree, requesting that he be granted sole legal and physical custody and seeking an order requiring Tiffany to pay child support. Tiffany filed a cross-complaint seeking an increase in Damian’s child support obligation. After a modification hearing, the district court denied a change of custody and increased Damian’s child support obligation. The Supreme Court ultimately affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that a modification of custody was not warranted and adjusted child support. View "State ex rel. Jakai C. v. Tiffany M." on Justia Law

The juvenile court determined that it had jurisdiction over Child, an infant, because of the faults and habits of Mother. The court gave the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services temporary custody of Child. The Department subsequently placed Child with Foster Parents. Foster Parents filed a complaint to intervene to object to any placement change. Mother subsequently moved to place Child with Aunt, who did not live in Nebraska. The court dismissed Foster Parents’ complaint to intervene and approved Aunt for placement. Foster Parents appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Foster Parents lacked standing to appeal the order changing Child’s placement; and (2) Foster Parents were not entitled to intervene as of right, and the juvenile court lacked the power to allow them to equitably intervene. View "In re Interest of Enyce J." on Justia Law

Mother was the biological mother of three minor children. The State, alleging that Mother had substantially and repeatedly neglected and refused to give necessary parental care and protection to the children, filed an amended petition alleging that the children came within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-292(2) and that Mother’s parental rights should be terminated. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that the children were within the meaning of section 43-292(2) and that it was in their best interests to terminate Mother’s parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) clear and convincing evidence established that Mother substantially and repeatedly neglected to provide the children necessary parental care and protection; and (2) clear and convincing evidence established that Mother’s parental rights be terminated. View "In re Interest of Joseph S." on Justia Law

The State filed a petition seeking to adjudicate Child as a child under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a), alleging that Father had abused and neglected Child. The motion was granted. Mother subsequently filed a motion for custody of Child. Following an adjudication hearing, the juvenile court entered an order adjudicating Child and placing her in the temporary custody of the Department of Health and Human Services with placement to exclude the parental home. The juvenile court also denied Mother’s motion for custody. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the order of adjudication; but (2) reversed the denial of Mother’s motion for custody, as the juvenile court erred to the extent it concluded that Mother needed to file a motion to intervene in this case and erred in overlooking Mother’s status as Child’s mother in making its custody determination. Remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Interest of Sloane O." on Justia Law

When Father and Mother divorced, the court granted Mother custody of the parties’ minor daughter and ordered Father to pay child support. The court subsequently raised Father’s child support obligation. After Father’s income substantially decreased, Father filed a complaint to modify his child support obligation. The trial court dismissed the complaint, concluding that Father might be entitled to a modification under the Nebraska Child Support Guidelines but that a deviation from the guidelines was warranted because Father owned non-income-producing real estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by deviating from the guidelines because of Father’s financial resources, including his equity in non-income-producing real estate. View "Stekr v. Beecham" on Justia Law

The district court issue a decree of dissolution dissolving the marriage of Dale Coufal and Lavon Coufal. The court included in the marital estate the increase in value of the premarital portion of Dale’s public employee’s retirement account. Prior to the parties’ marriage, the increase in value was fixed and guaranteed by statute, but the interest accrued during the marriage. The district court concluded that the increase in value was part of the martial estate because it was accumulated and acquired during the course of the marriage through the joint efforts of the parties. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court abused its discretion by including as a marital asset the increase in value of the nonmarital portion of the retirement account, as such increase in value was not due to the efforts or contribution of marital funds by the parties during the marriage and was readily identifiable and traceable to the nonmarital portion of the account. View "Coufal v. Coufal" on Justia Law

Laura Binder and Glenn Binder were in their nineties when the trial court dissolved their marriage. The court ordered Glenn to pay $3,302 per month in alimony. Glenn appealed, arguing that that the amount of alimony was a presumptive abuse of discretion because it drove his net monthly income below the poverty threshold in the Nebraska Child Support Guidelines. In support of his argument, Glenn cited Gress v. Gress, where the Supreme Court held that the subsistence limitation in the Guidelines also applied to an alimony award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Guidelines do not apply in this case because the parties have no minor children; and (2) the alimony award was not an abuse of discretion under the circumstances. View "Binder v. Binder" on Justia Law

Mother was an enrolled member of the Oglala Sioux Tribe. After Jassenia, who was allegedly eligible for enrollment in the tribe, was removed from Mother’s care, the State filed a petition for adjudication pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a). At issue before the juvenile court was whether the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) applied to the adjudication proceeding. The juvenile court determined that ICWA applied to the proceedings. Jassenia’s guardian ad litem appealed, asserting that Mother’s intent to relinquish custody of Jassenia rendered ICWA inapplicable. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the juvenile court’s order did not constitute a final, appealable order because the mere determination that ICWA applied, without further action, did not affect a substantial right. View "In re Interest of Jassenia H." on Justia Law

In one proceeding, the juvenile court of Douglas County terminated Mother’s parental rights to four of her children and Father’s parental rights to all of those children with the exception of Jahon. In a separate proceeding underlying this appeal, the same court terminated Father’s parental rights to Jahon. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the juvenile court in this case correctly determined that statutory grounds for termination existed as to Jahon; and (2) the separate juvenile court did not err in finding that termination of Father’s parental rights was in Jahon’s best interests. View "In re Interest of Jahon S." on Justia Law