Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The State filed a petition seeking to adjudicate Child as a child under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a), alleging that Father had abused and neglected Child. The motion was granted. Mother subsequently filed a motion for custody of Child. Following an adjudication hearing, the juvenile court entered an order adjudicating Child and placing her in the temporary custody of the Department of Health and Human Services with placement to exclude the parental home. The juvenile court also denied Mother’s motion for custody. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the order of adjudication; but (2) reversed the denial of Mother’s motion for custody, as the juvenile court erred to the extent it concluded that Mother needed to file a motion to intervene in this case and erred in overlooking Mother’s status as Child’s mother in making its custody determination. Remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Interest of Sloane O." on Justia Law

When Father and Mother divorced, the court granted Mother custody of the parties’ minor daughter and ordered Father to pay child support. The court subsequently raised Father’s child support obligation. After Father’s income substantially decreased, Father filed a complaint to modify his child support obligation. The trial court dismissed the complaint, concluding that Father might be entitled to a modification under the Nebraska Child Support Guidelines but that a deviation from the guidelines was warranted because Father owned non-income-producing real estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by deviating from the guidelines because of Father’s financial resources, including his equity in non-income-producing real estate. View "Stekr v. Beecham" on Justia Law

The district court issue a decree of dissolution dissolving the marriage of Dale Coufal and Lavon Coufal. The court included in the marital estate the increase in value of the premarital portion of Dale’s public employee’s retirement account. Prior to the parties’ marriage, the increase in value was fixed and guaranteed by statute, but the interest accrued during the marriage. The district court concluded that the increase in value was part of the martial estate because it was accumulated and acquired during the course of the marriage through the joint efforts of the parties. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court abused its discretion by including as a marital asset the increase in value of the nonmarital portion of the retirement account, as such increase in value was not due to the efforts or contribution of marital funds by the parties during the marriage and was readily identifiable and traceable to the nonmarital portion of the account. View "Coufal v. Coufal" on Justia Law

Laura Binder and Glenn Binder were in their nineties when the trial court dissolved their marriage. The court ordered Glenn to pay $3,302 per month in alimony. Glenn appealed, arguing that that the amount of alimony was a presumptive abuse of discretion because it drove his net monthly income below the poverty threshold in the Nebraska Child Support Guidelines. In support of his argument, Glenn cited Gress v. Gress, where the Supreme Court held that the subsistence limitation in the Guidelines also applied to an alimony award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Guidelines do not apply in this case because the parties have no minor children; and (2) the alimony award was not an abuse of discretion under the circumstances. View "Binder v. Binder" on Justia Law

Mother was an enrolled member of the Oglala Sioux Tribe. After Jassenia, who was allegedly eligible for enrollment in the tribe, was removed from Mother’s care, the State filed a petition for adjudication pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a). At issue before the juvenile court was whether the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) applied to the adjudication proceeding. The juvenile court determined that ICWA applied to the proceedings. Jassenia’s guardian ad litem appealed, asserting that Mother’s intent to relinquish custody of Jassenia rendered ICWA inapplicable. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the juvenile court’s order did not constitute a final, appealable order because the mere determination that ICWA applied, without further action, did not affect a substantial right. View "In re Interest of Jassenia H." on Justia Law

In one proceeding, the juvenile court of Douglas County terminated Mother’s parental rights to four of her children and Father’s parental rights to all of those children with the exception of Jahon. In a separate proceeding underlying this appeal, the same court terminated Father’s parental rights to Jahon. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the juvenile court in this case correctly determined that statutory grounds for termination existed as to Jahon; and (2) the separate juvenile court did not err in finding that termination of Father’s parental rights was in Jahon’s best interests. View "In re Interest of Jahon S." on Justia Law

Mother and Father were the biological parents of four children. In one proceeding, the juvenile court terminated the parents' parental rights to three of the children. In separate proceedings, the juvenile court also terminated their parental rights to their fourth child. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the juvenile court in each case, holding (1) the juvenile court did not err in terminating Father’s parental rights to the three children involved in the first case; and (2) Mother’s sole assigned error that the State violated her due process rights on both cases by failing to base termination on Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-292(5) was not preserved for appellate review. View "In re Zanaya W." on Justia Law

Two days after Teresa S. gave birth to an infant, Teresa and Monty S., the infant’s biological father, each signed separate documents relinquishing their parental rights to the child and consenting to the child’s adoption by Jason W. and Rebecca W., the friends of Teresa and Monty. The parties had previously agreed to an “open” adoption. Nearly one year later, Teresa and Monty (together, Petitioners) filed a petition for habeas corpus seeking return of the child. As grounds for the writ, Petitioners alleged that their consents and relinquishments were invalid due to fraud, duress, and the failure to present the nonconsent adoption forms prior to signing the relinquishments. The district court rejected all of Petitioners’ allegations but nevertheless invalidated the relinquishments, concluding that the parties’ plan for an “open” adoption invalidated the relinquishments as conditioned upon the retention of some parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) excluding evidence of post relinquishment visits by Petitioners and why those visits were discontinued; and (2) concluding that the consents were conditioned upon the retention of parental rights and were therefore invalid. View "Monty S. v. Jason W." on Justia Law

Appellant, the ex-husband in this case, appealed from an order of the district court generally overruling his objections to garnishment upon a foreign dissolution decree. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant waived his argument that he was not properly notified of the registration of the foreign judgment and of the garnishment; (2) the lower court adequately addressed the percentage of Appellant’s wages that should be garnished; and (3) because Appellee, the ex-wife, did not meet the requirements of Neb. Ct. R. App. P. 2-109(D)(4) in her purported cross-appeal, the Court will not consider the merits of her cross-appeal. View "Friedman v. Friedman" on Justia Law

Kari and Elizabeth Johnson were divorced in 2010. The parties were awarded joint legal custody of their two children, and Elizabeth was awarded physical custody. The decree to required Kari to pay $3,000 per month in child support. Kari later filed an application to modify the decree. The parties stipulated to a modification of physical custody to a joint physical and legal custody arrangement. After a trial, the district court determined that Kari’s child support obligation should be set at $443 per month and that Kari was entitled to receive credit a result of his “overpayment” of child support obligations during the pendency of the modification proceedings. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the Court of Appeals (1) correctly determined that the district court erred when it imputed to Elizabeth a wage-earning capacity of $52,000 per year; (2) did not err in affirming the district court’s conclusion that Kari should not be given a credit for Social Security benefits paid to the children; and (3) erred when it reasoned that, upon remand, Kari could not receive credit for overpayments made during the pendency of the modification proceedings. Remanded. View "Johnson v. Johnson" on Justia Law