Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Husband filed a complaint for dissolution of marriage from Wife. The couple had three minor children. A deputy county attorney filed the petition in the Douglas County Juvenile Court. The court dismissed the action for lack of prosecution. Husband filed a motion to reinstate. Wife then filed a complaint for dissolution in the Lancaster County District Court. Meanwhile, the Douglas County District Court reinstated the original case. At trial, the Douglas County District Court overruled Wife's motion to dismiss, concluding that its order to reinstate Husband's action related back to the date that Husband had filed the motion. The court also concluded it had jurisdiction over the subject matter despite pending juvenile proceedings involving two of the parties' children. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Douglas County District Court had jurisdictional priority over the Lancaster County District Court; and (2) because the parties did not comply with the procedural requirements for transferring a case to juvenile court, the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction. View "Molczyk v. Molczyk" on Justia Law

Upon the dissolution of the parties' marriage, the district court entered an order requiring Husband to pay Wife temporary alimony. While Husband's appeal was pending, Wife filed a motion asking the district court to award her temporary alimony pending the appeal. During the pendency of the appeal, the district court filed an order awarding Wife temporary alimony. The district court later found Husband to be in contempt for failing to pay temporary alimony and for failing to appear at the contempt hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court had jurisdiction to order Husband to pay temporary alimony when the appeal of the decree of dissolution was pending, and therefore the order was not void, and (2) Husband was subject to contempt for violating the order to pay temporary alimony. View "Spady v. Spady" on Justia Law

Mother's two Indian children, both minors, were placed in foster care by a separate juvenile court. After the State filed a motion to terminate parental rights, the Omaha Tribe of Nebraska sought to transfer the proceedings to the Omaha Tribal Court pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act and the Nebraska Indian Child Welfare Act. The juvenile court denied the request, finding that the motions were filed at an "advanced stage" of the juvenile proceedings. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no basis for a determination that the motions to transfer these cases to tribal court were filed at an advanced stage of the proceedings to terminate parental rights, and therefore, the court of appeals erred in affirming the separate juvenile court's denial of the motions on this ground. Remanded with directions to sustain the motions to transfer the cases to the Omaha Tribal Court. View "In re Zylena R." on Justia Law

On October 22, 2010, an amended petition was filed in juvenile court alleging improper care of two minor children. After twice continuing the permanency planning hearing because opposing counsel objected to reports offered by the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), the juvenile court held a third attempt at a review and permanency hearing on January 9, 2012. The court again sustained opposing counsel's objection to DHHS' reports because they were offered without notice. In its order, the juvenile court ordered DHHS to pay opposing counsel's costs associated with the preparation and attendance of the January 9 hearing as well as the next scheduled hearing. The Supreme Court vacated the January 9, 2012 contempt order and remanded, holding (1) the juvenile court's inherent power to issue contempt orders is subject to the contemnor's receiving proper notice and an opportunity to be heard when the contempt is not committed in the presence of the court; and (2) in this instance, the juvenile court abused its discretion by summarily imposing a sanction for conduct that did not occur in its presence. View "In re Samantha L." on Justia Law

After her Father's death, Mother underwent intrauterine insemination using Father's cryopreserved sperm. The procedure was successful, and Mother gave birth to a child. Mother subsequently applied to the Social Security Administration (SSA) for surviving child's insurance benefits on behalf of the child. SSA denied the application. An ALJ decided that the child was entitled to child's insurance benefits on Father's Social Security record. SSA's appeal council reversed. On appeal, the U.S. district court certified the following question to the Nebraska Supreme Court: "Can a child, conceived after her biological father's death through intrauterine insemination using his sperm, and born within nine months of his death, inherit from him as the surviving issue under Nebraska intestacy law?" The Supreme Court answered in the negative, holding that under the relevant Nebraska statutes, a child conceived after her biological father's death cannot inherit from her father as surviving issue for purposes of intestacy. View "Amen v. Asture" on Justia Law

The district court placed Appellant's corporation, a cemetery association, into receivership and approved the winding up of the business and its dissolution. The court then fashioned an equitable remedy for distribution of the resulting funds, which Appellant challenged on appeal. At issue was whether the district court had the power to take these actions. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) the district court properly appointed the receiver; but (2) because the statutory requirements for judicial dissolution were not met, the receiver's actions in winding up Floral Lawns and selling its assets were improper and outside the power of the court to approve. The Court then crafted a remedy according to equitable principles. View "Floral Lawns Mem'l Gardens Ass'n v. Becker" on Justia Law

The district court gave a pro se inmate notice of the court's intent to dismiss the inmate's marital dissolution proceeding but identified two ways of avoiding dismissal. The inmate timely performed one of the court's specified actions. Despite this compliance and without explanation, the court dismissed the inmate's complaint. The court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that because the prison previously had denied the inmate transportation and telephone access to the court, the inmate would be unable to attend any hearing no matter how many motions he made. The Supreme Court reversed where (1) the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the inmate's complaint without explanation even though the inmate did what the court instructed, and (2) the court of appeals erred in basing its decision on predictions of future events. Remanded. View "Jones v. Jones" on Justia Law

Erick M., a juvenile, requested that the juvenile court enter an order finding that under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(J), he was eligible for "special immigrant juvenile" (SIJ) status. SIJ status allows a juvenile immigrant to remain in the United States and seek lawful permanent resident status if federal authorities conclude that the statutory conditions are met. The conditions include a court order determining that the juvenile's reunification with "1 or both" parents is not feasible because of abuse, neglect, or abandonment. The juvenile court found Erick did not satisfy that requirement. At issue on appeal was the meaning of the phrase "1 or both" parents. Erick lived only with his mother when the juvenile court adjudicated him as a dependent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when ruling on a petitioner's motion for an eligibility order under section 1101(a)(27)(J), a court should generally consider whether reunification with either parent is feasible; and (2) therefore, the juvenile court did no err in finding that because reunification with Erick's mother was feasible, he was not eligible for SIJ status. View "In re Interest of Erick H." on Justia Law

The Mother of three children appealed from an order of the county court, sitting as a juvenile court, terminating her parental rights to the three minor children. Paternal rights were not at issue in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the lower court did not err in terminating Mother's parental rights to her three children, holding (1) clear and convincing evidence showed that Mother's personal deficiencies prevented her from performing her reasonable parental obligations to the three children in the past and would likely prevent her from doing so in the future, and accordingly, the presumption of fitness was rebutted; and (2) clear and convincing evidence showed that terminating Mother's parental right would be in the children's best interests. View "In re Kendra M." on Justia Law

Lindsay gave birth to Alexander, whose biological father was Carlos. Lindsay and Carlos, who were both fifteen years of age at the time of Alexander's birth, were never married. Lindsay planned to place the child for adoption, but Carlos objected and sought custody. The county court found that Carlos did not timely file his objection to the adoption and that Carlos was not a proper party to bring an action because he was a minor. The court of appeals dismissed Carlos' appeal, finding that the county court's order was not a final order. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the county court lacked jurisdiction over the action, which was brought solely in the name of a minor, and therefore, the Court also lacked jurisdiction. View "Carlos H. v. Lindsay M." on Justia Law