Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant was injured while on duty as a deputy sheriff with the Douglas County sheriff’s office. While Appellant was receiving workers’ compensation benefits, a County employee had Appellant placed under surveillance. The Sheriff’s Office later terminated Plaintiff’s employment on the basis that Appellant had been “untruthful and deceptive” regarding the extent of his injuries. The Douglas County Sheriff’s Merit Commission affirmed the termination. The district court affirmed. Thereafter, Appellant filed a petition in the district court against the Douglas County Sheriff and the County (collectively, Appellees), alleging wrongful discharge in retaliation for having pursued a workers’ compensation claim and violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983 based on three theories of liability. The district court granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it determined (1) Appellant’s first cause of action was barred under Neb. Rev. Stat. 13-919(1); and (2) Appellees did not violate Appellant’s constitutional right to property, right to freedom of speech, or right to privacy. View "Brock v. Dunning" on Justia Law

Barbara Potter suffered a repetitive trauma injury as a result of her employment as a dental hygienist over a period of more than 30 years. In late 2007 or early 2008, while working in a dental clinic for Dr. Patrick McCulla, Potter began experiencing pain in her neck. Potter received medical treatment for her pain 12 times between October 17, 2008, and January 20, 2009. By this time, McCulla had sold the dental practice to Dr. Tracy Garcia. Potter’s duties and hours remained the same during and after the ownership change. Potter filed a petition in the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court seeking benefits. That court found Potter had preexisting conditions in her neck which were aggravated by her duties as a dental hygienist and awarded benefits based on a 40-percent loss of earning capacity. It determined that the date of the injury was February 11, 2009, as that was the date she first missed work to be treated for her injury. Because Garcia was Potter’s employer on the date of the injury, the court held Garcia and FirstComp liable for all of Potter’s medical expenses and compensation benefits. Garcia appealed. The Supreme Court concluded Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court properly determined that her injury manifested itself on February 11, 2009, during Potter’s employment with Garcia, and that Garcia and Garcia’s workers’ compensation carrier are liable for all of Potter’s medical expenses and compensation benefits. View "Potter v. McCulla" on Justia Law

Beginning in 1974, Douglas County’s retired employees paid the same amount as active employees for health insurance coverage. In 2009, the County Board of Commissioners adopted a resolution that charged retirees premiums that were higher than the rate paid by active employees. Shortly before the change was to take effect, retired employees of the County (Plaintiffs) sued the County. The district court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, concluding that equitable estoppel prohibited the County from increasing the premiums to be paid by the retirees above those paid by active employees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the retirees had no contractual right to pay the same premiums as active employees, the district court erred in using equitable estoppel to create such a contractual obligation. Remanded with direction to enter judgment for the County on Plaintiffs’ claims. View "Christiansen v. County of Douglas" on Justia Law

Michael Simmons was employed by Precast Haulers, Inc. when he sustained extensive injuries to his whole body during the course of his employment. Precast Haulers conceded that Michael’s injuries and the related medical bills were compensable. In addition, the trial court ordered Precast Haulers to (1) provide and pay for custom wheelchairs and a wheelchair-accessible van, (2) reimburse Michael for home health care services provided by his wife, and (3) pay for Michael’s attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient competent evidence to establish that a wheelchair-accessible van was an “appliance” that would help restore Michael’s health; (2) sufficient competent evidence supported the award of compensation for Michael’s spouse for “on-call” nursing hours; and (3) the trial court did not err in the amount of attorney fees it awarded. View "Simmons v. Precast Haulers, Inc." on Justia Law

In December 2008, Appellee was performing his duties as an outdoor parking lot attendant when he developed frostbite. Appellee’s employer and its insurance company (Appellants) voluntarily paid for the medical treatment of Appellee’s frostbite injury and paid temporary total disability benefits through mid-2009. In September 2012, a partial amputation of the fifth metatarsal in Appellee’s right foot was performed. In January 2013, Appellee sought additional benefits for his work-related injury. The Workers’ Compensation Court awarded benefits. On appeal, Appellants argued that the Workers’ Compensation Court erred in finding that Appellee’s claim was not barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the partial amputation of Appellee’s foot was a material change in condition and substantial increase in disability that would permit Appellee to seek benefits more than two years after Appellants’ last voluntary payment. View "Lenz v. Cent. Parking Sys. of Neb., Inc." on Justia Law

Edwin Kuhnel, an employee of BNSF Railway Company, was injured during while working for BNSF. Kuhnel brought this action against BNSF under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), alleging that his injuries were caused by BNSF’s failure to provide him with a reasonably safe place to work and its failure to take other appropriate safety measures. Pursuant to the jury’s general verdict, the district court entered judgment for BNSF. The court of appeals reversed, concluding (1) the district court’s jury instructions erroneously permitted the jury to decide, as a factual determination, whether BNSF was under a duty to provide a reasonably safe place to work; and (2) the general verdict rule did not bar the court from overturning the jury’s verdict. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the jury instructions in this case did not rise to the level of plain error because the instructions implicitly recognized BNSF’s duty by requiring the jury to find that BNSF was negligent if it found that BNSF had failed to provide Kuhnel with a reasonably safe place to work. View "Kuhnel v. BNSF Ry. Co." on Justia Law

Appellant suffered an injury while working for Employer in Nebraska. After a trial, Appellant was awarded temporary total disability (TTD) benefits. Three years later, Employer petitioned to discontinue the TTD benefits. Meanwhile, Appellant moved to Mexico. The compensation court terminated Employer’s obligation to pay TTD benefits but declined Appellant’s claim for permanent impairment and loss of earning capacity, finding that Appellant had failed to prove loss of earning capacity in his new community in Mexico. The Supreme Court remanded the case to permit Appellant to establish loss of earning capacity using the Nebraska community where the injury occurred. On remand, the compensation court found that Appellant suffered a forty-five-percent loss of earning capacity. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the compensation court erred in failing to weigh all the evidence in making its factual findings, specifically in regard to the court’s findings that the opinions of a vocational rehabilitation counselor regarding Appellant’s loss of earning capacity were not rebutted. Remanded. View "Visoso v. Cargill Meat Solutions" on Justia Law

Employee was injured during the course and scope of his employment with Employer. In 2010, the compensation court awarded Employee temporary total disability (TTD) benefits. In 2012, Employee filed two motions, one to compel payment of TTD benefits in compliance with the 2010 award, and the other to modify the 2010 compensation award for loss of earning capacity and entitlement to vocational rehabilitation benefits. In two orders entered on the same date, the compensation court found Employee was entitled to (1) receive TTD benefits after reaching maximum medical improvement for his physical injuries; (2) a waiting-time penalty, (3) an award of attorney fees, and (4) a loss of earning capacity and vocational rehabilitation evaluation carried out by a vocational rehabilitation counselor. The Supreme Court (1) dismissed for lack of jurisdiction Employer’s appeal with respect to the order directing the vocational rehabilitation counselor to perform an evaluation because the order was not final; and (2) affirmed in all respects the order of the compensation court enforcing the 2010 award. View "Deleon v. Reinke Mfg. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a nurse formerly employed by the Department of Health and Human Services, filed an action against Defendant, a supervisor who terminated her employment, alleging violations of her due process, free speech, and equal protection rights, among other claims. Defendant moved for summary judgment, claiming that, as a state employee, she was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court reversed in part and dismissed in part, holding (1) Plaintiff did not allege a viable violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights, and Defendant was entitled to qualified immunity on that claim; and (2) because Plaintiff’s alleged First Amendment claim necessitated resolving a fact-related dispute, Defendant’s appeal on this issue was not immediately reviewable under the collateral order doctrine, and the appeal must be dismissed at to this issue. View "Carney v. Miller" on Justia Law

Appellee injured his back while working for Appellant. The original workers’ compensation judge found that Appellee was permanently and totally disabled. On appeal, a three-judge review panel concluded it could not tell whether the judge had considered the presumption of correctness afforded to a vocational rehabilitation specialist’s opinion of Appellee’s disability and remanded the cause. The court of appeals affirmed. On remand, the case was assigned to a new trial judge, who ruled that Appellee was permanently and totally disabled without holding an evidentiary hearing, finding that Appellee had rebutted the presumption afforded to the specialist’s opinion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that new judge’s ruling on the issues without a new evidentiary hearing violated Appellee’s right to due process because the witnesses’ credibility was relevant to the issues presented at trial. View "Liljestrand v. Dell Enters., Inc." on Justia Law